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This thesis investigates whether English law ought to be further developed to provide 
fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation. 
As an essential preliminary step, the thesis first explores the concept of privacy in 
general – privacy interests, definitions of privacy, rationales of privacy; and then 
proceeds to formulate a concept of privacy for the corporation.  
The thesis advances to consider the level of protection of the privacy of the corporation 
in English law, and finds that only a limited level of protection is provided – in 
broadcasting matters – by the Broadcasting Act 1996. 
The thesis then proceeds to critically examine whether the extended action for breach 
of confidence which protects an individual's privacy can and ought to be further 
developed to provide protection for the corporation’s privacy, and argues that the 
corporation’s privacy can and ought to be so developed. 
The thesis also investigates whether, in the alternative, the corporation’s privacy would 
be more suitably protected if it were developed as a property right under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 ECHR, and finds that Article 1 of Protocol 1 would not suitably protect the 
corporation’s privacy. Instead, the thesis upholds the extended action for breach of 
confidence as a more natural and suitable home for the protection of the privacy of the 
corporation in English law. 
The thesis concludes with recommendations on the structural framework for the 
proposed protection of the corporation’s privacy under the extended action for breach 
of confidence. 
This research is undertaken primarily through doctrinal analysis; it analyses English 
Courts’ jurisprudence, the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, as well as 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union where it concerns the 
administration of Article 8 ECHR. Theoretical arguments are also engaged in when it 
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Half a decade ago, it would have almost been inconceivable for one to suggest that 
consideration be had for the protection of the privacy of the corporation. The scholarly 
writings and vibrant debates which have been had on privacy protection by scholars, 
judges, the press, as well as the legislature, and which led to the development of 
privacy protection in the English law have almost always focused on the protection of 
the individual; little consideration has been given to the corporation’s protection. 
However, it has now become imperative to consider whether English law ought to be 
further developed to provide fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation, for the 
following significant reasons:  
First, because of the present culture of more aggressive media reporting which has 
become even more intrusive into the activities of the corporation, aided by 
sophisticated technological advances, for instance, through the surveillance of the 
corporation’s premises by press agents, or through the hacking into the corporation’s 
computers or telephones, wherein the corporation has no effective means of protecting 
itself. 
Secondly, the fact that English law presently only provides protection for the privacy 
of the corporation in broadcasting matters by virtue of the Broadcasting Act 1996, and 
protection for the corporation’s privacy in the area of media [newspaper and magazine] 
intrusion or interference, as well as unlawful interference by public authority is 
presently lacking. 
Thirdly, in the light of the evolution of the jurisprudence of Article 8 ECHR by the 
European Court of Human Rights to provide protection for the privacy of the 
corporation [Article 8 being the source from which the independent protection of the 
privacy of the individual in English law emerged, and the United Kingdom being a 
member of the Council of Europe which instituted the said Court]. 
Fourthly, in view of the development of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union to provide protection for the privacy of the corporation, where it 
concerns the administration of Article 8 ECHR [the United Kingdom being a member 
of the European Union]. 
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Finally, to provide the corporation with the autonomy it requires to effectively carry 
out its activities. 
The European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR] which is an instrument for the 
protection of human rights is also an instrument for the protection of fundamental 
rights. This means that in addition to being an instrument which provides specific 
protection for the natural person, it also provides protection for the fundamental rights 
of both the natural person and the non-natural person, which includes the corporation. 
To this end, in addition to the protection of the individual, the ECHR also envisaged 
the protection of the corporations in its provisions as illustrated in Article 34 which 
speaks to the jurisdiction of who can bring an action under the ECHR as including the 
individual as well as the corporation. Equally, under Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR, the 
corporation is also included as persons who can bring an action. The protection of the 
fundamental right of the corporation to its privacy under Article 8 ECHR has also been 
established by the European Court of Human Rights in its jurisprudence. The United 
Kingdom, as a Member State of the Council of Europe which instituted the ECHR, has 
incorporated the ECHR into its domestic law through the implementation of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 [HRA]; and section 2(1)(a) HRA mandates that ‘a court or 
tribunal in determining a question which arises in connection with a Convention right 
must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the 
Court of Human Rights, where it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question 
has arisen’. Equally, section 6(1) HRA mandates that ‘it is unlawful for a public 
authority [which includes a court] to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right’. 
In the light of this development, and in view of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights on Article 8 ECHR, the aim of this thesis is therefore to 
investigate whether English law ought to be further developed to provide fuller 
protection for the privacy of the corporation, and consequently to argue that the 
corporation’s privacy can and ought to be fully protected in English law in order to 
satisfy sections 2 and 6 HRA. ‘Fuller’, because English law already provides 
protection for the privacy of the corporation in matters concerning broadcasting under 
the Broadcasting Act 1996. This investigation also aims to satisfy Article 13 ECHR, 
which states that ‘everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention 
are violated shall have an effective remedy in national law’. Finally, this investigation 
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also aims to provide the corporation with the autonomy it requires to effectively carry 
on its activities, within the law. 
 
Accordingly, in making the argument for the protection of privacy for the corporation, 
the research question – the corporation and privacy protection: ought English law to be 
further developed to provide fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation – is 
investigated by first examining the concept of privacy in general; that is to say, it 
examines the privacy interests, definitions of privacy, rationales of privacy; and then 
proceeds to examine the concept of privacy for corporations. The research 
subsequently advances to consider the level of protection of the privacy of the 
corporation in English law. The research then proceeds to critically examine whether 
the extended action for breach of confidence, which protects the individual's privacy, 
can and ought to be further developed to provide protection for the corporation’s 
privacy; or, in the alternative, whether the corporation’s privacy would be more 
suitably protected if it were developed as a property right under Article 1 of Protocol 1 
ECHR. The research concludes with recommendations on how the corporation’s 
privacy ought to be developed. 
To achieve this, this research is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the 
theoretical concept of what privacy is for the corporation, espousing the general 
concept of privacy for the individual, and advancing to declare a working definition of 
privacy for the corporation. In this chapter, I make a number of arguments and 
submissions. 
a. I argue that the privacy of the individual constitutes of two interests – intrusion 
privacy and information privacy – and suggest that a comprehensive definition of 
privacy is expressed in two limbs, along the lines of these fundamental interests: first, 
as the state in which a person wishes to be free from unwanted intrusion; and secondly, 
as a claim to the control of private information from being released into the public 
domain, thereby protecting the said information from unwanted dissemination or 
publication.  
b. I espouse the rationales of privacy of the individual, arguing that privacy is 
important for the purpose of the individual’s autonomy and/or his dignity. I 
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consequently submit that the rationales of privacy may be pleaded independently or in 
conjunction with one another.  
c. I proceed to test the individual’s privacy interests of intrusion privacy and 
information privacy, as well as my definitions, and the rationales of the individual’s 
privacy on the corporation; and submit that the privacy interests of intrusion privacy 
and information privacy as well as my definition of privacy also apply to the 
corporation. I further submit that the independent rationale of autonomy likewise 
applies for the corporation. 
I conclude chapter 1 with the submission that the corporation has the intrusion privacy 
and information privacy interests which are worthy of protection in English law.  
Chapter 2 through doctrinal analysis examines the level of protection of the privacy of 
corporations in English law. It examines the mediums of protection within which the 
protection of the individual’s privacy under English common law was erstwhile sought 
[the traditional action for breach of confidence, malicious falsehood, and defamation]; 
it also examines the mediums of protection of certain aspects of the individual’s 
privacy under statute [the Data Protection Act 1996, Protection from Harassment Act 
1997, and the Broadcasting Act 1996]. This examination is undertaken in order to 
ascertain whether the privacy of the corporation is therein protected, and if so, to what 
extent; and finds that the privacy of the corporation is protected only to a limited 
extent, by the Broadcasting Act 1996. The chapter concludes with an outline of the 
aspects of the protection of the privacy of corporation to which the research question is 
directed: first, the privacy of the corporation vs. the news press – such as, where agents 
of newspapers or magazines surreptitiously intrude into the premises of the 
corporation, and subsequently publish the outcome of such intrusion; secondly, the 
privacy of the corporation vs. public authorities – such as, where public authorities 
intrude into the premises of the corporation as well as where public authorities 
interfere with the private information of the corporation; and finally, the privacy of the 
corporation vs. other corporations – such as, where agents of a corporation 
surreptitiously intrude into the premises of another corporation as well as where the 
said agents interfere with the private information of that corporation. The aim of this 




Chapter 3 through doctrinal analysis addresses the manner in which the general 
protection of the privacy of the individual was developed, that is to say under common 
law, through the extended action for breach of confidence which incorporates Article 8 
and 10 ECHR into the jurisprudence of English domestic law. Accordingly, the chapter 
investigates whether the extended action for breach of confidence ought to be further 
developed to provide protection for the privacy of the corporation. It establishes that 
by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as well as the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, Article 8 ECHR provides protection for the privacy of 
the corporation; consequently, it submits that the corporation’s privacy can and ought 
to be developed under the extended action for breach of confidence. The aim of this 
chapter is therefore to establish that corporation’s privacy can and ought to be 
developed under the extended action for breach of confidence. 
Chapter 4 through doctrinal analysis investigates whether, in the alternative, the 
corporation’s privacy would be more suitably protected if it were developed as a 
property right under Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR, and finds that Article 1 of Protocol 
1 would not. The aim of this chapter is to establish and uphold the extended action for 
breach of confidence as a more natural and suitable home for the protection of the 
privacy of the corporation in English law. This is because the extended action is the 
medium that has been established for the general protection of the privacy of the 
individual; equally, in view of the fact that the European Court of Human Rights is the 
final arbiter of human rights matters for Member States of the Council of Europe, the 
extended action is a more natural home for the protection of the privacy of the 
corporation in English law because Articles 8 & 10 ECHR, which the English common 
law incorporated into the cause of action for breach of confidence to establish the 
extended action for breach of confidence, have been the basis for the protection of 
privacy of the corporation at the European Court of Human Rights.  
Having found that the extended action is more suitable for the development for the 
privacy of the corporation, chapter 5 concludes the research with recommendations on 
the structural framework for a proposed protection of the privacy of the corporation 
under the extended action for breach of confidence; this development aims to ensure 
compatibility with the ECHR in accordance with sections 2 and 6 HRA, as well as to 
ensure compliance with Article 13 ECHR. 
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This research is undertaken primarily through doctrinal analysis; it analyses English 
courts’ jurisprudence, the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, as well as 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union where it concerns the 
administration of Article 8 ECHR. Theoretical arguments are also engaged in when it 






















CHAPTER 1  
CONCEPT OF PRIVACY FOR THE CORPORATION 
Political, social, and economic 
changes entail the recognition of 
new rights, and the common law, 
in its eternal youth, grows to meet 





In thoroughly investigating the question of whether English law ought to be further 
developed to provide fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation, an 
understanding of the concept of privacy, the concept of the corporation, as well as the 
present level of the protection of privacy in English law are imperative. The aim of this 
chapter therefore is to investigate the concept of privacy for the corporation by first 
presenting a general concept of privacy: defining the concept of privacy, examining 
why privacy is important; and then examining the concept of the corporation, as well 
as developing an understanding of the concept of privacy for the corporation.  
To achieve this, the chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 generally introduces the 
subject, privacy, upon which the research question is based, as well as defines the 
concept. It establishes that privacy protects two fundamental interests – the intrusion 
privacy interest and the information privacy interest – and defines privacy based on 
these two interests. It is suggested that the subject would not be complete without 
aiming to espouse why privacy is important, consequently, Part 2 explores the 
rationales of privacy and submits that the rationales of privacy which may be pleaded 
separately, or in conjunction with one another are the rationales of autonomy and 
dignity. Part 3 begins with an understanding of the notion of the corporation, in order 
to fully appreciate the research question; and proceeds to proffer a working definition 
of the concept of privacy for corporations. This is important because the research 
question seeks to investigate whether English law ought to be further developed to 
                                                          
1
 Warren, S.D. and Brandeis, L.D. The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review. 1890: 4(5), 193-220, 193. 
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provide fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation; thus it is imperative to set 
out at the beginning of the work a specific understanding of what privacy means for 
























THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF PRIVACY: DEFINITION OF PRIVACY 
The concept of privacy has proven particularly difficult to define. In different parts of 
the Western world, scholars have articulated this difficulty in defining precisely what 
privacy is; often, those who seek to define privacy seek to describe what privacy 
constitutes.
2
 The Younger Committee in its report
3
 expressed this difficulty and added 
that the word ‘privacy’ could not be satisfactorily defined.4 In spite of the vast 
literature on the subject, a satisfactory definition of privacy remains elusive. Privacy 
has been defined as a ‘right’,5 a ‘condition’,6 a ‘state’,7 an ‘interest’,8 a ‘claim’,9 a 
‘value’,10 a ‘form of control’,11 an ‘area of life’.12 It has also been proclaimed to be ‘an 
absolutely essential value that makes life more wholesome and worth living’,13 ‘a pre-
condition to personhood’,14 ‘a universal concept’,15 ‘an aspect of one’s humanity’,16 
                                                          
2
 Parker, R. B. A Definition of Privacy. Rutgers Law Review. 1974: 27, 275-296, 277; Prosser, W.L. 
Privacy. California Law Review. 1960: 48, 383-423, 389; Beverly-Smith, H., Ohly, A. and Lucas-
Schloetter, A. Privacy, Property and Personality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 53-54.  
Also see generally Cooke, J. Law of Tort. 7
th
 edn. Essex: Longman, 2005; Solove, D., Rotenberg, M. and 
Schwartz, P. Privacy Information and Technology. New York: Aspen, 2006. 
3
 Younger Committee Report: Report of the Committee on Privacy, Cmnd. 5012, HMSO, 1972, paras 57-
61. 
4
 This was reiterated eighteen years later in the Calcutt Committee Report: Report of the Committee on 
Privacy and Related Matters, Cmnd. 1102, HMSO, 1990, paras 3.1-3.8.  
5
 Warren, S.D. and Brandeis, L.D. The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review. 1890: 4(5), 193-220, 205.  
6
 Weinstein, M.A The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life in Pennock, J. and Chapman, J.(eds) Privacy 
Nomos XIII. New York: Atherton Press, 1971, 88; Lusky, L. Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of 
Concepts. Columbia Law Review. 1972:72(4), 693-710, 709; Parent, W.A. Privacy, Morality, and the 
Law. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1983:12, 269-288, 269. 
7
 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1. Anderson J. defined privacy as a “state of personal exclusion from 
involvement with or the attention of others.” At para 264. 
8
Prosser, W. Privacy. California Law Review. 1960: 48(3), 383-423, 389.  
9
 Westin, A. Privacy and Freedom. New York: Association of the Bar, 1967, 7. 
10
 Whitman, J.Q. The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty. Yale Law Journal. 2004: 
113, 1151-1221, 1153. 
11
 Fried, C. Privacy. Yale Law Journal. 1968: 77(3), 475-493, 483, 493; Gross, H. Privacy and Autonomy 
in Pennock, J. and Chapman, J. ibid, 169; See also Miller, A. Assault on Privacy. Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 1971, 25. 
12
 Privacy and the Law, 1970. A Report by the British Section of the International Comm’n of Justice 
cited in Wacks, R. Personal Information: Privacy and the Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 14. 
13
 Whitman, J.Q. The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty. Yale Law Journal. 2004: 
113, 1151-1221, 1153. 
14
 Reiman, J. Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood. Philosopy and Public Affairs. 1976: 6, 26-44, 39. 
15
 Westin, ibid, 7-30. 
16
 Fried, C. Privacy. Yale Law Journal. 1968: 77(3), 475-493, 486. 
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and a ‘fundamental freedom’.17 Privacy has equally been defined in terms of freedom, 
with ‘gains and losses of privacy as gains and losses of freedom’.18  
However, in attempting to understand the concept of privacy, a number of scholars 
have proffered definitions. One of the simplest and arguably earliest definition of 
privacy emerged from Judge Cooley who defined privacy as the right ‘to be let 
alone’.19 This definition, though proffered by Cooley, was made better known by 
Warren and Brandeis
20
 who declared that privacy is the protection of the individual 
and securing to that individual what Judge Cooley referred to as the right ‘to be let 
alone’;21 therefore, the protection of privacy is merely an instance of the enforcement 
of the more general right of the individual to be let alone. 
This definition has been criticised on the grounds that it denies privacy its 
distinctiveness, and a great many instances of ‘not letting people alone’ cannot readily 
be described as an invasion of privacy;
22
 and hence should be rejected.
23
 However, this 
criticism did not take into account the context in which that statement was made by 
Warren and Brandeis,
24
  which was particularly in the light of ‘intrusion into the sacred 
precincts of an individual’s private and domestic life by the press’.25 Although 
conceding that this definition of privacy is quite limited in scope, it is suggested that 
the definition serves as the starting point in the development of the theoretical 
jurisprudence of privacy.  
In a further attempt at defining privacy, Gavison
26
 states that two types of questions 
about privacy are important. First, with regard to the status of privacy: ‘Is privacy a 
situation, a right, a claim, a value, a form of control?’ Secondly, with regard to the 
characteristics of privacy: ‘Is privacy related to information, to physical access, to 
autonomy, to personal identity?’27 Consequently, in adopting a value-laden concept of 
                                                          
17
 Macklem, T. Independence of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 58. 
18
 Parker, R. A Definition of Privacy. Rutgers Law Review. 1974: 27, 275- 296, 277. 
19
 Cooley, T. Cooley on Torts. 2
nd
 edn.1888, 29 cited in Warren, S.D. and Brandeis, L.D. The Right to 
Privacy. Harvard Law Review. 1890: 4(5), 193-220, 195. 
20
 Warren and Brandeis, ibid. 
21
 At 205. 
22
 Such as the requirement that people pay their taxes, or be enrolled in the army. 
23
 Gavison, R. Privacy and the Limits of Law. The Yale Law Journal. 1980:89(3), 421-471, 437-438. 
24
 Warren and Brandeis, ibid. 
25




 At 424. 
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privacy, Gavison defined privacy as a concept which is related to three elements – 
‘secrecy, anonymity, and solitude’.28 Gavison added that these three elements which 
are distinct and independent, yet inter-related, capture more of the suggestive meaning 
of privacy; thereby, providing a richer definition of the complex concept of privacy 
than any definition centred around only one element. 
The elements of secrecy, anonymity and solitude were reiterated in the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Mackay’s definition, in which he defined privacy to be a 
combination of these three elements, adding that privacy encompasses a right to be 




Other scholars have defined privacy in terms of control.
30
 On this definition, Fried 
explains that privacy is simply not an absence of information about oneself in the mind 
of others; rather, it entails ‘the control one has over information of oneself – the 
control one has over knowledge about oneself’.31 This understanding of privacy is 
however channelled primarily to relationships of friendship, trust, and love; wherein 
the individual exercises control over his information in choosing to confide in intimate 
friends and lovers, granting them exclusive access to guarded information. 
The definition of privacy as control over one’s information or knowledge is disputed 
by Parent
32
 who gave an example of an individual who voluntarily divulges all sorts of 
intimate information about himself to his friend; he argued that although exercising 
control in the sense of the term, such an individual is not preserving his privacy but 
rather is voluntarily relinquishing much of his privacy. Parent proceeds to define 
privacy as the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about an 
individual, possessed by others. He stated that an individual’s privacy is diminished to 
the degree that others have personal knowledge about him. Parent goes on to define 
personal information as facts which an individual may feel sensitive about and as such 
chooses not to reveal about himself.  
                                                          
28
 At 425, 428. See also Beverly-Smith, H., Ohly, A. and Lucas-Schloetter, A. Privacy, Property and 
Personality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
29
 Lord Mackay, the Lord Chancellor {as he then was}, in his consultation paper: Infringement of 
Privacy. July, 1993. 
30
 See Fried, C. Privacy. Yale Law Journal. 1968: 77(3), 475-493; Miller, A. Assault on Privacy. Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1971. 
31
 At 482, 483. 
32
 Parent, W.A. Privacy, Morality, and the Law. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1983:12, 269-288. 
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It is suggested however that one can preserve one’s privacy whilst revealing some 
information within close associations and intimate friendships, thereby, sharing 
personal information with intimates which is not shared with others. It is also 
suggested that this is the context which Fried
33
 propounded. It is further suggested that 
in Parent’s definition of personal information, the choice which an individual has to 
decide whether to, or who to reveal his personal information, is the exercise of that 
individual’s control over the management of his information.34 It is observed that 
Parent’s present definition of privacy varies from his earlier definition35 in which he 
took the view that privacy may be defined as facts which though not generally 
considered personal, a particular person would chose not to reveal about himself. 
Likewise, in this earlier definition, it is suggested that the choice the individual has in 
deciding not to reveal certain sensitive personal information is the individual 
exercising of his control over such information. 
The difficulty in defining privacy was further illustrated by Prosser
36
 who stated that 
he would not attempt to extract a definition out of privacy. Nevertheless, in defining 
privacy as a tort, he declared that privacy was not an independent tort, but rather a 
complex of four torts. He stated that these four torts involve four distinct kinds of 
invasion of four different interests of the individual which are tied together by the 
common name ‘Privacy’, but which otherwise have almost nothing in common except 
that each distinct cause of action represents an interference with the right of the 
individual ‘to be let alone’; namely: 
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private 
affairs; 
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 
(3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 
                                                          
33
 Fried, C. Privacy. Yale Law Journal. 1968: 77(3), 475-493. 
34
 For other definitions centred on control, see Miller, A. Assault on Privacy. Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 1971; Beardsley, E. L. Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure in Pennock, J. and 
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 Parent, W.A. A New Definition of Privacy for the Law. Law and Philosophy. 1975: 2(3), 305-338. 
36
 Prosser, W.L. Privacy. California Law Review. 1960: 48(3), 383-423. 
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Prosser’s privacy division was subsequently adopted in section 625A of the 
Restatement, Second, of Torts 1977 of the United States of America. 
In reiterating captions (2), (3), and (4) above, Parker
38
 further stated that privacy may 
be defined as the ability of the individual to lead his life without anyone interfering 
with his family and home life, misusing his private communications, disclosing 
information given or received by him in circumstances of professional confidence, and 
interfering with his correspondence. 
Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin
39
 in defining privacy as the desire of the individual to be 
free from intrusion added that an invasion of privacy included regular surveillance, 
surreptitious spying, interference with one’s property, entry onto private premises, or 
acquisition and revelation of information. 
Furthermore, Westin
40
 in defining privacy in terms of being a claim, declared that 
privacy is the claim of individuals, institutions or groups to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. He 
added that viewed in terms of the relation of the individual with social participation, 
privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society 
through physical or psychological means either in a state of solitude, or in small group 
intimacy, or in a conditions of anonymity, or reserve.
41
 
The difficulty in defining privacy was also expressed by the Calcutt Committee in its 
report,
42
 in which it stated that it had not found a wholly satisfactory statutory 
definition of privacy; but nevertheless stated that the definition of privacy, however 
imprecise, was needed as a yardstick with which to measure complaints and solutions. 
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 At 389.  
38
 Parker, R. B. A Definition of Privacy. Rutgers Law Review. 1974: 27, 275-296, 277. 
39
 Cornish, W., Llewelyn, D. and Aplin, T. Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and 
Allied Rights. 8
th
 edn. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013, 357. 
40
 Westin, A. Privacy and Freedom. New York: Association of the Bar, 1967, 7.   
41
 Privacy has also been defined as a right to be free from harassment. See Government Response to 
the National Heritage Select Committee, Privacy and Media Intrusion, Cmnd. 2918, HMSO, 1995. 
42
 Calcutt Committee Report: Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, Cm. 1102, 
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To this end, the committee indicated that privacy could be regarded as the antithesis of 
that which is public, and includes everything concerning an individual’s home, health, 
family, religion, sexuality, personal legal and personal financial affairs. It further 
stated that privacy is the right of an individual to be protected against intrusion into his 
or her personal life or affairs, or those of his or her family, by direct physical means or 
by publication of information. It added that privacy includes protection from 
publication which is hurtful or embarrassing, inaccurate, or misleading; as well as 




From the above definitions, it is observed that there is yet an unresolved academic 
consensus of what privacy really means, as well as its scope.
44
 Nevertheless, it may be 
clearly stated that from the above definitions, two common themes emerge. They are 
the two fundamental privacy interests: the intrusion privacy interest – which involves 
an unwanted interference into an individual’s physical space, home or property; and 
the information privacy interest – which involves limiting publication or dissemination 
of certain information considered private. These two fundamental privacy interests 
represent the core of the provisions of the Article 8 European Convention on Human 
Rights right which protects the right to one’s ‘private life, family life, home and 
correspondence’.  
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A consideration of these fundamental privacy interests is outlined below. 
Intrusion privacy interest 
This is the desire to want to be free from unwanted access or disturbance or 
interference or surveillance into one’s private sphere – a sphere in which an individual 
is free to carry on his activities – and this includes unwanted access into one’s physical 
space, one’s home, or one’s property.  
An individual may want to be in a state of solitude or seclusion, he may want to create 
a physical or psychological barrier to the ‘outside world’ – outside the circle of persons 
whom he may deem to be among an intimate circle of friends; the individual may also 
more generally want to be free from disturbance or interference or surveillance. In all 
these states, the aim, it is suggested, is the pursuit of freedom from unwanted access. 
This aim is also captured in the Oxford English Dictionary definition of intrusion as 
“the action of coming into a place or situation where you are unwelcome or 
uninvited”.45  
The breach of this aspect of privacy is seen in the unwanted and unjustified access or 
disturbance or interference or surveillance into one’s physical sphere, or one’s home, 
or one’s property. This may be illustrated by the prying on an individual whilst he is 
undertaking activity which he may not wish to share with others, such as, for example, 
prying on the individual while he is taking a bath.
46
 In this case, a peeping Tom’s 
surreptitious viewing of the individual in this state may constitute a breach of the 
individual’s privacy. This unwanted intrusion on the individual may occur where the 
peeping Tom is physically present within the premises; it may also occur where the 
peeping Tom engages in the surreptitious activity by means of modern technology, 
such as viewing the individual through the use of zoom lens with the intent of saving 
the information obtained for personal use. In this case of intrusion, the focus of the 
breach of privacy is on the act of prying, and not on the dissemination or publication of 
the result of the surreptitious activity. Thus, the unwanted and unjustified surreptitious 
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 Soanes, C., Hawker, S., and Elliott, J. (eds). Oxford English Dictionary. 6
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University Press, 2005, 398. 
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 See, for instance, C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155. 
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The breach of the intrusion aspect of privacy may also be illustrated in the unwanted 
and unjustified persistent pursuit of an individual in the hope of obtaining newsworthy 
information.
48
 As with the case of the peeping Tom above, in this case, the focus of 
intrusion is on the action of the pursuit, and not on whether newsworthy information 
was successfully gathered and possibly disseminated or published; thus, whether the 
pursuit is successful or not, the mere action of pursuing the individual constitutes an 
intrusion. 
Equally, the breach of the intrusion aspect of privacy may be illustrated in the 
unwanted and unjustified search of an individual,
 49
 his home, or his property; it may 
also occur in the event of a consequent seizure resulting from a search. As with the 
peeping Tom and the pursuit cases above, the focus of this case of intrusion is not on 
the result of the search, but on the search itself. 
Furthermore, the breach of the intrusion aspect of privacy may also occur in the 
unwanted and unjustified hacking into an individual’s telephone or computer.50 The 
hacking may be instituted for the purpose of the surveillance of an individual by the 
authorities with the intent of using the obtained information in other investigation, and 
without dissemination or publication. In this instance, the focus of the breach in this 
case of intrusion is on the action of hacking into the individual’s telephone or 
computer. Thus, the hacking would be properly treated under the intrusion privacy 
interest. If, however, the hacking in question is instituted for instance by the media, 
with the primary intent of consequent publication or dissemination, it ceases to be a 
violation which would be treated as an intrusion privacy action at the point where the 
contents of information obtained from the hacking are disseminated or published. 
Thus, upon the publication or dissemination of information, the case would properly be 
dealt as an information privacy matter.  
                                                          
47
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It may also be argued that an individual being captured by over 300 CCTV cameras in 
the course of a busy day in central London is a highly intrusive undertaking 
reminiscent of ‘big brother watching you’.51 This action, although intrusive, may 
however not violate the intrusion privacy interest because although it may be 
unwanted, it is arguably justified as a result of the national security issues of the day. 
The intrusion privacy interest therefore involves unwanted interference or disturbance, 
without more – that is to say, in the absence of publication or dissemination. The focus 
of the intrusion privacy interest is therefore on the interference or disturbance itself – 
the intrusion – and not on the dissemination or publication of the result of the 
intrusion. 
Information privacy interest 
This privacy interest involves the protection of an individual’s private information 
from unwanted dissemination or publication. Private information are facts about an 
individual which that individual may not want to reveal about himself. It may include a 
variety of information which individuals may want to keep to themselves such as their 
sexual life, physical or mental health condition, religious beliefs, political opinions, 
ethnic origin, financial information, and criminal record;
52
 it may also include 
information which may be found in the individual’s home or property, such as 
information in personal files or documents relating to the running of the individual’s 
home, the individual’ private life, or the life of the individual’s partner or the 
individual’s children.  
The breach of this aspect of privacy occurs in the unwanted and unjustified publication 
or dissemination of an individual’s private information. Thus, as indicated in the 
intrusion privacy section above, where a peeping Tom engages in surreptitious activity 
with the use of zoom lens technology, with the intent of saving the result of such 
prying for personal use, such a case would properly be dealt with under intrusion 
privacy. However, where he proceeds to disseminate or publish the private information 
resulting from the surreptitious activity, at that point of dissemination or publication, 
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is an Act that provides for the regulation of the processing of information relating to individuals. 
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the case became one which would properly be dealt with as an information privacy 
matter. 
The same principle applies to the case of the persistent pursuit of an individual in the 
hope of obtaining newsworthy information, the search and/or seizure of an individual’s 
property, or the hacking of an individual’s telephone or computer; as such, where the 
private information derived therefrom is disseminated or published, it becomes a case 
to be dealt with as an information privacy matter. 
Information privacy therefore involves the unwanted dissemination or publication of 
private information. It differs from the intrusion privacy interest in that the focus of the 
intrusion privacy is on an interference or disturbance, without more – the intrusion; 
while the focus of the information privacy interest is on the dissemination or 
publication of private information. The information privacy interest has been the 




From the above, it is therefore submitted that the two fundamental privacy interests – 
intrusion privacy and information privacy – independent of each other may result in a 
loss of privacy; thus a privacy action may be brought where an intrusion has occurred 
independent of the misuse of private information. Indeed, these two fundamental 
privacy interests are the hallmark of what privacy represents, and are reflected in 
comprehensive definitions of privacy.
54
 
Researcher’s definition of privacy 
In attempting to define the individual’s privacy, therefore, it is proposed that privacy, 
though a broad concept, may be defined in two limbs along the lines of these 
fundamental interests. First, privacy may generally be defined as the state in which one 
desires to be free from unwanted interference or disturbance – intrusion – into his 
private sphere, which includes his physical space, or his home or his property; and 
secondly, privacy may be defined generally as a claim to the control of an individual’s 
private information from being released into the public domain against the individual’s 
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wishes, thus protecting the said information from unwanted dissemination or 
publication. 
On this definition, it is noted that intrusion into the individual’s private sphere may 
occur through the disruption of the individual’s desire to retreat into the halls of his 
own sanctuary or seclusion, a space in which he enjoys a variety of states such as 
solitude, anonymity, reserve, the development of intimate relationships, and also the 
development of his personality – in a state in which he may desire to be free from 
unwanted intrusion or exposure. Equally, intrusion into the individual’s home or 
property may occur through surveillance, surreptitious spying, or by means of entry 
into the individual’s home or property by public authorities, and the search and seizure 
of documents. 
A breach of an individual’s privacy therefore occurs where an individual’s physical 
space, home or property has been intruded upon or interfered with by another, against 
the wishes of the individual, and without justification by the law. Equally, the breach 
of the individual’s privacy also occurs where the individual’s private information has 
been misused, that is to say, where there has been an unwanted and unjustified 
dissemination or publication of the individual’s private information. 
This two limbed definition is of importance as it encompasses the fundamental privacy 
interests of intrusion privacy and information privacy – that is to say, limiting 
unwanted access to the individual, his home or his property, as well as limiting 
unwanted communication of the individual’s private information – thereby enabling 
the individual to exercise autonomy within the society.
55
 Indeed, this protection from 
intrusion, as well as the protection of private information from unwanted dissemination 
or publication are the hallmark of the protection of privacy; and it is suggested, reflect 
a comprehensive definition of privacy.
56
  
It is noted that although in a majority of situations the protection of privacy is a purely 
individual matter concerning natural persons, there are also situations where the 
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protection of privacy is a matter which may affect corporate persons such as 
corporations. This is examined in the working definition of privacy for corporations in 
the last part of this chapter, however, before that, investigations are made into the 

































RATIONALES OF PRIVACY AS A VALUABLE INTEREST 
This section examines the necessity as well as the value that privacy has in the life of 
the individual. It investigates the importance of privacy and argues that the 
preservation of the individual’s autonomy and/or dignity are the core rationales of 
privacy. It also argues that these rationales may be pleaded independently or in 
conjunction with one another in an argument for why privacy is important.   
Privacy and the principle of autonomy 
In my definition of privacy above, I defined privacy first, as one’s desires to be free 
from unwanted interference or disturbance – intrusion – into his physical sphere, his 
home or his property; and secondly, as the claim of an individual to the control of his 
private information, and the protection of said information from unwanted 
dissemination or publication. It is argued that the ability of an individual to decide 
whether, or when to, or when not to disclose information about himself – the right to 
control the dissemination or publication of private information about himself – is 
brought about by the exercise of autonomy: the individual’s personal autonomy. This 
power to control the dissemination or publication of his private information is what 
Beardsley
57
 views as ‘selective disclosure’, Fried58 refers to this as ‘control over 
information or knowledge’, and Fenwick and Phillipson59 explains it as ‘informational 
autonomy or informational control’.60  
Equally, privacy provides conditions in which individuals are liberated from the 
intrusive influences of others.
61
 The ability of an individual to decide whether, when 
to, or when not to allow access into his physical space, his home or his property – the 
right to protect against unwanted intrusion – is also a function of the autonomy of that 
individual – his personal autonomy. Autonomy as a rationale of privacy therefore 
provides the individual the power to decide who to allow access into his domain, 
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thereby giving him the autonomy to realise his full potential. As Negley
62
 comments, 
some degree of privacy is necessary in order to ensure to the individual the possibility 
of choice and action. Thus, by limiting ‘the disclosure of private information about an 
individual’ and ‘who has access to an individual’, privacy affords individuals control 
over who to share the most private sphere of their lives with. It is therefore this 
autonomy to control ‘who has access to us’, or ‘who disseminates what about us’, 
which forms an essential argument for the value of privacy.
63
  
Privacy is also important for protecting an individual’s independent thoughts, opinions, 
and other private information from social pressures brought about by the intrusion into 
the individual’s life through scrutiny, censure, ridicule, and pressure to conform. An 
individual in modern society needs space and time for reflection, meditation and 
planning, as well as time apart to rationalise his thoughts and opinions.
64
 Privacy 
provides this opportunity for the individual while he struggles to incubate and integrate 
these ideas, and also provides the proper timing of the decision to transcend from the 
private realm to the public domain – to test these ideas before his peers, or before other 
individuals.
65
 The ability of the individual to utilize the space and time privacy 
provides him for reflection, meditation, planning, and the rationalisation of thoughts 
and opinions, proceed from that individual’s exercise of his autonomy. The autonomy 
which privacy provides in the circumstance aids in the process of the development of 
the individual’s personality, individuality, and conscious individual choices which the 
individual makes in his life.
66
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Likewise, privacy provides a sanctuary for the release of one’s emotions resulting from 
stresses and tensions of life.
 67
 In these modern times, living life in the society comes 
with stresses which can physically and mentally affect an individual if he does not set 
aside a private time with which to unwind and release his emotional when necessary.
68
 
The individual in modern society plays a succession of wide-ranging roles subject to 
the audience and environment. In this sense, the individual is metaphorically a ‘social 
actor’ who performs before a ‘world stage’ with the main aim of maintaining 
coherence while adjusting to different settings life places before him.
69
 In 
Weinstein’s70 view, human beings have a social self with which they face the outside 
self, and which is in consonance with social norms; and an actual self, constituted by 
personal activities and inclinations. The sanctuary of privacy therefore provides an 
opportunity for the actual self to lay aside his mask with which he faces the outside 
world, and release his true feelings without interference, while maintaining social 
relationships.
 71
 This is what Westin refers to as ‘emotional release’.72 This emotional 
release consequently links privacy with the ability of individuals to maintain mental 
health. Accordingly, privacy is valuable in the interest of the individual’s physical, 
emotional, mental, and spiritual well-being.
73
 Indeed, privacy provides a special kind 
of independence, which it is submitted, ensues from the individual’s ability to exercise 
his autonomy; this in turn affords the individual the autonomy to be himself.  
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Privacy has also been rationalized on the basis of intimacy. In Inness
74
 view, privacy is 
a shared experience of intimacy and is inherently valuable because it offers the 
individual control over the most intimate aspects of their lives – intimate, not because 
it involves isolation from others, but because it involves emotions such as loving, 
caring and liking.
75
 Similarly, the importance of privacy has been espoused on the 
basis that it aids in the development of relations of the most fundamental sort: love, 
friendship, trust and respect, which is at the heart of individuality.
76
 In Fried’s77 view, 
privacy is the control one has over information or knowledge about oneself in 
relationships of love, friendship, trust and respect; he however acknowledged that the 
value of privacy could be comprehended in many other forms not limited to 
relationships of love, friendship, trust and respect alone.
78
 
It is suggested that the control which the individual exercises in Inness’s79 and 
Fried’s80 accounts of the importance of privacy ensue from the individual’s exercise of 
his autonomy.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
It is accordingly submitted that the power which the individual exercises in the control 
of his private information regarding ‘who knows what about him’ vis-à-vis who to or 
who not to share such information with, or who has access to him, or the individual’s 
independence to protect his thoughts, opinions, and other private information from 
social pressures, as well as the individual’s power to decides whether or how to 
alternate the roles which he plays in society, are all merely different expressions of the 
exercise of the individual’s autonomy – his personal autonomy.  
 
Privacy and dignity 
In my definition of privacy above, privacy was first defined as one’s desires to be free 
from unwanted interference or disturbance – intrusion – into his physical sphere, his 
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home or his property; and secondly, as the claim of an individual to the control of his 
private information, and the protection of said information from unwanted 
dissemination or publication. It was suggested that the ability of an individual to 
decide whether, or when to, or when not to disclose information about himself – the 
right to control the dissemination or publication of information about his private life – 
is brought about by the exercise of that individual’s autonomy. It is further suggested 
that in addition to this above position, the desire of an individual to control the 
dissemination or publication of information about his private life may also, or, in the 
alternative, be brought about by that individual’s pursuit to maintain his dignity. 
Likewise, it was suggested that the ability of an individual to decide through 
independent evaluation whether, when to, or when not to allow access into his physical 
sphere, his home or his property – the right to protect against unwanted intrusion – is 
also a function of that individual’s autonomy. It is equally suggested that in addition to 
this above position, the desire of an individual to protect himself from unwanted 
intrusion may also, or, in the alternative, be brought about by that individual’s pursuit 
to maintain his dignity. It is this pursuit of dignity which forms an essential argument 
for the value of privacy.  
Dignity may be expressed as the state of being worthy of, and commanding respect 
and honour.
81
 This pursuit of the maintenance of dignity is the subject of Kant’s82 
account, that the respect of the basic values of an individual is the supreme limiting 
condition of every individual’s freedom of action. Indeed, every individual is entitled 
to respect. Where an individual’s privacy is not respected, the resultant intrusion into 
the core of his being amounts not only to a violation of his autonomy, but also, or in 
the alternative, to an affront to his dignity.
83
 It is this entitlement to respect that a 
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suggest underpins dignity as an essential value of privacy. Conversely, failure to 
respect the individual’s dignity amounts to an affront to the individual’s dignity which 
brings on profound feelings of humiliation, shame and unworthiness. 
Some scholars such as Bloustein,
89




 have defined 
the rationale of privacy on these terms, suggesting that all invasions of an individual’s 
privacy are violations of the individual’s dignity, as the exposure of an individual’s 
private information to public scrutiny is a tendency in the direction of stripping that 
individual of his human dignity. Thus, in addition to, or as an alternative to the 
autonomy rationale, by limiting the disclosure of private information about an 
individual and who has access to that individual, privacy, through dignity, affords 
individuals control over who to share the most private sphere of their lives with.  
 
From the above rationales of privacy, therefore, it is submitted that the autonomy and 
dignity rationales may be pleaded independently, or in conjunction with one another in 
an argument for why privacy is important. Thus, the autonomy rationale of privacy and 
all that is encapsulated thereunder may be pleaded alone, as illustrated by the views 
expressed by such scholars as Negley, Fried, Inness, above; likewise, the dignity 
rationale of privacy may also be pleaded alone, as demonstrated in the view expressed 
by Bloustein, Warren and Brandeis, and Neill, above. Equally, the autonomy and 
dignity rationales of privacy which are also supported by case law of the English 
courts as well as the European Court of Human Rights
92
 may be pleaded in 
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(QB), para 99, 214. For the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see Goodwin v United 
Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 18, para 90. 
It is worthy of mention that the rationales of privacy in the case law of other common law jurisdictions 
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A WORKING DEFINITION OF PRIVACY FOR THE CORPORATION 
Privacy has almost always been defined from the perspective of the individual. 
Scholars have often defined the notion of privacy through themes of personhood, 
individuality, humanity, and as a fundamental human right. This raises the question of 
whether privacy matters affect the corporation. 
In a majority of English law cases, the infringement of privacy often concerns the 
individual and is protected under the extended action for breach of confidence which 
incorporates Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
[ECHR] into the action for breach of confidence.
94
 However, it is suggested that there 
are instances in which privacy matters affect the corporation, and for such 
circumstances this section develops an understanding of what privacy means for the 
corporation. 
In developing a working definition of privacy for the corporation, therefore, this 
investigation engages four key concerns. 
First, an examination of what a corporation is, and what rights it has, is undertaken so 
as to understand the concept of the corporation upon which the research question is 
based. 
Secondly, having submitted in part 1 of this chapter that privacy protects two 
fundamental interests – intrusion privacy and information privacy – an examination is 
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The extended action for breach of confidence is critically examined in chapter 3. 
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made into these two privacy interests. In making this examination, therefore, the 
intrusion privacy interests and information privacy interests are tested on the 
corporation; this investigation will demonstrate how the privacy interests of intrusion 
privacy and information privacy apply to the corporation.  
Thirdly, the definitions of privacy of the individual, as discussed in part 1 of this 
chapter, are equally tested on the corporation; this investigation establishes a definition 
of privacy for the corporation.  
Finally, the two independent rationales for the privacy of the individual are also tested 
on the corporation. In making this examination, therefore, the autonomy and dignity 
rationales of the privacy of the individual are tested on the corporation to examine 
whether they may apply to the corporation. This examination will find that the sole 
rationale of the corporation’s privacy is the autonomy rationale. It will also 
demonstrate that a cause of action which has more than one rationale for the 
individual’s protection can equally have a single rationale in the case of the 
corporation’s protection; it makes this illustration by highlighting the case of 
reputation under defamation which has the rationales of dignity, honour, and property 
for the individual’s protection, but has the sole rationale of property for the 
corporation’s protection. 
As such, the abovementioned tests will generally demonstrate that privacy also applies 
to corporations, and corporations do have privacy aspects which are worthy of 
protection in English law. 
 
Definition of the corporation 
An essential preliminary step in pursuing this research is defining the notion of a 
‘corporation’. Thus, this section provides an understanding of what a corporation is, 
and also investigates the extent of its rights and privileges as prescribed by the law. 
A corporation is a juristic or a juridical person – an artificial entity established and 
recognised by law. In the United Kingdom, it is registered by one or more persons and 





 It is directed, controlled and managed by its management team. A 
corporation also refers to companies that are established by royal charter.
96
 In law, the 
concept of a corporation is such that as a result of incorporation, it becomes a legal 




The fundamental importance of the concept of separate legal personality of the 
corporation was espoused in the locus classicus case of Salomon v A. Salomon & Co 
Ltd.
98
 In this case, Mr Salomon, a sole trader sold his solvent business to a company, A 
Salomon & Co Ltd, which was incorporated for that purpose. The only members of this 
company were himself, and six members of his family; in compliance with the 
minimum number of a company’s members at the time, which was seven.99 
Subsequently, the company went into liquidation, and was unable to pay the ordinary 
creditors. The liquidator on behalf of the unsecured creditors of the company resisted 
Mr Salomon’s claim to enforce his floating charge, and the matter went to court.  
The court of first instance held that Mr Salomon was a mere nominee and agent of the 
company, hence refused to recognise its separate existence from the members. 
The Court of Appeal opined that the formation of the company was a mere scheme to 
enable Salomon to carry on business in the name of the company with limited liability, 
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However, the House of Lords rejected the reasoning of the lower courts, holding, inter 
alia, that the company was duly formed and registered and that all the requirements of 
the Companies Act 1862 had been duly observed. Therefore the company was not a 
mere ‘alias’ or agent of, or trustee for the vendor, and hence he was not liable to 
indemnify the company against its creditors’ claim.  
Lord Macnaghten in summarizing the doctrine of a corporate entity categorically 
declared that 
When the memorandum is duly signed and registered…the subscribers are a 
body corporate ‘capable forthwith’, to use the words of the enactment, ‘of 
exercising all functions of an incorporated company’… The company attains 
maturity on its birth. There is no period of minority… The company is at law a 
different person altogether from the subscribers of the memorandum; and, 
though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it 
was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive 
profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustees for 
them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except 
to the extent and manner prescribed by the Act.
101
  
As a consequence of the concept of separate legal personality of the corporation, a 
corporation is recognised by law to have a separate legal existence and status, with a 
legal name, legal rights, duties, privileges, responsibilities, assets, or liabilities, very 
much in a similar manner as a natural person. To this end, Lord Halsbury declared in 
Salomon’s case 
…once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other 
independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself.
102
 
Furthermore, the separate legal personality of a corporation is also established under 
section 15 Companies Act 2006.
103
 The effect of section 15 is that the subscribers of 
the memorandum, as well as such other persons as may from time to time become 
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members of the company are ‘a body corporate’ by the name contained in the 
certificate of incorporation.
104
 Thus, the concept of a corporation is one which is a 
distinct legal person – the body corporate – with a separate existence from its 
membership and management team.
105
 It may be run by only one individual who may 
be the corporation’s sole employer, its governing director, as well as its controlling 
shareholder; nonetheless, this does not make that individual the corporation. As 
indicated by Lord Wrenbury in Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd
106
 
...the corporator even if he holds all the shares, is not the corporation.
107
 
Although the courts accept and uphold the concept of separate legal personality which 
places a veil of incorporation on the corporation, metaphorically speaking, there are 
circumstances where the courts disregard the accruing privilege of separate corporate 
personality, and treat the rights or liabilities of a corporation as those of the 
shareholders, consequently bringing about personal liability. This may be called 
‘lifting’, ‘piercing’, ‘setting aside’, or ‘going behind’ the veil of incorporation.108 
These exceptional circumstances under which the veil may be lifted include cases 
under common law; and by statute. Under common law, the veil may be lifted in the 
case of agency,
109







 or where the existence of a single economic unit is proved.
113
 The courts 
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may also dislodge the corporate veil in the case of criminal responsibility, where one 
attributes to a corporation the acts and knowledge of its ‘directing mind and will’ – 
that is, its management.
114
 Under statute, the veil may also be lifted by section 24 CA 
1985, section 117 CA 1985 replicated in section 767 CA 2006, section 349 CA 1985, 
section 15 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, section 122 Insolvency Act 
1986, section 213 Insolvency Act 1986, section 214 Insolvency Act 1986.  
By the above account, therefore, a corporation is established as a separate legal 
personality. The consequence of this separate legal personality is that the corporation 
upon incorporation is brought to life,
115
 has perpetual succession,
116
 can sue and be 
sued in its own name,
117
 can own its own property,
118
 can enter into contracts,
119
 and 
can die upon its winding up.
120
 Furthermore, the corporation by virtue of its 
incorporation is empowered by the CA 2006, irrespective of being a non-natural 
person, to a distinct legal existence recognised by law with legal rights, duties, 
privileges, responsibilities, assets, or liabilities, very much in a similar manner as any 
other natural person. This illustrates the capacity the corporation has, as a non-natural 
person with legal personality, and the manner in which the courts have treated the 
separate personality of corporations, which is akin to a natural person save for 
exceptional circumstances which have been examined above. To this end, it therefore 
follows that the corporation has the capacity to enjoy certain rights and privileges 
which are enjoyed by the natural person.  
Consequently, it may then be asked: does this apply to privacy? If a corporation has 
such rights which enable it to come to life with its registration, have a name, enter into 
contracts with this name, sue and be sued in its own name, have members, own 
property, and cease to exist when it is wound up; it is reasoned that one may question: 
can the corporation also have a right to its privacy to carry on certain activities within 
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its establishment? To which the question ensues: what does privacy mean for the 
corporation?    
In seeking to examine this question, the investigation of this chapter proceeds to test 
the three following key concepts of the privacy of the individual on the corporation, as 
set out at the beginning of this part of this chapter: 
- Privacy interests: the intrusion privacy interests and information privacy 
interests are tested on the corporation  
- Definition of privacy: the definitions of privacy of the individual which 
reflects the two above privacy interests are also tested to investigate whether 
they may apply to the corporation  
- Rationales for the privacy: the two independent rationales for the privacy of 
the individual are tested on the corporation. In making this examination, 
therefore, the dignity and autonomy rationales of the privacy of the 
individual are tested on the corporation to investigate whether they may 
apply to the corporation. 
These tests are undertaken to demonstrate that the concept of privacy also applies to 
corporations; and that corporations do have privacy aspects which are worthy of 
protection in English law. 
Privacy interests 
In developing a definition of privacy for corporations as part 3 of this chapter has set 
out to achieve, it is suggested that the next step, having defined the notion of the 
corporation, is to inquire whether corporations have the privacy interests of intrusion 
privacy and information privacy, from which the definition of privacy ensues; and if 
so, how they apply. This section therefore tests these two interests and illustrates how 
they occur in the case of the corporation. 
Intrusion privacy interest 
The intrusion interest of the individual, as discussed in part 1, above, involves freedom 
from unwanted access or disturbance or interference or surveillance into one’s private 
sphere – a sphere in which an individual is free to carry on his activities – and this 
includes unwanted access or disturbance or interference or surveillance into one’s 
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physical space, one’s home, or one’s property. Does this apply to corporations? Can 
the corporation’s premises be deemed its space, its home or its property; and if so, then 
can it be subject of unwanted access or disturbance or interference or surveillance – 
that is to say, intrusion?  
It is argued that the corporation’s premises can be deemed its home or property which 
represents its own space. This is supported by the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights which declares in a host of cases that the protection of private life 
and the home as provided for in Article 8 ECHR has to be respected, and extends to 
the premises of commercial companies.
121
 To this end, in the case of Societe Colas Est 
v France,
122
 it has been established that ‘on a dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, the 
right to home as guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR may be construed as including the 
right to respect for a company's registered office, branches or other business 
premises’.123 It is also noted that in an earlier case, Niemietz v Germany,124 the notion 
of ‘private life’ and ‘home’ under Article 8 ECHR was interpreted as including certain 
business activities and business premises.
125
 Furthermore, Lord Woolf MR in R v 
Broadcasting Standards Commission ex parte BBC
126
 in reiterating the statement of 
the Advocate General in the Court of Justice of the European Communities case of 
Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities
127
 noted that ‘a general trend 
was discernible in the national legal systems of member states of the European Union 
towards the assimilation of business premises to a home’.128  
It is therefore reasoned that having been settled by the law that a corporation’s 
premises or property may be deemed its home, it follows that an unwanted access into 
a corporation’s home or premises or property may constitute an intrusion into its own 
space. This submission is supported by the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
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Human Rights as illustrated in the case of Societe Colas Est v France,
129
 in which the 
court established that ‘entry into a corporation’s premises for inspection, without 
judicial authorization, and the search and seizure of various documents containing 
evidence unrelated to the inspection in issue, constitutes intrusion into a corporation’s 
home’.130  
Equally, the submission that an unwanted access into a corporation’s home or premises 
or property may constitute an intrusion into its own space is also made because in 
looking at instances of intrusion on the individual as illustrated in part 1 of this chapter 
above, with such examples as the surreptitious prying on an individual, the search of 
an individual,
 
his home, or his property, the seizure ensuring from the search, the 
hacking into an individual’s telephone or computer; it could be argued that these are 
instances of intrusion which may similarly occur in the case of the corporation. To this 
end, a corporation’s private sphere – that is to say, its home or premises or property 
which represents its physical space – may be subject to unwanted surreptitious 
spying.
131
 In the case of surreptitious spying on an individual, it is the individual 
person that is the subject of interest of the peeping Tom, while in the case of 
surreptitious spying on a corporation, it is the corporation’s physical sphere, which is 
its home or premises or property, that is the subject of the surreptitious spying. 
Likewise, the corporation’s home or premises or property may be subjected to an 
unwanted search and seizure of its property or documents.
132
 Similarly, the 
corporation’s property such as its telephone or computer may be the subject of an 
unwanted hacking. Other instances of intrusion on the corporation may include the 
unwanted entry into, and clandestine listening to the activities of a board meeting, or 
surreptitious spying into the corporation’s correspondence.133 Indeed, corporations 
may well wish to keep their property free from intrusion.
134
  
Accordingly, intrusion in the case of the corporation entails freedom from unwanted 
access or disturbance or interference or surveillance into the corporation’s private 
sphere – a sphere in which the corporation is free to carry on its activities – and this 
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includes unwanted access into the corporation’s home, or property, which represents 
its space. It is therefore submitted that the intrusion interest of privacy is one which 
also applies to corporations; furthermore, an affront on the legal personality of a 
corporation may constitute injury to its personality, albeit legal. 
Information privacy interest 
The information privacy interest of the individual as discussed in part 1 above involves 
the protection of private information from unwanted dissemination or publication – it 
protects against the misuse of private information. Does this apply to corporations? 
Can the corporation be deemed to have information which may be held to be private, 
and thereby be subject to the information privacy interest? 
The typical information of the corporation which is protected in English law is its 
commercial confidential information, such as its technical secrets and business 
secrets.
135
 However, it is submitted that there are situations in which certain 
information concerning the business of the corporation, that is to say, its commercial 
confidential information, transmutes into the private information sphere. In such 
situations, this sort of information becomes subject to the information privacy interest. 
The transmutation from the commercial sphere to the private sphere occurs through the 
manner in which the corporation’s commercial information is handled; and this is 
illustrated in such instances as follows: 
a. The contents of certain information ensuing from the corporation’s meetings or 
obtained from the minutes of such meetings; such as, information ensuing, for 
instance, from meetings where the internal rules and procedures, or policies of the 
corporation are deliberated. In this case, if the press surreptitiously obtains such 
information and publishes it, this may be held as the publication of the private 
information of the said corporation; and as such, this action would become subject of 
the information privacy interest.
136
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b. Information ensuing from certain documents of the corporation, such as, documents 
on its policies, certain negotiations with other corporations, or its decisions. It may be 
that the corporation may not want to divulge the contents of this information before a 
given time. If the press, however, surreptitiously obtain and divulge the contents of this 
information to the public against the corporation’s wishes, this may be held as the 
publication of the corporation’s private information; and as such, this action would 
become subject of the information privacy interest. An instance of this sort of 
information may be information involving merger negotiations.
137
 
c. Likewise, the contents of information ensuing, for instance, from the corporation’s 
internal correspondence. For instance, where there is internal correspondence between 
a corporation and its staff, or between a corporation and its subsidiary regarding the 
use of its products. In this case, the director of the subsidiary may be writing to the 
head office to consult or make recommendations on the effectiveness of one of the 
corporation’s products. If this internal correspondence is surreptitiously obtained by 
the press, and published, it is suggested that this act by the press may be held as the 
publication of the private information of the said corporation; and therefore become 
subject of the information privacy interest.
138
 
d. Furthermore, such other information, obtained, for instance, through the 
surreptitious surveillance and filming of the corporation’s private areas such as its 
bathrooms, toilets,
139
 or information regarding the general standards of care within a 
corporation.
140
 If the details of these sorts of information are published by the press, 
this may be held as the publication of the corporation’s private information; and as 
such, this action would become subject of the information privacy interest. 
From the above, therefore, it is accordingly submitted that corporations do have private 
information which may result from its business activities, which it may wish to keep 
private, and the contents of which it may well wish to protect from unwanted 
publication or dissemination. It is further submitted that the publication or 
dissemination of the private information obtained, for instance, through hacking into 




 This is discussed in Schering Chemicals v Falkman Ltd [1982] QB 1, under the traditional action for 
breach of confidence, in part 1 of chapter 2. 
139
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the corporation’s computer or telephone, or through clandestine filming or zoom lens 
technology, or other clandestine means, would engage the information privacy interest. 
As such, the information privacy interest is one which applies to corporations. The 
focus of the information privacy interest is on the dissemination or publication of 
private information resulting from an interference or disturbance – an intrusion.  
Indeed, the transmutation of information from commercial to private may be inferred 
to be demonstrated in the European Commission’s understanding of privacy. In its 
impact assessment on the protection of undisclosed business information against 
unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure,
141
 the European Commission in indicating 
that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to privacy of the 
natural or legal person has been recognised by the European Court of Justice, declared  
As a result, an economic actor who protects valuable information through 
secrecy (i.e. as a trade secret) is indeed exercising [its] right to private life and, 
as a result, a misappropriation of a trade secret constitutes an intrusion 
into/interference with such right.
142
 
With regard to the transmutation of corporation’s information from commercial to 
private, the above declaration, in view of the title of the report, seems to suggest that 
the misappropriation of a trade secret – unlawful disclosure – through for instance, 




Furthermore, that corporations do have information which is held to be private in 
nature accords with the declarations of Woolf MR and Hale LJ in R v Broadcasting 
Standards Commission ex parte BBC.
144
 In this case, programme makers for a 
broadcasting company secretly filmed transactions in plaintiff’s store without the 
plaintiff’s permission. The plaintiff, DSG Retail Ltd, made a complaint to the 
Broadcasting Standards Commission (the BSC) that the secret filming had been an 
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unwarranted infringement of its privacy within sections 110 and 111 of the 
Broadcasting Act 1996. 
The BSC found that the secret filming had infringed the plaintiff’s privacy and that the 
infringement was unwarranted and as such upheld the complaint. On application for 
judicial review by BBC, the court of first instance reversed the finding of the BSC on 
the grounds that a corporation did not have a right to privacy and as such could not 
complain of an infringement of privacy. This decision was unanimously overturned at 
the Court of Appeal which held that under the Broadcasting Act 1996, a company 
could make a complaint of unwarranted infringement of its privacy, and as such, the 
BSC had been entitled to conclude that secret filming of transactions in the plaintiff’s 
stores was an infringement of the plaintiff’s privacy. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal 
restored BSC's adjudication. 
In the course of its judgment, Hale LJ stated that ‘there are many things which 
corporations may wish to keep private such as its property, its meetings and its 
correspondence’.145 Furthermore, Lord Woolf MR declared that ‘while the 
infringements into the privacy of an individual are no doubt more extensive than the 
infringements of privacy which are possible in the case of a corporation, a corporation 
does have activities of a private nature which need protection from unwarranted 
interference, such as its correspondence, which it could justifiably regard as private 
and which the unwanted broadcast of the contents would amount to an interference 
with the corporation’s privacy’.146 Although this case dealt with matters concerning 
broadcasting under the Broadcasting Act 1996, nevertheless Lord Woolf MR in 
concluding the case declared that ‘to hold such an action as an infringement of privacy 
could not possibly be held to be in conflict with the ECHR’.147  
   
Consequently, corporations do have a legitimate claim to the privacy interests of 
intrusion privacy and information privacy. These two fundamental privacy interests, 
which are the hallmark of what privacy represents, apply to the corporation and are 
worthy of protection in English law. These two fundamental privacy interests, 
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independent of each other may result in a loss of the corporation’s privacy; thus a 
privacy action may be brought where an intrusion has occurred independent of the 
misuse of private information.
148
 For a privacy action to be successful, however, the 
claim to privacy by the corporation must be balanced against the right to freedom of 
expression, in the case of the press;
149
 in the case of interference by a public authority, 




Definition of privacy 
Having found that the intrusion and information privacy interests apply to 
corporations, this section proceeds to test the definitions of the privacy of the 
individual on the corporation and thereafter develop a definition of privacy for 
corporations. 
As has been stated above, privacy grew out of the basic need for the protection of the 
individual; and as such, in a majority of cases, the infringement of privacy often 
concerns the individual. This focus on the individual can be seen in the definitions of 
Warren and Brandeis,
151
 in which they argued for the individual’s right to be let alone 
without intrusion into the sacred precincts of his private and domestic life. This is also 
seen in Prosser’s,152 Fried’s,153 Gavison’s,154 and Parent’s155 definitions above. 
However, as has been indicated above, there are situations in which privacy is 
arguably a notion which may extend beyond the individual’s realm to also apply to 
corporations. To this end, it is suggested that the definitions of privacy as a right to be 
free from unwanted intrusion
156
 such as regular surveillance and surreptitious 
spying,
157
 or the ability to lead life without interference to home life,
158
 or public 
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disclosure of private facts,
159
 or misusing private communications and 
correspondences,
160
 are, in the light of such cases as Broadcasting Standards 




 and Societe Colas Est v 
France,
163
 instances of privacy of the individual which are likewise applicable to 
corporations.  
The recognition of the possibility of privacy applying to corporations has not been one 
which has received much acceptance from scholars. An arguably lone recognition of 
this possibility was highlighted in Westin’s164 definition in which he recognised four 
basic states of privacy which were exclusive to the individual;
165
 but nevertheless 
envisaged a situation in which a claim to privacy of information would advance 
beyond the realm of the natural person, and extend into the realm of non-natural 
persons such as organisations. Westin contended that the legitimate claim to privacy 
given to organisations and groups are more than the mere protection of the collective 
privacy rights of the members as individuals. Westin
166
 acknowledged that 
organisations, just as individuals, need the right to decide when and to what extent 
their actions and decisions should be made public, notwithstanding the fact that it is a 
separate entity that has an organisational purpose, internal rules, and procedures.
167
 
Thus, in examining the first limb of my own definition of the privacy of the individual 
in relation to the corporation, it is submitted that in accordance with my definition,
168
 
privacy for corporations may be defined in a similar manner; that is, as the state in 
which the corporation wishes to be free from unwanted interference or disturbance – 
intrusion – into its private sphere, and this includes its home or its property which 
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represents its own space. In this definition, the corporation’s premises is referred to as 
its home on the strength of the principle established by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Societe Colas Est v France.
169
 
Although the corporation may wish to be free from intrusion into its home or property, 
to the extent where privacy involves a desire to retreat into the halls of one’s own 
sanctuary or seclusion so as to enjoy a variety of states without unwanted intrusion, 
such as solitude, anonymity, reserve, and intimacy, this is an aspect of privacy which is 
specific to the individual. Likewise, it is also noted that to the extent where privacy 
involves freedom from intrusion into a corporation’s home or property, for instance, 
through surveillance or surreptitious spying on the corporation by press agents, or 
other corporations’ agents, or by means of entry, search, and seizure effected on the 
corporation by public authorities; this is an aspect of privacy which is specific to the 
corporation. 
Furthermore, in examining the second limb of my definition of the privacy of the 
individual in relation to the corporation, it is submitted that privacy for corporations 
may be defined in a similar manner; that is, as a claim to the control of the 
corporation’s private information from being released into the public domain against 
the corporation’s wishes, thus protecting the said information from unwanted 
dissemination or publication. 
Therefore, privacy for the corporation is defined in two limbs: first, as the state in 
which the corporation wishes to be free from unwanted interference or disturbance – 
intrusion – into its private sphere, and this includes its home or its property which 
represents its own space; and secondly, as a claim to the control of the corporation’s 
private information from being released into the public domain against the 
corporation’s wishes, thus protecting the said information from unwanted 
dissemination or publication. 
In suggesting that privacy is a matter which may concern natural persons and non-
natural persons alike, with the fundamental interests of intrusion privacy and 
information privacy present in the case of individuals as well as corporations, it is 
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however noted that the privacy of the natural persons differs in kind from that which is 
applicable to the corporation.
170
 Nevertheless, privacy for individuals as well as 
corporations involves the protection against intrusion into the private sphere, as well as 
a claim to the control of private information from being released into the public 
domain against the one’s wishes; thus protecting the said information from unwanted 
dissemination or publication. 
This two limbed definition is of importance as it incorporates the fundamental privacy 
interests of intrusion privacy and information privacy, which are the hallmark of what 
privacy represents. 
Rationales of privacy 
In trying to further appreciate and better understand the notion of privacy for the 
corporation, the two independent rationales for the privacy of the individual – dignity 
and autonomy – are tested on the corporation. 
Dignity rationale 
It is suggested that an affront to the personality of the individual may constitute an 
injury to it. This injury which may bring on hurt feelings, distress, humiliation, shame 
or unworthiness, is protected by the dignity rationale of privacy. Dignity, as an 
essential value of privacy, protects against the feelings of loss of respect which the 
above emotions may bring on. To this end, the privacy rationale of dignity can be 
enjoyed by the individual alone. It cannot be enjoyed by the corporation because the 
corporation does not have human feelings which can be injured in the manner 
described above; and as such, is not subjected to the emotions an individual goes 
through when his privacy is infringed. 
Autonomy rationale 
It was established in part 2 of this chapter that the autonomy rationale underpins the 
protection of the individual’s privacy. More specifically, the ability of an individual to 
decide whether, when to, or when not to allow access into his private sphere which 
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includes his physical space, his home or his property – the right to protect against 
unwanted intrusion – is a function of the autonomy of that individual. Equally, it was 
held to be the function of the individual’s autonomy to decide whether, when to, or 
when not to disclose information about himself, as well to control the dissemination or 
publication of such information.  
Consequently, it may be questioned: does this exercise of autonomy apply only to 
natural persons? Can a corporation also exercise autonomy against unwanted intrusion 
into its home or property, as well as in the protection of its private information? And if 
so, does that then suggest that the autonomy rationale also applies to the corporation? 
It is argued that the ability of the corporation to be in a state free from unwanted 
intrusion into its home or property, as well as its claim to the control of its private 
information from unwanted dissemination or publication, are brought on by its ability 
to exercise autonomy in a given situation. The function of this autonomy gives the 
corporation, as a non-natural person, the power and control to make a choice in 
deciding who to grant access into its premises or its property, as well as who to 
disclose its private information to.  
The autonomy rationale enables corporations the required privacy to carry out its work 
away from the public view. As Westin
171
 stated  
Just as with individuals, and subject to the same process of social limitations, 
organizations [including corporations] need the right to decide when and to 
what extent their acts and decisions should be made public.
172
 
It is noted, as indicated by Westin
173
 that the claim to privacy by organizations, 
including corporations, is much more than just the protection of the collective privacy 
rights of its members as individuals. He further indicated that just as in the case of the 
individual, corporations also have the same basic need to be free from constant and 
immediate public exposure. As such, corporations also have a legitimate claim to resist 
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unwanted intrusions into its privacy. The lack of privacy for the corporation can 
threaten the autonomous and independent life of a corporation.
174
 
As concluded by Westin, 
The foregoing discussion of organizational behaviour suggests that privacy is a 
necessary element for the protection of organizational autonomy, gathering of 
information and advice, preparation of positions, internal decision making, 
inter-organizational negotiations, and timing of disclosure. Privacy is thus not a 
luxury for organizational life; it is a vital lubricant of the organizational system 
in free societies. 
In view of the above argument, as supported by Westin’s175 declarations, it is 
submitted that a corporation can exercise autonomy in its home or property against 
unwanted intrusion and in the protection of its private information from dissemination 
or publication; and the corporation’s ability to exercise autonomy in its private sphere 
suggests that the autonomy rationale of privacy also applies to the corporation. The 
autonomy of the corporation in this regard is fundamental to the effective functioning 
of the corporation in a democratic society.  
It is however indicated that the right of the corporation to exercise autonomy in the 
running of its affair is subject to social limitations, so for instance, the corporation, just 
like the individual, cannot plead privacy to cover up fraud or other unlawful acts, such 
as tax evasion. If an illegitimate claim for autonomy by a corporation occurs, then the 
public authority would have the power to lawfully interfere with that corporation’s 
autonomy; equally, the press would have a genuine public interest to report on the 
case. Nevertheless, this ought not to discourage legitimate claims by the corporation to 
the protection of its autonomy in privacy. 
Furthermore, it is acknowledged that over-concealment, by the corporation, of its 
property or private information may threaten legitimate public interest; equally, over-
exposure of private information of corporation by the press may bring about the abuse 
of Article 10 ECHR which is subject to regard for ‘the rights of others’. Similarly, 
interference with the corporation’s privacy by public authorities must be in accordance 
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with the law and necessary in a democratic society.  Therefore, the argument for 
autonomy in the privacy of the corporation must be subject to the balance between 
privacy and disclosure, with great emphasis on freedom of the press as well as 
disclosure based on public interest; however, it ought not to eliminate the legitimate 
claim for the privacy of the corporation. Just as the balancing exercise in the argument 
for privacy protection for the corporation will also act as a check on certain activities 
of the corporation, it would likewise act as a check on the excessive use of power by 
public authorities; furthermore, it will as well act as a check on the excessive use of the 
freedom granted the press by law. 
 
From the testing of the rationales of privacy of the individual on the corporation, as has 
been demonstrated above, the dignity rationale is exclusive to the individual, while the 
autonomy rationale applies to the corporation as it does to the individual. It is 
suggested that this does not deny the corporation the proposition for privacy protection 
in English law. Indeed, it is not unusual for a cause of action to have various rationales 
which apply to it, with a certain rationale applicable to the individual as well as the 
corporation, and other rationales applicable to the individuals alone. This is illustrated 
in the tort of defamation which protects the natural as well as non-natural person such 
as a corporation, where injury has been suffered as a result of a false attack on the 
reputation, character or good name.
176
  
The three rationales which may explain the concept of reputation under defamation are 
identified as interests in dignity, honour, and property.
177
 On the dignitary interest, 
dignity is regarded as an interest in reputation on the basis that ‘the right of a man to 
the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt 
reflected no more than the basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every 
human being – a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty’.178 The 
injury suffered arises from and deals with the damage to the reputation – the 
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unwarranted violation of ‘one’s standing among his fellow-men’.179 The legal remedy 
in such a case seems to involve the treatment of the injury done to the individual in his 
external relations with the community which has subjected him to the hatred, ridicule, 
or contempt of his fellow men, and which lowers him in the estimation of his fellow 
men, invariably causing him distress and hurt. Hence, the injury to his reputation, 
which arguably engages feelings of distress, hurt, and embarrassment.  
On the honour interest, the notion of honour as a reputation interest is one in which an 
individual ‘personally identified with the characteristics normative of a particular 
social role and in return personally receives from others the regard and estimation that 
society accords that role’.180 Honour is regarded as an interest in reputation on the 
basis that it is ‘a personal reflection of the pre-eminence of an individual in society, 
therefore to attack it would result in loss of the individual’s honour and pre-
eminence’.181  
On the property interest, where a person suffers injury as a result of false attack on his 
reputation or good name, this false attack on the reputation may be regarded as a 
property interest – a form of intangible property – on the basis that one’s good name 
and reputation are deemed one’s property which has been cultivated over time. Hence 
to attack or injure it without justification is to unjustly destroy the reputation.
182
 
Pursuant from the above, therefore, it is suggested that where the corporation seeks 
remedy through defamation, the dignity and honour rationales do not apply to it 
because the feelings associated to the said rationales such as feelings of pain, hurt, 
distress, loss of honour and pre-eminence, are arguably feelings which can only be felt 
by the individual; to this end, only the individual may rely on these two rationales. It is 
further argued that when the corporation seeks remedy through defamation, it is on the 
basis of the property rationale – on the basis that the corporation’s good name and 
reputation are deemed the corporation’s property.183 It thus follows that the different 
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rationales of defamation support the different claims to defamation depending on the 
persons involved, to the end that the individual may claim an interest in the dignitary, 
honour or property rationale, whilst the corporation may only claim to have an interest 
in the property rationale. That only one rationale – the property rationale – supports the 
corporation’s claim under defamation, does not result in the corporation not being able 
to claim for the protection against defamation. 
Likewise, in the case of privacy, it is suggested that the privacy rationales of dignity 
and autonomy are also engaged depending on the nature of the claimant; such that the 
dignity rationale of privacy may be claimed by the individual alone, for reasons noted 
above, while the autonomy rationale serves the corporation as well as the individual, as 
has already been submitted. As illustrated in the case of defamation; in privacy cases, 
that only one rationale – the autonomy rationale – supports the corporation’s claim 
under privacy, ought not to result in the corporation not being able to claim for the 
protection against violations of its privacy.  
Accordingly, it is submitted that although only one rationale of privacy is engaged in 
the case of the corporation, this does not deny the corporation the proposition for 
privacy protection in English law. This accords with the views of scholars such as 
Bloustein,
184




 who although referring to the 
individual’s privacy protection, nevertheless, defined the rationale of privacy solely on 
a single rationale. It also accords with the position of the law in the rationales of 
reputation under corporate defamation. As submitted in Part 2 above, the rationales of 
privacy may be pleaded independently, or in conjunction with one another; and as a 
result, the privacy of the corporation is fully supported by the autonomy rationale 
alone. 
 
From the above, therefore, it has been illustrated that privacy also applies to 
corporations; corporations do have privacy interests – the intrusion privacy interests 
and information privacy interests – which are worthy of protection in English law. It 
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has also been illustrated that the definitions of privacy for the individual similarly 
apply to the corporation to the extent that it involves the protection against intrusion 
into the private sphere, as well as a claim to the control of private information from 
being released into the public domain against the one’s wishes; thus protecting the said 
information from unwanted dissemination or publication. Furthermore, it has been 
illustrated that the independent rationale of privacy for the corporation is the autonomy 
rationale, and this rationale carries the proposed action for the privacy of the 
corporation. 
It is most important to note that in an argument for the protection of the privacy of the 
corporation, it is the legitimate acts of the corporation that such protection speaks to. 
As with other laws protecting the corporation, illegitimate actions will not be shielded 
by privacy; indeed, as already well-established in company law, the veil of 
incorporation is not provided by law to shield the corporation from illegality or fraud. 
As earlier stated, the veil of incorporation will be lifted, pierced, or set aside in cases 
such as sharp practice and fraud,
 
an instance of this may be found in the evasion of tax 
by the corporation. Equally, by Section 993(1) CA 2006, on the offence of fraudulent 
trading, ‘if any business of a company is carried on for any fraudulent purpose, every 
person who is knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in that manner 
commits an offence’. As such, the question of whether English law ought to be further 
developed to provide fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation, is not to say 
that the corporation would be absolved from performing its generic responsibilities as 
a corporation, for instance, the payment of its taxes; neither will the argument for 
corporation’s privacy absolve it from performing its social responsibilities. Just as the 
claim to privacy by the individual has not amounted to the individual not performing 
his civic duties in society, likewise, the corporation’s claim to privacy protection is 
argued in the same vein. Besides, as will be demonstrated in chapters 3 and 5, for a 
claim to privacy to be successful in the case of press interference, such interference 
must be balanced with Article 10 ECHR freedom of expression, to the end that 
interference by the press is held not to be in compliance with Article 10 ECHR and not 
in the public interest. Equally, in the case of public authority interference, for a claim 
to privacy to be successful, such interference must be balanced with Article 8(2) 
ECHR, to the end that interference by a public authority is held not to be in accordance 
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with law nor necessary in a democratic society.
187
 Consequently, the reservations 
which may exist regarding the advancement of the law to provide protection for the 
privacy of the corporation ought not to deny the corporation or prevent it from 
receiving effective protection of the law, which is a fundamental right in a democratic 
society. Thus, the reservations against any further legitimate protection of the 
corporation ought not cause the corporation not to be effectively protected in a 
democratic and ever evolving world. It is suggested that as the world evolves, the law 
ought to effectively evolve with it so as to keep up with the realities of the times. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that privacy for the corporation protects the corporation’s 
autonomy to carry on its activities, within the law, and without unwanted interference; 
in view of this, the corporation ought to be able to lawfully resist the unjustified or 
unwarranted interferences into its privacy. Indeed, the privacy of the corporation is 
worthy of protection in English law.  
 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter has illustrated that the individual has two fundamental privacy interests – 
the intrusion privacy interest and the information privacy interest – upon which a 
definition of privacy for the individual has been derived. It has also illustrated that the 
autonomy and dignity rationales are the independent rationales for the protection of the 
individual’s privacy. Furthermore, this chapter has established that the corporation also 
has the two abovementioned privacy interests. It has defined the corporation’s privacy 
in two limbs, based on these two interests: first, as the state in which the corporation 
wishes to be free from unwanted interference or disturbance – intrusion – into its 
private sphere, and this includes its home or its property which represents its own 
space; and secondly, as a claim to the control of the corporation’s private information 
from being released into the public domain against the corporation’s wishes, thus 
protecting the said information from unwanted dissemination or publication. It has also 
held that the corporation’s privacy, like the individual’s privacy, involves the 
                                                          
187
 Article 8(2) ECHR provides there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
[the right to privacy] except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
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protection against intrusion into the private sphere, as well as a claim to the control of 
private information from unwanted dissemination or publication. Equally, this chapter 
has established that the autonomy and dignity rationales of privacy may be pleaded 
independently, or in conjunction with one another; and in the case of the corporation’s 
























THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF THE PRIVACY OF THE 
CORPORATION IN ENGLISH LAW 
INTRODUCTION  
Having established that privacy applies to the corporation and thereto examined the 
concept of privacy for the corporation in the previous chapter, in investigating whether 
English law ought to be further developed to provide fuller protection for the privacy 
of the corporation, this chapter considers the present level of protection of the privacy 
of the corporation in English law. Accordingly, this chapter through doctrinal analysis 
undertakes an investigation into the mediums of protection within which the protection 
of the individual’s privacy under English common law were previously sought, as well 
as the present mediums of protection of certain aspects of the individual’s privacy 
under statute. The aim of this investigation is to identify the level of protection of the 
corporation’s privacy in English law. 
To achieve this, this chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 investigates the common 
law; hereunder, the traditional action for breach of confidence, [the extended action for 
breach of confidence is investigated in chapter 3] malicious falsehood, as well as 
defamation. An investigation is made into whether the traditional action for breach of 
confidence also protects the privacy of corporations because in addition to being an 
erstwhile medium of protection for the privacy of the individual, it is also the present 
medium of protection for the corporation’s, as well as the individual’s, commercial 
confidential information – hence the investigation into whether the privacy of the 
corporation is also therein protected. In addition, malicious falsehood and defamation 
are investigated because these are causes of action through which the protection of the 
individual’s privacy were previously sought. Part 2 investigates English Statute; 
hereunder, this chapter investigates the Data Protection Act 1998, Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, and the Broadcasting Act 1996. These statutes presently protect 
specific aspects of the individual’s privacy; consequently, this investigation is made to 
ascertain whether the privacy of the corporation is also therein protected, and if so, to 
what extent.  
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From the above investigations, this chapter establishes that of all the mediums 
examined, the privacy of the corporation is protected only to a limited extent by the 
Broadcasting Act 1996; consequently, an outline of the aspects of the corporation’s 
privacy which still require protection in English law, and to which the research 
























The traditional action for breach of confidence 
The history of the development of the traditional action for breach of confidence is 
obscure.
188
 It has been stated to be ‘pre-eminently a field of law which is known in part 
and prophesied in part’.189 However, the traditional action for breach of confidence has 
its origin in the mid-19
th
 century with the locus classicus case of Prince Albert v 
Strange.
190
 In this case, a workman was intrusted with private copper-plates not 
intended for publication, but for the purpose of making impressions of etchings for the 
plaintiff. In violation of the trust, he took the impressions for himself and sold them to 
the defendant who without the authorisation of the plaintiff published a catalogue of 
them. 
The Court held that the right to property therein had been manifestly invaded through 
the medium of a breach of trust, and that the invasion entitled the plaintiff under 
common law to an action for the breach of contract, violation of confidence, and 
breach of trust. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to a perpetual injunction to restrain 
the publication of the catalogue and to a decree ordering the impressions to be 
destroyed. This judgment was upheld on appeal, with the injunction sustained on the 
same grounds upon which it was originally granted. 
It is noted that although matters of confidence had been dealt with before this locus 
classicus case,
191
 Prince Albert’s case is important because, as stated by Aplin et al192 
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 Aplin, T., Bently, L., Johnson, P., and Malynicz, S. Gurry on Confidence – The Protection of 
Confidential Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. See also Law Commission Working 
Paper on Breach of Confidence, No 58, Cmnd 8388, 1974; Law Commission Report  on Breach of 
Confidence, No 110, 1981. 
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 Finn, P.D. Fiduciary Obligations. Sydney: Law Book Co, 1977. 
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 See Yovatt v Winyard [1820] 1 Jaob & Walker 394; 37 ER 425 in which the Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Eldon, granted an injunction to restrain a defendant from communicating certain recipes for 
medicines, upon the grounds that the defendant had obtained the knowledge of the mode of 
preparing them through a breach of trust and confidence. 
See also Abernethy v Hutchinson [1825] 3 LJ OS Ch 209 which was cited in Prince Albert’s case. In 
Abernethy’s case, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon, granted an injunction against third persons 
publishing lectures orally delivered, who have procured the means of publishing those lectures from 
parties who attended the oral delivery of them, on the ground that there was an implied contract 
between the lecturer and the parties who attended his lectures, that they should not publish them.  
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‘it acknowledges a distinct action for breach of confidence, which alongside property 
and contract, protects confidentiality’. Similarly, Lord Hoffmann in Campbell v Mirror 
Group Newspapers
193
 referred to Prince Albert’s case as a ‘seminal judgment’. More 
recently, on the action of breach of confidence, Lord Neuberger MR in Imerman v 
Tchenguiz
194
 declared that 
The earliest cases on the topic pre-date even the days of Lord Eldon LC. 
However, the jurisprudence really starts with a number of his decisions and 
then continues throughout the 19th century. There are many reported cases but 
it is convenient to start with the celebrated case of Prince Albert v Strange 
(1849) 1 Mac & G 25…195 
Accordingly, although Prince Albert’s case was not the earliest case in matters of 
confidence, it is safe to suggest that it is the ‘starting point’196 of the evolution of the 
traditional action of the law of breach of confidence.  
Furthermore, even though this case initiated what came to be known as the action for 
breach of confidence, its judgment was arrived at on the basis of property rights. This 
is illustrated in the declaration of Sir Knight-Bruce VC that ‘the right of property had, 
in this case, been manifestly invaded through the medium of breach of trust’.197 
Similarly, Lord Cottenham LC reiterated this on appeal, propounding that ‘the case in 
question depended solely upon the question of property – for breach of trust, 
confidence, or contract, and as such, the court would interfere herein to protect the 
right of property’.198 Furthermore, although the case had its legal basis in property 
rights, privacy was arguably a fundamental aspect of this case as it involved the 
intrusion into the plaintiff’s private and domestic life, as well as the misuse of the 
plaintiff’s private information. This invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy was 
acknowledged by Sir Knight-Bruce VC where he declared that ‘as the etchings were 
executed by the plaintiff and his consort for their private use, they were entitled to 
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retain a state of privacy, to withhold such from publication’.199 To this end, Sir Knight-
Bruce VC declared  
I think, therefore, not only that the Defendant here is unlawfully invading the 
Plaintiff’s right, but also that the invasion is of such a kind and affects such 
property as to entitle the Plaintiff to the preventative remedy of an injunction 
… because it is an intrusion – an intrusion … offensive to that inbred sense of 
propriety natural to every man – if intrusion, indeed, fitly describes a sordid 
spying into the privacy of domestic life – into the home (a word hitherto sacred 
among us), the home of a family … the most marked respect in this country.200 
On appeal, Lord Cottenham LC in a further acknowledgement of privacy stated that 
the etchings in question were the exclusive property of the plaintiff, hence 
[The plaintiff] is entitled to be protected in the exclusive use and enjoyment of 
that which is exclusively his
201




However, in spite of the fact that privacy was a fundamental aspect in this case, the 
case was not pursued under an action for an invasion of privacy since privacy as an 
independent cause of action had not at the time been contemplated in English law. 
Privacy in this period was deemed a property right, and as such, an interference with 
one’s private information203 was deemed and dealt with, not as an interference with 
one’s privacy, but as an interference with one’s property rights in that information – ‘a 
violation of one’s property’204 – which, depending on how the violation of property 
occurred, could bring about an action in breach of confidence, breach of trust, and/or 
breach of contract. In perceiving privacy as a property right, the idea was that privacy 
was ‘one attribute of property which was often its most valuable quality’.205 
The traditional action for the breach of confidence requirements 
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As the law further evolved, it became settled that there are three requirements which 
are essential for a successful action under the traditional action for breach of 
confidence to succeed. These requirements were laid down by Megarry J in Coco v 
Clark (Engineers) Ltd.
206
 In accordance with Megarry J’s declaration, three elements 
are required if, apart from contract, a case of breach of confidence is to succeed: 
First, the information itself in the words of Lord Greene MR in the Saltman 
case ... must have the necessary quality of confidence about it. Secondly, that 
information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation 
of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of that information to 
the detriment of the party communicating it.
207
  
These requirements are briefly examined below. 
A. Confidential quality of information 
Confidential quality entails that the information in question must be confidential in 




[For] information to be confidential, [it] must …have the necessary quality of 
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 At 215. 
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Something which is public property and public knowledge cannot per se 
provide any foundation for proceedings of breach of confidence.
211
 
This in essence denoted that there could be no breach of confidence in revealing to 
others, information that was already common knowledge which was in the public 
domain, irrespective of the fact that such information was communicated in 
confidence. As stated by Carty,
212
 ‘information which is in the “public domain” is the 
antithesis of confidential’. 
B. Obligation of confidence 
The second requirement towards a successful action for breach of confidence as laid 
down by Megarry J. in Coco v Clark (Engineers) Ltd
213
 is that ‘information must have 
been communicated in circumstances which import an obligation of confidence’.214  
Relying on the case of Saltman Engineering v Campbell Engineering Co,
215
 Megarry J. 
noted  
I think it is quite plain from the Saltman case that the obligation of confidence 
may exist where, as in this case, there is no contractual relationship between 
the parties. In cases of contract, the primary question is no doubt that of 
construing the contract and any terms implied in it. Where there is no contract, 
however, the question must be one of what it is that suffices to bring the 
obligation into being; and there is the further question of what amounts to a 
breach of that obligation.
216
 
To this end, Megarry J., in indicating that an obligation of confidence may exist by 
express agreement or implied by law, declared the circumstances in which the 
obligation will be imposed, thus 
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If the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of 
the recipient of the information would have realised upon reasonable grounds 
that the information was being given to him in confidence.
217
 
Consequently, the question of whether there has been a breach of obligation of 
confidence involves an objective test in which as noted by Megarry J, ‘the hard 
worked creature – the reasonable man – may be pressed into service, to once more 
labour in equity’.218  
It is noted however, that irrespective of how secret and confidential information is, 
there can be no binding obligation of confidence if that information is communicated 
in circumstances which negate any duty of holding it confidential, such as where 
information is divulged in public by the person who expects an obligation to be 
respected; that is to say, the owner of the information. Equally, if a person owes 
another an obligation of confidence regarding information, and in breach of this 
obligation the information finds its way to the public domain, the person who owes the 
obligation of confidence may be prevented from being able to use the information for a 
reasonable time thereafter, in spite of the fact that it is in the public domain. This is 
known as the spring board doctrine.
219
 
An obligation of confidence may therefore be by express agreement, or implied by 




 or in 
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C. Detriment  
The third requirement for an action of breach of confidence according to Megarry J. in 
Coco v Clark (Engineers) Ltd
223
 is that 




Although detriment is stated by Megerry J. to be a requirement as seen above, it is not 
clear if detriment is a prerequisite for a successful action in all cases. This is because 
Megarry J. went on to state that 
…although for the purposes of this case I have stated the proposition [that there 
must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party 
communicating it] in the stricter form, I wish to keep open the possibility of the 
true proposition being that in the wider form.
225
 
Indeed, courts have been reluctant to definitively take a stand on the subject. To this 
end, Lord Goff in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd
226
 restated that he 
wished ‘to keep open the question whether detriment was an essential requirement of 
an action for the breach of confidence’.227  
 
The nature of protection the traditional action for breach of confidence provides 
the corporation 
This section analyses the nature of protection the traditional action provides. It 
investigates whether the traditional action provides protection for the privacy of the 
corporation – that is to say, protection against the misuse of the corporation’s private 
information as well as the protection of the corporation’s intrusion interest – and 
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argues that the traditional action only protects against the misuse of commercial 
confidential information. 
Protection against the misuse of commercial confidential information 
Although the traditional action for breach of confidence arguably had its origin in the 
protection of the two fundamental interests of intrusion and information privacy, albeit 
in a commercial context, as illustrated from the case of Prince Albert v Strange
228
 
above, as the law developed, the majority of cases handled thereunder were 
predominantly cases involving the protection of commercial confidential information 
of the individual as well as the corporation.
229
 However, a few cases involving the 
protection of the private information of individuals were instituted on the grounds of 
breach of confidence;
230
 but this was the position before the Human Rights Act 1998 
[HRA]. With the implementation of the HRA, which gave effect to the rights and 
freedoms under the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 [ECHR], the 
protection of privacy has developed into an independent cause of action. As such, 
cases involving the violation of privacy of the individual began to be handled by a 
mechanism which involved the incorporation of Articles 8 and 10 ECHR into the 
traditional action to establish a new action that has become known as the extended 
action for the breach of confidence.
231
 With the protection of the privacy of the 
individual as an independent cause of action under the extended action for breach of 
confidence, the traditional action presently and adequately protects against the misuse 
of commercial confidential information of both individuals and corporations, as further 
illustrated in such matters as relating to manufacturing technology,
232
 technical 
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Consequently, one may thus ask: what is commercial confidential information?  
Commercial confidential information may be defined as information of a confidential 
nature which is related to business or trading activity, through which a business may 
achieve economic advantage over other competing businesses. It is also referred to as 
trade secrets. In Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler,
237
 in which the plaintiffs filed an 
injunction and made claim to damages for breaches of contracts of employment and/or 
breaches of confidence, for the use of confidential information or trade secrets gained 
by the defendants in the course of their employment; Goulding J., in the course of his 
judgment,
238
 identified two classes of commercial confidential information as follows 
[First] information which the employee must treat as confidential (either 
because he is expressly told it is so or because from its character it is obviously 
confidential) but which once learned necessarily remained in the employee's 
head and became part of his own skill and knowledge applied in the course of 
his employer's business. So long as the employment continues, he cannot 
otherwise use or disclose such information without infidelity and therefore 
breach of contract. But when he is no longer in the same service, the law allows 
him to use his full skill and knowledge for his own benefit in competition with 
his former master. 
[Secondly] specific trade secrets so confidential that, even though they may 
necessarily have been learned by heart and even though the employee may 
have left the service, cannot lawfully be used save for the employer's benefit.
239
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On appeal, the Court of Appeal, disagreed with the first class of commercial 
confidential information as espoused by Goulding J., where Goulding J. suggested that 
an employer can protect the use of information even though it does not include either a 
trade secret or its equivalent, by means of a restrictive covenant. The Court of Appeal 
stated that ‘a restrictive covenant will not be enforced unless the protection sought is 
reasonably necessary to protect a trade secret or to prevent some personal influence 
over customers being abused so as to entice them away’.240 The Court of Appeal 
however upheld the second class of commercial confidential information as specific 
trade secrets so confidential that it cannot lawfully be used for the employee’s benefit 
even where the employee may have left service. Lord Neill LJ went on to define trade 
secrets as commercial information which is ‘of a sufficiently high degree of 
confidentiality’.241 
In clarifying the notion of trade secrets, Staughton LJ in Lansing Linde v Kerr,
242
 
declared that trade secrets may be defined thus 
[Frist] it must be information used in a trade or business, and secondly that the 




In the earlier case of Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd. v Guinle,
244
 Megarry V-C had 
declared that four elements may be discerned in identifying confidential information or 
trade secrets which the court will protect, thus 
First, I think that the information must be information the release of which the 
owner believes would be injurious to him or of advantage to his rivals or 
others. Second, I think the owner must believe that the information is 
confidential or secret, i.e., that it is not already in the public domain. It may be 
that some or all of his rivals already have the information: but as long as the 
owner believes it to be confidential I think he is entitled to try and protect it. 
Third, I think that the owner's belief under the two previous heads must be 
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reasonable. Fourth, I think that the information must be judged in the light of 
the usage and practices of the particular industry or trade concerned.
245
 
From these definitions, it becomes clear that commercial confidential information – 
trade secrets – has three elements: 
a. Information must be confidential 
b. Information has commercial value 
c. Reasonable efforts must have been made by the holder to maintain its 
confidentiality.
246
   
It is suggested that trade secrets are broadly divided into two classes: technical secrets, 
and business secrets.
 247
 Technical secrets are secrets which relate to the production of 
goods and services
248
 and have been held under the traditional action for breach of 
confidence to include such processes as secret processes of manufacture such as 
chemical formulae,
249




 designs and 
drawings.
252
 Business secrets are secrets which the business entity generates about its 
business activities
253
 and have been held under the traditional action for breach of 
confidence to include copies of list of customers of employer and the goods which they 
buy,
254
 the names and telex addresses of an employer's manufacturers, suppliers and 
overseas buying agents through whom the company deals,
255
 the company's samples, 








  the 
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scope of business secrets also extend to information about the management and 




From the above, therefore, it has been demonstrated that the traditional action for the 
breach of confidence is a medium which fully protects against the misuse of 
commercial confidential information – trade secrets. Furthermore, following from the 
above account of trade secrets as including the secret processes of manufacture such as 
chemical formulae, special methods of construction, secret recipes, designs and 
drawings, copies of list of customers of employer and the goods which they buy, the 
names and telex addresses of an employer's manufacturers, suppliers, and overseas 
buying agents through whom the company deals, the company's samples, new ranges, 
and current fast-moving lines, quotations, costs and prices, information about the 
management and performance of a business, and plans for its future; it is observed that 
the corporation’s privacy has not been included in its protection. 261  
Accordingly, it then follows to inquire: does the traditional action for breach of 
confidence provide protection for the corporation’s information privacy interest?262 
Equally, does the traditional action provide protection for the corporation’s intrusion 
privacy interest?
263
 That is to say, does the traditional action provide protection for the 
privacy of the corporation? This is investigated below. 
 
Protection for the privacy of the corporation? 
Having found that the traditional action for breach of confidence protects against the 
misuse of commercial confidential information, the investigation is made into whether 
the traditional action also protects the corporation’s privacy.  
It is argued that in cases dealt with under the traditional action for the breach of 
confidence which involve the misuse of commercial confidential information of the 
corporation, the misuse of its private information as well as intrusion into its property, 
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the commercial aspect of the case tends to be dealt with under the traditional action, 
and the privacy aspect arguably not recognized. This is illustrated in the case of 
Schering Chemicals v Falkman Ltd.
264
 In this case, the plaintiff company employed a 
firm which held a training course with the aim of countering the adverse publicity the 
plaintiff company was facing regarding one of its drugs. In the course of this training, 
the plaintiff company supplied information which the firm agreed to keep confidential. 
Subsequently, one of the instructors of the firm, Mr Elstein, without the consent of the 
plaintiff, and in collaboration with a production company, Thames, made a film 
concerning the drug. Furthermore, Sunday Times got hold of a file of the internal 
correspondence of the plaintiff company and published it. 
In the court of first instance, the court granted an injunction restraining the instructor, 
Mr Elstein, and the production company, Thames, from broadcasting the film on the 
grounds of breach of confidence. 
On appeal, the order of the lower court was upheld.
265
 
The court adjudicated the case on the basis of breach of confidence in a commercial 
context. Shaw LJ indicated that the commercial interests of the party confiding the 
information was the interest involved. In arriving at its judgment, the court indicated 
that Mr Elstein and Thames owed the plaintiff an obligation of confidence for the 
confidential information which was used without the plaintiff’s consent.  
On the commercial context, Shaw LJ noted that Schering was owed an obligation of 
confidence by Mr Elstein. He noted that save for certain information which may be in 
the public interest or public safety to conceal, an obligation of confidence was one 
which the receiver of information was obliged to keep. To this end, he stated 
As I see the position, the communication in a commercial context of 
information which at the time is regarded by the giver and recognised by the 
recipient as confidential, and the nature of which has a material connection 
with the commercial interests of the party confiding that information, imposes 
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on the recipient a fiduciary obligation to maintain that confidence thereafter 
unless the giver consents to relax it.
266
 
On the obligation of confidence, Templeman LJ added that Mr Elstein had an implied 
obligation of confidence to Schering on the basis that the information in question was 
Schering’s information which he acquired as a result of his training. Templeman LJ 
stated 
In any event, even if Mr Elstein did not make an express promise himself to 
Schering and did not know that Falkman had made an express promise to 
Schering on his behalf that he would not make use in the future of information 
public or private supplied by Schering for the purposes of the training 
programme, he nevertheless, in my judgment, impliedly made such a promise 
to Schering when he agreed to take part in the training programme, accepted 
information supplied by Schering for that purpose...
267
 
His Lordship noted that the fact that Mr Elstein was not employed and paid by 
Schering but by Falkman does not prevent the implication of such a promise as it was 
obvious to him that the information supplied by Schering was specifically given to him 
for one purpose only, which is, to enable him to advise Schering how to avoid or 
mitigate bad publicity in the future.
268
 
Furthermore, his Lordship stated that the production company that chose to employ Mr 
Elstein in making a film with full knowledge of all the circumstances were in no better 
position than Mr Elstein himself. His Lordship noted that 




Consequently, the appeal by Mr Elstein and Thames to lift the injunction restraining 
them from broadcasting the film on the grounds of breach of confidence was 
dismissed.
270
 This position accords with the spring board doctrine,
271
 wherein a person 
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who owes another an obligation of confidence may be prevented from being able to 
use information upon which the said obligation is based, for a reasonable time, even 
though the information in question may already be in the public domain. 
It is, however, suggested that there are privacy aspects to this case which were not 
accorded protection. The publication of the contents of the file of the internal 
correspondence of Schering by Sunday Times, without Schering’s consent, amounted 
to an interference with Schering’s private information – thereby engaging Schering’s 
information privacy interest. Likewise, the taking of the file of the internal 
correspondence by Sunday Times, without Schering’s consent, amounted to an 
intrusion into Schering’s correspondence – thereby engaging the intrusion privacy 
interest. 
That a corporation may have correspondence which may be justifiably regarded as 
private was recognised by the Court of Appeal in R v Broadcasting Standards 
Commission ex parte BBC,
272
 in which Lord Woolf MR declared that ‘a corporation 
has correspondence which could be justifiably regarded as private’;273 adding that the 
dissemination of the contents of such correspondence ‘would amount to interference 
with the corporation’s privacy’.274 
The privacy aspect of this case regarding the file of the internal correspondence of 
Schering, which had been taken and published by Sunday Times without Schering’s 
consent, was not recognised as an interference with Schering’s privacy, or even 
considered by the majority,
275
 who focused on the commercial aspect only. However, 
Lord Denning MR, dissenting, recognised this privacy aspect of the case, and deemed 
it ‘a breach of confidence, or, in the alternative, an infringement of copyright’.276 Lord 
Denning MR further recognized that some other private information of Schering, the 
corporation, was also involved, which it handed to the training firm. To this end, Lord 
Denning MR stated 
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It is important to remember that this is an interlocutory application in which it 
is not possible to know the full facts. Suffice it to say … neither Mr Elstein nor 
Thames were at liberty to use any private information without the consent of 
Schering…277 
Lord Denning MR, dissenting, subsequently, decided the case on the basis of 
balancing the interests of freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR and privacy 
under Article 8 ECHR, and incorporating both into the action of breach of confidence. 
In considering whether there had been a breach of duty of confidence Lord Denning 
MR therefore declared  
Whilst freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, so also is the right 
to privacy. Everyone has the right to respect for his private life and his 
correspondence: article 8 of the European Convention. This includes a right to 
have his confidential information kept confidential. This right may in some 
circumstances be so important that it takes priority over the freedom of the 
press. An injunction may be granted restraining the newspapers from breaking 
the confidence. The principle is well expressed in article 10 (2) of the European 
Convention. It recognises that the freedom of expression may be restricted 
whenever a restriction is "necessary in a democratic society, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence…” If Thames were about to 
publish important private information which was highly confidential and very 
properly confined to Schering, I have no doubt that an injunction should be 
granted to prevent its publication in the film.
278
  
On the basis of balancing the two competing interests of freedom of expression and 
privacy, Lord Denning MR ruled in favour of freedom of expression, declaring  
I am clearly of opinion that no injunction ought to be granted to prevent the 
publication of this information, even though it did originate in confidence. It 
dealt with a matter of great public interest. It contained information of which 
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On this balancing act, Lord Denning MR declared  
Freedom of the press is of fundamental importance in our society… It is not to 
be restricted on the ground of breach of confidence unless there is a pressing 
social need for such restraint. In order to warrant a restraint, there must be a 
social need for protecting the confidence sufficiently pressing to outweigh the 
public interest in freedom of the press. But there are other cases when the right 
of the press to inform the public – and the corresponding right of the public to 
be properly informed – takes priority over the right of privacy: see paragraphs 
65-66 of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in The Sunday 
Times case[1979] 2 E.H.R.R. 245 , 280-281. In such a case no injunction 
should be granted against the newspapers and television to prevent them from 
publishing the information, even though it originated in confidence.
280
 
Lord Denning MR ruled in favour of freedom of expression, on the grounds that the 
present case was one in which the right of the press to inform the public, as well as the 
right of the public to be properly informed took priority over the corresponding right of 
privacy. Although Lord Denning MR ruled in favour of freedom of expression, Lord 
Denning dealt with and decided Schering’s case on the basis of privacy v freedom of 
expression. It is suggested that Lord Denning MR in stating that a right to privacy 
where everyone had the right to respect for his private life and his correspondence in 
accordance with Article 8 ECHR includes a right to have his confidential information 
kept confidential, in the light of his statement that neither Mr Elstein nor Thames were 
at liberty to use any “private” information without the consent of Schering;281 Lord 
Denning MR was speaking to the right of Schering to have its privacy protected under 
Article 8 ECHR. Equally, Lord Denning in stating that if Thames were about to 
publish important private information which was highly confidential and very properly 
confined to Schering; it is also suggested that Lord Denning MR was referring to 
Schering’s right to its privacy under Article 8 ECHR.  
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In addition, a transmutation of information from commercial confidential information 
to private information is observed in Lord Denning’s adjudication. This transmutation 
accords with the classification of the corporation’s private information in chapter 1;282 
it also accords with the principles enunciated in cases such as Societe Colas Est v 
France,
283
 and Veolia ES Nottinghamshire Ltd v Nottinghamshire CC,
284
 which 
suggests that Article 8 ECHR may be a home for the issue of the legitimacy of access 
to and interference with private information of, inter alia, corporations. 
Consequently, it is submitted that in adjudicating the Schering’s case, Lord Denning’s 
judgment, although dissenting, envisaged a corporation having a right to privacy, and 
recognised the corporation’s privacy through the counter-balance between privacy and 
freedom of expression.
 
In balancing the two competing interests, Lord Denning MR 
incorporated the Article 8 ECHR rights (of the privacy of the corporation) and the 
Article 10 ECHR rights (of the freedom of expression of the press) into the traditional 
action for breach of confidence, and decided the case on that basis.
285
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Conversely, for the view that a breach of confidence is not, and should not to be limited to the 
spectrum of fiduciary duty, see generally, Hammond, R.G. Is Breach of Confidence Properly Analysed in 
Fiduciary Terms? McGill Law Journal. 1979-80, 25, 244-253. Hammond notes that the notion that the 
equitable obligation of confidence is doctrinally dependent upon the spectrum of fiduciary obligation 
seemed to have gained acceptance. He however rejected the necessity to link the equitable duty of 
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As has been demonstrated from the above case, under the traditional action for breach 
of confidence, only the commercial confidential information of the corporation
286
 is 
protected. The corporation’s privacy – the intrusion privacy interest and the 
information privacy interest – is not provided protection under the traditional action for 
breach of confidence. Lord Denning’s approach of recognising the privacy of the 
corporation through a counter-balance of privacy v freedom of expression under the 
traditional action in his dissenting judgment is sui generis in its application. In other 
cases adjudicated under the traditional action for breach of confidence, the concept of 
the recognition of the corporation’s private information interest as well as its intrusion 
interests are generally deemed a concept which cannot apply to corporations; hence 
these privacy concerns under the traditional action are either left untreated with the 
focus on the commercial confidential information aspects of the case,
287
 or such 
privacy concerns are transferred to represent the privacy concerns of the individual 
alone.  
 
The reluctance to entertain the abovementioned privacy concerns of the corporation on 
its own merit, but rather the transferring of such privacy concerns to represent the 
privacy of the individual inhabitants of a corporation alone, is illustrated in the case of 
Lakeside Homes Ltd v BBC.
288
 In this case, the claimant, Lakeside Homes, applied to 
the court for an injunction to restrain the BBC from broadcasting a film made by its 
agent who had worked undercover as a staff member at a nursing home, relating to the 
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standards of care at the home. The claim was based, inter alia, on alleged breach of 
confidence. The application for an injunction failed. 
This case was argued on the basis that the BBC’s agent owed a duty of confidentiality 
to the claimant and also separately to its residents, and as such, the disclosure by the 
BBC’s agent was a breach of her confidentiality to the corporation, as well as to the 
residents. The agent’s disclosure was also argued to be an unwarranted and completely 
unjustified invasion into the privacy of the residents’ home and residents’ private lives 
in the filming of the residents.   The privacy interests of the corporation which 
involved the intrusion into the corporation’s property, and the surreptitious filming of 
the private activities occurring within its premises with a view to broadcasting the 
contents were not recognised in this case. Indeed, the individual residents in this case 
had a right to have their privacy protected; but also, so did the corporation.  
Consequently, it is therefore submitted that the surreptitious spying within the property 
or premises of the corporation, as well as the clandestine filming of the private 
information of the corporation with the view of dissemination, violated the intrusion 
interest of the corporation’s privacy. The intrusion into the corporation’s property or 
premises, as well as the corporation’s private information which were collected are 
valuable aspects of the intrusion privacy interests of the corporation which were not 
recognised, and are worthy of protection in English law. 
 
The reluctance to entertain the privacy of the corporation on its own merit, but rather 
transfer of such privacy concerns to represent the privacy of the individual inhabitants 
of a corporation alone, is also illustrated in the case of in BKM Ltd v BBC.
289
 In this 
case, BKM Ltd, a corporation which operated a nursing home, brought an application 
seeking an injunction to restrain the BBC from broadcasting a programme which was 
based on surreptitiously obtained material. This injunction was sought, not in pursuit 
of any rights of its own as a corporation, but in order to protect the rights of the home's 
residents to their private and family life under Article 8 ECHR.  
The BBC however relied on its rights to freedom of expression under Article 10 
ECHR, stating that to the extent that there was an infringement of privacy rights, its 
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Article 10 rights were stronger as it was in the public interest to allow a broadcast that 
informed on the failure of regulation and standards in the nursing home; besides, the 
residents faces would not be identified, and voice recording would be modified to 
disguise the identity of the speaker. Furthermore, that an injunction could not be 




Mann J. in his judgment engaged in a balancing act between the Article 8 ECHR rights 
of the invasion of privacy and the dignity of the residents by the clandestine filming, 
and Article 10 ECHR freedom of expression of the BBC based on the public interest, 
and held in favour of Article 10. Mann J. held in favour of Article 10 on the grounds 
that the general areas of standards in care homes and the ability of a regulator to 
maintain them were serious factors which were firmly in the territory of the public 
interest which outweighed the privacy of the residents; in addition to the weight of 
section 12(3) and (4). Thus, the injunction was refused. 
In this case, it is observed that in the application for the injunction by the claimant 
corporation, in addition to, inter alia, praying the court to restrain the defendant from 
broadcasting any audio or video of any of the residents, it also prayed the court to 
restrain from broadcasting  
[A]ny part of the bedrooms, toilets, bathrooms and/or lounges including the 




It is contended that in making the plea for the privacy of empty bathrooms or toilets 
being ‘private’ areas of the said corporation, the claimant was actually speaking to the 
privacy of the corporation itself – to a possible reasonable expectation of its privacy. 
As pondered by Mann J. regarding the application for relief based on the privacy of the 
individual  
It was not clear to me why film of empty bathrooms or toilets was an 
infringement of privacy rights.
292
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Mann J. goes on to elaborate by reiterating
293
  
I have already pointed out that BKM does not rely on any of its own rights in 
relation to this application. It seems to rely on the rights of its residents.
294
  
The combined effect of both statements seem to point to the fact that the infringement 
of privacy complained of with respect to the filming of the empty spaces, was 
invariably directed at the corporation’s protection. Perhaps BKM was particularly 
unwilling to pursue this case as a corporate privacy case based on the reluctance the 
Court of Appeal demonstrated in the case of R v Broadcasting Standards Commission 
ex parte BBC
295
 in the course of its judgment;
296
 and the position the English law in 
general, with regard to the corporation’s privacy. 
 
As has been demonstrated from the cases above, the traditional action for the breach of 
confidence is a medium which presently exclusively protects against the misuse of 
commercial confidential information – trade secrets. It does not provide protection for 
the private information of the corporation; it also does not provide protection for the 
intrusion into the corporation’s premises or property. Equally, it is observed that where 
the privacy concerns of the corporation as well as the privacy concerns of the 
individuals within a corporation are involved, only the privacy concerns of the 
individuals are accorded protection; while the corporation’s interests tend to be 
subsumed into the individual’s interest, or not treated at all. To this end, the protection 
against the misuse of the corporation’s private information and intrusion into its 
premises or property – the privacy of the corporation – is not accorded protection 
under the traditional action for breach of confidence. 
 
As declared by Lord Woolf in R v Broadcasting Standards Commission ex parte 
BBC
297
 ‘in difficult cases, it is perfectly appropriate to have regard to the jurisprudence 
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of the ECtHR, the ECJ, and of other countries’. Accordingly, the reluctance to 
recognise the privacy of the corporation at common law is seen in another common 
law jurisdiction – Australia. In the case of Australia Broadcasting Corporation v 
Lenah Game Meat Property Ltd (ABC)
298
 in which an application for an interlocutory 
injunction was brought by Lenah against the ABC, to restrain the broadcasting of a 
film of its operations at a brush tail possum processing facility, which was made 
surreptitiously. 
The interlocutory application was denied by Underwood J. at the Supreme Court of 
Tasmania. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Victoria however, the injunction was 
allowed.
299
 ABC subsequently brought the matter before the High Court of Australia in 
order to have the injunction lifted. The appeal was allowed.
300
 
On the invitation by the respondent to the High Court of Australia to declare that 
Australian law recognises the tort of invasion of privacy, and that it was available to be 
relied upon by corporations, the court declined to so hold.
301
 Gleeson CJ 
acknowledged that activities such as directors meeting were activities which were 
private in nature. Similarly, Gleeson CJ accepted that certain internal communications 
of a corporation may be considered private. Gleeson CJ however drew a pertinent 
distinction between Australian law and United Kingdom law, stating that the United 
Kingdom legislation envisaged the possibility of privacy for corporations by virtue of 
the Broadcasting Act 1996, thus 
United Kingdom legislation recognises the possibility. Some forms of 
corporate activity are private. For example, neither members of the public, nor 
even shareholders, are ordinarily entitled to attend directors' meetings. And, as 
at present advised, I see no reason why some internal corporate 
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Gleeson CJ added 
However, the foundation of much of what is protected, where rights of privacy, 
as distinct from rights of property, are acknowledged, is human dignity. This 
may be incongruous when applied to a corporation.
303
  
In looking at Gleeson CJ statements above, it is suggested that the judge acknowledged 
that a corporation may have the privacy interest of intrusion – into directors meetings, 
as well as into the internal correspondence of a corporation. Conversely, on his 
statement that human dignity is the foundation of what is protected in privacy; it is 
suggested, as illustrated in the definition of privacy for corporations in chapter 1, that 
the dignity rationale of privacy is but one aspect of the rationales of privacy. There still 
remains the rational of autonomy: the autonomy the corporation as a legal personality 
exercises in limiting unwanted intrusion into its property, which is its home; as well as 
the autonomy it exercises in deciding whether to, when to, or when not to disclose 
information about itself – hence the limiting of unwanted dissemination of private 
information of the corporation. It will be recalled that the case of the sole rationale was 
also illustrated in the tort of defamation, as discussed in chapter 1, where the three 
rationales which may explain the concept of reputation under defamation are identified 
as interests in dignity, honour, and property.
304
 It will be recalled that it is established 
that in the case of a claim of defamation by the individual, the rationales of dignity, 
honour, and/or property may apply; however, in the case of a claim of defamation by 
the corporation, it is only the property rationale that applies. This was held not to 
exclude the corporation from being able to make a claim under defamation. Akin to the 
property rationale in corporate defamation cases, it is suggested that a sole rationale – 
the autonomy rationale – supports the corporation’s claim under privacy, and this 
ought not to result in the corporation not being able to claim for the protection against 
violations of its privacy. 
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On the position that corporations cannot enjoy a right to privacy in this case, Gummow 
and Hayne JJ in their joint judgment stated that commercial enterprises may sustain 
economic harm through methods of competition which are said to be unfair, or by 
reason of other injurious acts or omissions of third parties.
305
 They stated that in the 
present case, the interest involved concerned the profitable conduct of Lenah’s 
business; and that this provided an important distinction between the interest the 
corporation may have, and that of the individual in which the individual may be 
subjected to unwanted intrusion into his personal life and seeks to protect seclusion 
from surveillance and to prevent communications therefrom. To this end, Gummow 




In noting that a corporation could only suffer economic harm, Gummow and Hayne JJ 
referred to the observation of Professor W. L. Morison in his 1973 writing
307
 with 
reference to the case of Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co. v Taylor
308
 
The plaintiff in the case was a racecourse proprietor [which] was not seeking 
privacy for [its] race meetings as such, [it] was seeking a protection which 
would enable [it] to sell the rights to a particular kind of publicity. [Its] 
sensitivity was 'pocket book' sensitivity ... The independent questions of the 
rights of a plaintiff who is genuinely seeking seclusion from surveillance and 
communication of what surveillance reveals, it may be argued, should be 




It is however noted that Morison in the above quotation distinguished between the 
commercial aspect of a corporation’s information and its privacy. He noted that the 
plaintiff, racecourse proprietor, was not seeking privacy for its race meetings – a 
statement which suggests the possibility of privacy for corporations; but that it, the 
plaintiff, was seeking to protect its commercial interest in its publicity – hence the 
commercial aspect. He went on to state that ascertaining the rights a plaintiff who 
genuinely sought seclusion from surveillance and communication of what surveillance 
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reveals, was an independent question which, arguably, ought to be regarded as open to 
review in future cases. 
In stating that the questions of the rights of a plaintiff who is genuinely seeking 
seclusion from surveillance and communication of what surveillance reveals, it may be 
argued, should be regarded as open to review in future cases, it is suggested that 
Professor Morison adopted an approach in which he envisaged the future possibility of 
privacy for corporations in the form of a plaintiff who genuinely sought seclusion from 
surveillance and communication of what surveillance reveals. Such a plaintiff may, in 
accordance with his writing, be a corporation seeking privacy for its meetings. 
On the principle in ABC’s case that a corporation cannot enjoy a right to privacy, it has 
been argued that privacy is not necessarily a personal right of which only natural 
persons can take advantage; and that broadly speaking, it ought to be recognised that it 
is contradictory for a legal system to create fictitious persons and conversely use their 




 argued that 
corporations do not deserve to be side-lined from important rights such as privacy, 
although noting that it does not mean that corporation’s privacy protection should be 
as exclusive as that of the individual; however they ought not to be wholly excluded 
from privacy protection either.  Additionally, Taylor
312
 also indicated that corporations 
do come in all shapes and sizes, and are set up for different purposes, and as such, it 
would be too simplistic and untenable to assume that their interests are always 
commercial. Indeed, as noted by Taylor,
313
 not all corporations exist for profit making; 
and as such, a denial of privacy to corporations on the ground which is often stated – 
that they exist for economic reasons – is unacceptable; as some corporations do exist 
primarily to serve the public. Instances of organisations not setup solely for economic 
purposes, or even at all, may include some non-governmental organisations and 
charities, universities, government owned medical institution, associations for 
promoting the ideals of the United Nations, associations for the advancement of 
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international understanding, Amnesty International and other worthy causes, churches, 
sundry voluntary associations, pressure groups, private scholarship bodies. 
Further regarding the principle that corporations cannot enjoy a right to privacy in 
ABC’s case, this case is very well distinguished from the position in English law on the 
basis that there are legal provisions such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1950 [ECHR] which is interpreted under the influence of the Human Rights Act 
1998 to proclaim the value of privacy in English law, and this has been developed in 
favour of a broader role for privacy in the legal system generally; however, in 
Australia, there is no such pre-existing public law value.
314
 It may also be 
distinguished from the position in English law in the light of the statutory protection 
provided by the Broadcasting Act 1996, in broadcasting matters, as applied in the R v 
Broadcasting Standards Commission ex parte BBC
315
 case. 
In any case, Callinan. J in noting that a right of privacy of the corporation has been 
held to exist, in part, as a result of the above R v Broadcasting Standards Commission 
ex parte BBC case,
316
 accepted the possibility that in certain cases a corporation may 
enjoy privacy, thus 
For my own part, I would not rule out the possibility that in some 
circumstances, despite its existence as a non-natural statutory creature, a 
corporation might be able to enjoy the same or similar rights to privacy as a 
natural person, not inconsistent with its accountability, and obligations of 
disclosure, reporting and otherwise. Nor would I rule out the possibility that a 
government or a governmental agency may enjoy a similar right to privacy 
over and above a right to confidentiality in respect of matters relating to foreign 
relations, national security or the ordinary business of government.
317
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From the above, therefore, although other common law jurisdictions may not currently 
provide protection for the corporation’s privacy, it is submitted that the case of English 
law is distinctly different because it follows from a corporation’s autonomy that a 
corporation has privacy concerns which ought to be protected, and the Broadcasting 
Act 1996 correctly codifies this notion. In addition, more recently, the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Right and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
further establishes this notion.  
 
OTHER COMMON LAW ACTIONS 
Malicious falsehood  
The cause of action of malicious falsehood emerged from the cause of action of 
slander of title.
318
 Malicious falsehood was described as ‘a specie of defamation’ by 
Staurt-Smith LJ in Khodaparast v Shad.
319
 However, as clarified by Carty
320
 ‘in spite 
of its name, slander of title was not derived or descended from the defamation torts of 
libel and slander; rather, it was a cause of  action for special damage resulting from a 
falsehood’. From this cause of action, malicious falsehood emerged, and came to 
concern false statements, oral or written, which have been made maliciously.
321
 The 
protection involved in malicious falsehood is the protection against malice, as well as 
falsehood. In order for this cause of action to succeed, malice and falsehood must have 
to be specifically proved; in the words of Carty, “[t]he claimant needs to prove a 
falsehood, published maliciously, which is calculated to produce and does produce 
pecuniary damage”.322  
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Malicious falsehood was one of the mediums into which the protection of the 
individual’s privacy was erstwhile shoehorned before an independent cause of action 
emerged in English law.
323
 This is illustrated in the notable case of Kaye v 
Robertson.
324
 In this case, a well-known actor who was recovering in hospital, having 
undergone very extensive surgery due to severe head injuries sustained in a car 
accident, was interviewed by journalists who improperly gained access to his room 
contrary to notices placed against such entry. Photographs were also taken, and the 
journalists subsequently announced that they intended to publish the interview. The 
plaintiff sought to protect his privacy, but in the absence of an independent cause of 
action for privacy at the time, the plaintiff, through his next friend, sought an 
interlocutory injunction against this publication through a host of actions. 
Consequently, malicious falsehood, libel, trespass to person, and passing off were 
relied upon. He claimed that he had not consented to the interview, and had not been in 
a fit state to consent. 
An injunction against publication was granted, but subsequently discharged on appeal. 
At the Court of Appeal, it was held as follows: that there was no passing off as the 
plaintiff was not a trader; on the claim of battery, there was no evidence that damage 
had in fact been caused; there was no libel; that there was no actionable right of 
privacy in English law; and that the elements of a claim for malicious falsehood had 
been made out. Malicious falsehood was the only grounds upon which the Court of 
Appeal felt able to grant relief on the basis that Mr Kaye had a commercial interest in 
his first interview following his accident, and that the newspaper would misleadingly 
damage this commercial interest if it suggested to the public that Mr Kaye had given 
this interview voluntarily. The court did not therefore restrain publication of the 
interview, because it felt unable to do so; all it could do was restrain publication of the 
interview without a clear indication that it had been given involuntarily. The 
newspaper accordingly went ahead and published the interview, notwithstanding the 
fact that it had been obtained without Mr Kaye's consent. 
In light of the apparent inadequacy in the law with regards to the protection of an 
individual’s privacy, the Court of Appeal in arriving at its judgment was unanimous in 
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its call for a legal right to privacy. Glidewell LJ in acknowledging the keen need for a 
right of privacy declared 
It is well-known that in English law there is no right to privacy, and 
accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a person's privacy. The 
facts of the present case are a graphic illustration of the desirability of 
Parliament considering whether and in what circumstances statutory provision 
can be made to protect the privacy of individuals.
325
 
Glidewell LJ noted that in the absence of such a right, the plaintiff had sought a 
remedy through other established rights of action. 
Bingham LJ added 
This case nonetheless highlights, yet again, the failure of both the common law 
of England and statute to protect in an effective way the personal privacy of 
individual citizens … If ever a person has a right to be let alone by strangers 
with no public interest to pursue, it must surely be when he lies in hospital 
recovering from brain surgery… It is this invasion of his privacy which 
underlies the plaintiff’s complaint. Yet it alone, however gross, does not entitle 
him to relief in English law.
326
  
Bingham LJ restated Professor Markesinis
327
 position that although many aspects of 
privacy were protected by a host of existing torts, it however entailed fitting the facts 
of each privacy case into the pigeon-hole of an existing tort which may not only 





From the above therefore, it is suggested that malicious falsehood served as a medium 
through which privacy was sought to be protected; however, it did not ultimately 
provide protection for privacy, as illustrated above. Drawing from the above 
declarations, also, it is further suggested that malicious falsehood does not, and would 
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not provide privacy protection for the corporation. This is because the interests 
protected in both causes of action are different – malicious falsehood involves the 
protection against malice and falsehoods; while privacy protects against intrusion and 
misuse of private information. Furthermore, the information involved in the case of 
privacy is truthful information – there is no falsehood to it. Consequently, seeking to 
shoe-horn the protection of privacy for the corporation within the cause of action of 
malicious falsehood would bring about a strained construction of the concept of 
privacy; again as observed in the case of the individual under Kaye, it was not 
achievable. 
Accordingly, in view of the above declarations in Kaye’s case, as well as the difference 
in the interests the actions of malicious falsehood and privacy protect, it is submitted 
that malicious falsehood does not protect privacy; and for the same reasons, is not a 




Defamation concerns defamatory statements made either in writing or orally. The 
interest involved in this cause of action is the protection of the reputation from 
libellous or slanderous statements. Defamation was another medium into which the 
protection of the individual’s privacy was erstwhile shoehorned before an independent 
cause of action emerged in English law, as has been demonstrated by Kaye’s case in 
the malicious falsehood section above. Although there are some similarities between 
defamation and privacy,
329
 there are arguably weightier differences between the two 
actions. The most profound distinction lies in the fact that for a matter to be successful 
under defamation, the defamatory statements or publication must be false, as truth is 
an absolute defence; conversely, under privacy, the statements or publication are true 
representations, the issue therein is that there has been an intrusion and/or the 
publication of private information without the consent of the complainant. It is 
suggested that where the statements made are false – misrepresentation of facts, it 
becomes a case which properly falls within the realm of defamation; conversely, where 
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the statements made are true – true representation of facts, such a case would be 
properly dealt with under privacy. This was the case in Kaye v Robertson,
330
 wherein a 
prayer for an interlocutory injunction based on the reliance on, inter alia, libel was 
rejected because according to the court, ‘an interlocutory injunction should only be 
granted where any jury would inevitably find for libel, and this was not the case 
here’.331 In declarations which suggested that the case of Kaye was a clear privacy 
case, the court went on to lament the absence of a cause of action for the protection of 
privacy in English law, stating that it is an invasion of privacy which was the 
foundation of Kaye’s case, as has been set out in the malicious falsehood, section 
above.  
It is also noted that where some statements made are true and others are false, then it 
becomes the case for two causes of action – privacy and defamation – wherein it is 
argued, either cause of action would not satisfy all the issues. 
Similarly, another difference between defamation and privacy lies in the principle that 
in defamation, the statements made must be defamatory and have a tendency to lower 
the victim of the statement before right thinking members of the society; thus, an 
attack on the reputation, and in the case of the corporation, the property interest. 
Therefore, a defamation action arises from the defamatory statement made. 
Conversely, under privacy, rarely can a statement be said to be defamatory to a 
complainant.
332
 It is rather argued that in privacy, it is the action behind the statement 
which is then disseminated or published without the consent of the complainant that is 
the issue. Thus, where the statement is a true representation of the actions of the said 
complainant as is the case in privacy matters, the issue would be one involving 
intrusion, and misuse of private information of the claimant.  
Drawing from the above declarations by the court in Kaye’s case regarding the causes 
of action of libel and privacy, therefore, it is suggested that although defamation was a 
medium through which privacy was sought to be protected, it did not guarantee 
protection for privacy. In addition, in view of the above discussions on the distinction 
between defamation and privacy, it is further suggested that defamation does not, and 
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would not provide privacy protection for the corporation. This is based on the fact that 
the truthfulness of a statement under defamation is an absolute defence; while under 
privacy, the focus is on the protection against intrusion and misuse of private 
information which has been interfered with without consent. As indicated in the 
malicious falsehood section above, the information involved in the case of privacy is 
truthful information – there is no falsehood to it. As put by Parkes,333 ‘a claimant 
complaining of the publication of private facts which can be proved to be true has no 
redress in the law of defamation, even though the publication of the said information 
may be just as intrusive and hurtful as the publication of false allegations’.  
In view of the above declarations, seeking to shoe-horn the protection of privacy for 
the corporation within the cause of action of defamation would bring about little or no 
protection for privacy, as observed in the case of the individual under Kaye’s case. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that defamation does not protect privacy; and for the same 
reasons, is not a medium through which the protection of the privacy of the 
corporation ought to be sought. While the corporation’s defamation involves the 
protection of the reputation based on property;
334
 the corporation’s privacy involves 
the protection of the corporation’s autonomy to carry on its activities, within the law, 
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PART 2  
STATUTE 
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, in seeking to answer the research 
question of whether English law ought to be further developed to provide fuller 
protection for the privacy of the corporation, it is essential to, in addition to common 
law, investigate whether the English statute offers protection for the privacy of the 
corporation, and if so, the extent of such protection. This Part therefore investigates the 
United Kingdom legislation – the Data Protection Act 1998, Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, and the Broadcasting Act 1996 – which protect certain aspects 
of privacy and establishes that the Broadcasting Act 1996 is the only statute therein 
which protects the privacy of the corporation. 
 
Data Protection Act 1998 
The Data Protection Act 1998 which came into force on March 1 2000 was passed to 
give effect to European Directive 95/46 EC. As indicated by Barnes in Tugendhat and 
Christie, the implementation of the Directive throughout the European Union was 
intended to give effect in the context of data protection to Article 8 ECHR right to 
respect for private life, family life home and correspondence. He continues that Recital 
9 makes clear that the Act “is expressly concerned with the right to privacy and [lays] 
down requirements for Member States to adopt data protection legislation at national 
level in order to protect privacy in relation to both computerized and manual files”.335 
Consequently, he states that the Data Protection Act 1998 is part of the law of privacy, 
although the word ‘privacy’ is notably absent from the United Kingdom legislation. 
Pursuant thereto, and in accordance with the introductory text of the Data Protection 
Act 1998, the Data Protection Act is ‘an Act to make new provision for the regulation 
of the processing of information relating to individuals, including the obtaining, 
holding, use or disclosure of such information’. From this text, it is clear that the Data 
Protection Act 1998 is an Act which provides exclusive protection for the privacy of 
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the individual’s personal data – his private information; it does not prescribe protection 
for the privacy of the corporation. 
Equally, the focus on the individual can be seen in the deliberations of the House of 
Lords in the debates that preceded the Act. During the deliberations on the Data 
Protection Bill by the House of Lords, repeated references were made to the protection 
of the individual by Lords William of Mostyn, Lord Norton, and Lord Falconer of 
Thoroton with regards to the individual’s activities, the individual’s personal data, as 
well as the rights and exemptions which the individual enjoys under the Bill, 
respectively.
336
 Similarly, Lord Burlison, indicated that when the Data Protection Act 
is brought into force, it would give effect to Directive 95/46/EC which protects 




Furthermore, in accordance with to Section 1(1) Data Protection Act 1998, on the 
basic interpretation of provisions, 
“Data subject” means an individual who is the subject of personal data; 
“personal data” means data which relate to a living individual who can be 
identified… and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and 
any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any other person in 
respect of the individual… 
From the above interpretative definitions of data subject and personal data, it is quite 
clear that the Data Protection Act 1998 does not prescribe protection for the 
corporation. Rather, it is an Act that controls how a living individual’s personal 
information is used by organizations, businesses or the government; for instance, data 
on an individual’s mental or physical health or conditions, religious beliefs, racial or 
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Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
In accordance with the introductory text of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, 
the Act is ‘an Act which makes provisions for protecting persons from harassment and 
similar conduct’. In this Act, the protection for the privacy of corporations was not 
envisaged at the time of its institution; it is an Act which focuses on the protection of 
the individual. This is demonstrated by the aim of the Act as espoused before the 
House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern.  
To this end, the Lord Chancellor, in praying to move for the second reading of the 
Protection from Harassment Bill declared  
The aim of this Bill is to protect the victims of harassment. It will protect all 
such victims whatever the source of the harassment – so-called stalking 
behaviour, racial harassment, or anti-social behaviour by neighbours… [T]he 
cases which have come to public attention in the past year or two... have 
highlighted the devastating effect that those who cause harassment to others 
can have on the lives of their victims.
339
 
Furthermore, the Lord Chancellor in further focusing on the individual, rationalized 
the need for the legislation by declaring  
Perhaps the first question the Government must answer when bringing 
legislation before your House is as to why the legislation is needed. In the case 
of the conduct in question--causing harassment--there is evidence that the 
courts themselves are already interpreting their existing powers in such a way 
as to provide relief for victims. The civil courts have granted injunctions to 
prevent the repetition of such behaviour and the criminal courts have, in some 
cases, equated severe psychological harm to bodily harm. In the light of those 
developments, is new legislation necessary? The Government's answer to that 
question is an emphatic yes.
340
 
Equally, the protection for the privacy of corporations is not provided for from the 
provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The focus on the individual is 
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demonstrated by sections 4(1) and 8(1)&(3)of the Act. Section 4(1) which speaks to 
putting people in fear of violence states  
A person whose course of conduct causes another to fear, on at least two 
occasions, that violence will be used against him is guilty of an offence if he 
knows or ought to know that his course of conduct will cause the other so to 
fear on each of those occasions. 
Section 8(1) states  
Every individual has a right to be free from harassment… 
Further, section 8(3) sets out what harassment of the individual entails 
For the purposes of this section – “harassment” of a person includes causing 
the person alarm or distress; and a course of conduct must involve conduct on 
at least two occasions. 
Case law has further established that the corporation is not entitled to protection under 
the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. This is illustrated in the case of DPP v 
Dziurzynski,
341
 wherein the respondent was charged with offences contrary to sections 
2(1) and (2) of the Act. On the question of whether the words of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 covered an offence whereby a corporation was capable of being 
harassed, Rose LJ and Gibbs J referred to the history of the Act, including the Home 
Office consultation paper which preceded the legislation (“Stalking – The Solutions”) 
and ministerial statements, and stated 
Those statements made it clear that “the Bill covers not only stalkers but 
disruptive neighbours and those who target people because of the colour of 
their skin” ( Hansard , December 17, 1997, Volume 781). This was further 
supported by ministerial statements and the unreported decision of Douglas 
Brown J. in Tuppen & Singh v. Microsoft Corporation, July 14, 2000, which 
both confirmed that the Act was designed to replace sections 4(1)(a) and 5 of 
the Public Order Act 1986.
342
 
Consequently, Rose LJ and Gibbs J therefore declared 
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Reference could properly be made to the legislative history of the 1997 Act in 
order to construe the meaning of “person” and this pointed against person 
meaning corporation…343 
Equally, in Daiichi Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd and others v Stop Huntingdon Animal 
Cruelty and others
344
 wherein five claimants, both individuals and corporations, 
applied for injunctive relief under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997, seeking protection from conduct by the defendants allegedly amounting to 
harassment under section 7 of the Act, the court allowed the applications of the 
individual claimants but dismissed those of the corporate claimants. On the proper 
construction the term “person” in section 7 of the 1997 Act, Owen J. declared 
It is submitted by counsel for the represented defendants that on the proper 
construction of the Act, the term “person” does not include a limited company, 
and that in consequence a company cannot be the victim of harassment and 
cannot bring a claim under the Act… In my judgment the word “person” in 





Furthermore, in Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas's NHS Trust,
346
 the House of Lords 
went further to declare that a corporation may be a perpetrator of harassment, but 
cannot be a victim. Herein, a claimant brought an action against his employer for 
breach of statutory duty, alleging that he had been unlawfully harassed by his 
departmental manager in breach of section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997; and that the employer, a corporation, was vicariously liable. In the course of the 
judgment,
347
 Lord Nicholls declared 
This statutory prohibition applies as much between an employer and an 
employee as it does between any other two persons. Further, it is now tolerably 
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From the above declarations, therefore, it is suggested that the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 is an Act which provides protection for the privacy of the 
individual alone; it does not prescribe protection for the privacy of the corporation. 
 
The Broadcasting Act 1996 
The privacy of corporations in the United Kingdom is to a limited extent protected by 
the Broadcasting Act 1996.
349
 In this Act, the United Kingdom Parliament recognised 
the right of corporations to the protection of its privacy, with respect specifically to 
broadcasting matters; and accorded it such a right under sections 110(1)(b), and 111(1) 
of the Broadcasting Act 1996.  
Section 110(1)(b) provides for the functions of the Broadcasting Standards 
Commission (BSC), and states that 
…it shall be the duty of the BSC to consider and adjudicate on complaints 
which are made to them in accordance with section 111… and relate to an 
unwarranted infringement of privacy in, or in connection with the obtaining of 
material included in, such programmes.
350
 
Section 111(1) which deals with matters concerning broadcasting provides that 
A fairness complaint may be made by an individual or a body of persons, 
whether incorporated or not… 
The combined effect of these two sections is that individuals, as well as incorporated 
persons such as corporations, may make a fairness complaint concerning an 
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infringement of privacy on matters specifically related to broadcasting to the BSC for 
consideration and adjudication.  From the above sections, therefore, it is clear that 
Parliament provided privacy protection not just for the individual, but also for 
incorporated persons with respect to broadcasting matters. 
The protection of the privacy of the corporation by Parliament is not unique to the Act 
of 1996. From the legislative history of the Broadcasting Act, it is observed that the 
first Broadcasting Act which was enacted in 1980
351
 also provided privacy protection 
for incorporated persons, in relation to broadcasting matters. Section 18(1)(b) of the 
Broadcasting Act 1980 provided for the functions of the Broadcasting Complaints 
Commission, which were very much akin to the functions of the Broadcasting 
Standards Commission in the Act of 1996. The section stated that 
…the functions of the commission shall be to consider and adjudicate upon 
complaints of [inter alia] unwarranted infringement of privacy… 
Similarly, section 19(2) of the 1980 Act which provided for making and entertainment 
of broadcasting complaints, very much like section 111(1) of the Act of 1996 adds 
that: 
 A complaint may be made by an individual or by a body of persons, whether 
incorporated or not… 
These two key sections, section 18(1)(b) and section 19(2) of the Broadcasting Act of 
1980 which initiated privacy protection for individuals as well as incorporated persons 
in broadcasting matters, were replicated in section 54(1)(b) and section 55(2) of the 
Broadcasting Act of 1981, and further reiterated in section 143(1)(b) and section 
144(2) of the Broadcasting Act of 1990 respectively. These two sections were again 
replicated in the present sections 110(1)(b), and 111(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1996. 
It is therefore submitted, that in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1980 and 
the subsequent amendments of the Acts of 1981, 1990, and 1996 noted above, it was 
the firm intention of Parliament to provide privacy protection for incorporated persons 
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in matters specific to broadcasting. This intention of Parliament is demonstrated in the 
HANSARD HL debate on the Broadcasting Bill 1980
352
in which the House of Lords 
heavily debated the bill before it was passed to law, including the relevant sections on 
the protection of the privacy of the incorporated persons.  
In debating the bill, a proposed amendment was initially called for to the effect that the 
1980 Act would allow only the individual to bring a complaint.
353
 
Lord Belstead stated  
The purpose of this amendment is to allow individuals, and only individuals, to 
initiate what would be the expensive and time-consuming process of what may 
be called a BCC investigation… Corporations can generally look after 
themselves. They have the power to protest and the resources to sue. Therefore 
the effect of that amendment would be to confine the complaints procedure or 
the initiation of that procedure to individuals.
354
 
However, Lord Somers challenged this proposition, stating that the Act ought not to be 
limited to individuals, as this would alienate such groups as the National Viewers' and 
Listeners' Association from being able to make a complaint.
355
 
Additionally, Lord Drumalbyn stressed the aim of the amendment, thus 
Apparently what these amendments are trying to do—I commend it—is to give 
an opportunity for a falsehood or a false impression to be corrected…It is only 
a question of establishing the truth and vindicating the truth where something 
has gone wrong. I think it is particularly important, because this is one of the 
great causes of complaint, [and] is also something that should be corrected, and 
I do not see why it should not be corrected for corporations and institutions, 
and all the rest as well as individuals.
356
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Lord Drumalbyn noted that groups such as mental hospitals, tourist agencies, schools, 
or football teams, like individuals, ought to be able to bring a complaint and have the 
truth established. 
Lord Belstead reiterated Lord Drumalbyn’s above statement, and concluded by 
declaring that the Bill was purposely drawn to provide that a complaint should lie 




In the light of the above debate the protection of the privacy of the corporation was 
maintained in the Broadcasting Act 1996. From the above, it is submitted that it was 
clearly the intention of Parliament in enacting the Broadcasting Act 1980 to 
accommodate complaints made not only by individuals, but also by corporations in 
their own right, and not of the natural persons upon whose behalf it acted. 
Case law application of sections 110(1)(b) and 111(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1996  
The application of sections 110(1)(b) and 111(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1996 right of 
the corporation to the protection of its privacy in broadcasting matters was illustrated 
in the case of R v Broadcasting Standards Commission ex parte BBC,
358
 in which 
programme makers for a broadcasting company secretly filmed transactions in 
plaintiff’s store without the plaintiff’s permission. The plaintiff, DSG Retail Ltd, made 
a complaint to the Broadcasting Standards Commission (the BSC) that the secret 
filming had been an unwarranted infringement of its privacy within sections 110 and 
111 of the Broadcasting Act 1996. 
The BSC found that the secret filming had infringed the plaintiff’s privacy and that the 
infringement was unwarranted and as such upheld the complaint. 
In the light of this, the BBC applied for judicial review. The court of first instance 
held, inter alia, that a body corporate as a matter of law did not have a right to privacy 
and as such could not bring a complaint for an infringement of privacy under the 
Broadcasting Act 1996, furthermore, there could not be an infringement of privacy by 
the mere fact of surreptitious filming in a place to which the public had access if there 
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was no element of seclusion in the event being filmed. He therefore quashed the BSC's 
finding. 
On appeal by the BSC, the Court of Appeal reversed the holding of the lower court and 
unanimously held, inter alia, that on a proper construction of section 110 and 111 of 
the Broadcasting Act 1996, a company could make a complaint of unwarranted 
infringement of its privacy, and as such, the BSC had been entitled to conclude that 
secret filming of transactions in the plaintiff’s stores was an infringement of the 
plaintiff’s privacy. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal restored BSC's adjudication. 
In the course of his judgment, Lord Woolf MR asked the question: under the Act, can a 
company be the subject of a complaint of unwarranted interference with its privacy? 
To which he declared  
There is no dispute that a company can make a complaint. This is categorically 
stated in section 111(1) of the Act. Section 111(1) provides: 
(1) A fairness complaint may be made by an individual or a body of persons, 
whether incorporated or not, but, subject to subsection (2), shall not be 
entertained by the BSC unless made by the person affected or by a person 
authorised by him to make the complaint for him. A "fairness complaint" is 
defined as meaning a complaint of any of the matters referred to in section 
110(1) and so it applies to complaints of both unjust or unfair treatment and 
unwarranted infringement of privacy.
359… Accordingly, to provide no 
protection under the Act for activities of a company of this nature would leave 
a company at a disadvantage under legislation designed to encourage and 





Although this case specifically dealt with the corporation’s privacy under the 
Broadcasting Act 1996, Lord Woolf MR generally recognised that a corporation could 
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suffer an infringement of its privacy which he referred to as ‘an intrusion of the 
corporation’s privacy’.361  
To this end, he stated  
While the intrusions into the privacy of an individual which are possible are no 
doubt more extensive than the infringements of privacy which are possible in 
the case of a company, a company does have activities of a private nature 
which need protection from unwarranted intrusion [such as if an intruder] 
without any justification attempted to listen clandestinely to the activities of a 
board meeting. The same would be true of secret filming of the board meeting. 
The individual members of the board would no doubt have grounds for 
complaint, but so would the board and thus the company as a whole. The 
company has correspondence which it could justifiably regard as private and 
the broadcasting of the contents of that correspondence would be an intrusion 
on its privacy. It could not possibly be said that to hold such actions an 
intrusion of privacy conflicts with the Convention.
362
 
Consequently, his Lordship concluded  




From the above declarations by Woolf LJ, it is clear that a corporation can suffer an 
infringement of privacy in its own right as a corporation, independent of the 
individuals in it. 
On the intention of the Broadcasting Act as an Act for the protection of not just the 
individual’s privacy, but also the corporation’s privacy in broadcasting matters, Hale 
LJ declared 
The provisions of the Act are quite clear. A "body of persons, whether 
incorporated or not" has the right to make a fairness complaint: section 
111(1)… It is, I acknowledge, surprising that section 111(2) and (3) also refer 
                                                          
361
 Para 33. 
362
 Para 33. 
363
 Para 34. 
 108 
 
to a "person or body", but had the draftsman intended to confine a "person 
affected" to an individual he could and, in my view, would have done so.
364
 
On the definition of privacy, Hale LJ stated 
Privacy is a difficult word for which to find synonyms (let alone to define by 
examples of interference, as the reports cited to us acknowledge) but the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 9th ed (1995), includes "avoidance of publicity" 
and it obviously has some connection with being or keeping "private”.365 
Furthermore, on the nature of a corporation’s privacy Hale LJ declared  
There are many things which companies may (legitimately or illegitimately) 
wish to keep private, including their property, their meetings and their 
correspondence. There are still more about which they may (legitimately or 
illegitimately) wish to avoid publicity… Notions of what an individual might 
or might want to be kept "private", "secret" or "secluded" are subjective to that 
individual… If this is so for an individual, I cannot see why it should not also 
be capable of being so for a company. The company will have its own reasons 
(good or bad) for wanting or not wanting to object and the secrecy of the 
filming has deprived it of the opportunity to do so.
366
 
As such, Hale LJ acknowledged that the corporation can enjoy privacy and has many 
things or activities which it may wish to keep private. It is suggested that Lord Woolf 
MR and Hale LJ in expressing the concept of privacy for corporation – the nature of a 
company’s activities of a private nature such as the clandestine listening to, or the 
secret filming of the activities of a board meeting; or the many things which a 
company may wish to keep private such as its property or correspondence – were 
referring to generic corporations.  
Lord Mustill on the other hand had difficulty in accepting that a corporation may have 
its privacy invaded. To this end Lord Mustill stated 
…it is equally clear that a corporate body may act as complainant: again, 
section 111(1) says so. This presents no conceptual problems, for a corporate 
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employer may wish to present a complaint on behalf of an individual 
employee, just as much for an invasion of privacy as for unfairness. Nor is 
there any difficulty where a body puts forward a complaint on its own behalf 
under section 110(1)(a), for a corporation as well as an individual may be 




Lord Mustill went on to query 
Can a company say that it is aggrieved by an invasion of its own privacy? As a 
matter of ordinary language I would not have thought so.
368
 
Lord Mustill in acknowledging that the concept of privacy was hard to define however 
took the view that the concept as he understood it involved the protection of the 
individual 
…for in general I find the concept of a company's privacy hard to grasp. To my 
mind the privacy of a human being denotes at the same time the personal 
"space" in which the individual is free to be itself, and also the carapace, or 
shell, or umbrella, or whatever other metaphor is preferred, which protects that 
space from intrusion. An infringement of privacy is an affront to the 
personality, which is damaged both by the violation and by the demonstration 
that the personal space is not inviolate. The concept is hard indeed to define, 
but if this gives something of its flavour I do not see how it can apply to an 




It is suggested that Lord Mustill, from his above declarations which suggests that the 
protection of privacy for the corporation under the Broadcasting Act is an artificially 
constructed recognition of privacy, admittedly did not fully appreciate the full extent 
of the concept of privacy. This may be because the case was heard on the threshold of 
the coming into force of the HRA when a broader understanding of privacy had not 
been contemplated. Besides, in accordance with Lord Woolf’s declaration in R v 
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Broadcasting Standards Commission ex parte BBC
370
 that ‘in difficult cases, it is 
perfectly appropriate to have regard to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the ECJ, and of 
other countries’;371 there were at the time of the present case, no ECtHR and ECJ cases 
on the corporation’s privacy to fully serve as guidance on the present case. As the 
ECtHR and ECJ jurisprudence on privacy continues to evolve, it has been established 
thus far that the concept of privacy involves much more than just the protection of the 
individual; it also affords protection to the corporation as will be analysed in chapter 3. 
Equally, as has been established in part 3 of this chapter, privacy encompasses the 
protection of not just the individual but also the corporation. It will be recalled that 
privacy for the corporation was held to involve the freedom from unwanted 
interference or disturbance – intrusion – into the corporation’s private sphere, which 
includes its home or its property, and which represents its own space; as well as a 
claim to the control of the corporation’s private information from being released into 
the public domain against the corporation’s wishes, thus protecting the said 
information from unwanted dissemination or publication. 
The above objection, it is suggested, accords with Lord Mustill’s concluding statement 
that  
… when it becomes necessary to consider the question [of a general 
appreciation of privacy] in the much wider context of human rights, as it surely 




In any case, in spite of Lord Mustill’s above reluctance, he nevertheless applied the 
Act and ruled in favour of privacy protection for the corporation. It is therefore 
submitted that although Lord Mustill suggested that privacy protection under the 
Broadcasting Act is more suited for the individual, the Broadcasting Act is 
nevertheless an Act of Parliament which has protected the privacy of corporations in 
broadcasting matters since its inception in 1980 to the present Act, and as such, the 
Court of Appeal were obliged to apply this law in the said R v Broadcasting Standards 
Commission ex parte BBC;
373
 and did so unanimously. In the light of this therefore, it 
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is further submitted that although privacy applies to the individual in a great many 
instances, there are also circumstances in which the concept of privacy applies to 
corporations as reflected in the judgment of this case; accordingly, this judgment 
serves as a precedent for the protection of privacy for the corporation, as far as it 
concerns broadcasting matters.  
In spite of this judgment however, privacy is in more general terms deemed a concept 





This chapter has investigated the level of protection of the privacy of the corporation in 
English law, and established that the privacy of the corporation is not a concept which 
is alien to English law, but is protected to a limited extent – in broadcasting matters – 
by the Broadcasting Act 1996. It has also established that the traditional action does 
not provide protection against the misuse of the corporation’s private information from 
dissemination or publication, nor does it provide protection against intrusion into the 
corporation’s premises or property; that is to say, the traditional action does not protect 
the privacy of the corporation. In view of this limited protection, it becomes imperative 
at this juncture to outline the scope of the corporation’s privacy which is still in need 
of protection in English law, and to which the research question is directed at.  
An outline of the scope of the corporation’s privacy in need of protection in English 
law  The question of the scope of the protection of the privacy of corporation is 
directed to, first, the privacy of the corporation vs. public authorities – such as where 
public authorities intrude into the premises of the corporation, as well as where public 
authorities interfere with the private information of the corporation;
375
 secondly, it is 
directed to the privacy of the corporation vs. the news press – such as where 
                                                          
374
 This is also in spite of the fact that the privacy of the corporation was also acknowledged by the 
Younger Committee in its report on privacy. It is suggested that this committee in its official enquiry 
into privacy, in making reference to the private information of a firm envisaged a firm asserting a right 
to privacy. See Younger Committee Report: Report of the Committee on Privacy Cmnd 5012, HMSO, 
1972, 298. 
375
 For instance, where a public authority hands corporation’s information to the press who then 
publish the said information, or where public authority acts in a manner which suggests it intends to 
disseminate the said information, such as where it displays the said information before the press who 
then photograph it and publish. 
 112 
 
newspapers or magazines surreptitiously intrude into the premises of the corporation, 
and/or publish corporation’s private information in an exposé; and finally between the 
privacy of the corporation vs. other corporations – such as where one corporation 
through its agents surreptitiously intrude into the premises of another corporation, as 




In the light of the above conclusion that the privacy of the corporation is protected to a 
limited extent by the Broadcasting Act 1996, in seeking to answer the research 
question of whether English law ought to be further developed to provide fuller 
protection for the privacy of corporations, the question is raised: how was the general 
protection of the privacy of the individual developed? This inquiry is made so as to see 
whether the corporation’s privacy may be so developed. To this end, the general 
protection of the privacy of the individual was developed under the common law 
through the cause of action of the extended action for breach of confidence. An inquiry 
is made into the general protection of the privacy of the individual rather than the 
specific protections of the individual’s privacy because as seen from the specific 
protections under statute, as examined in this chapter, they only advances a specific 
aspect of privacy protection for the individual. Moreover, even after the said specific 
protections had been established under statute, the common law was nevertheless 
developed under the extended action for breach of confidence to provide a more 
general protection for the individual’s privacy. 
Consequently, an investigation into whether the extended action for breach of 
confidence can and ought to be further developed to provide protection for the privacy 
of corporations in cases other than broadcasting matters, as outlined above, is the 
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CHAPTER 3  
PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF THE CORPORATION – THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTENDED ACTION FOR BREACH OF 
CONFIDENCE? 
INTRODUCTION 
Having considered the level of protection of the privacy of corporations in English 
law, and found that the corporation’s privacy is protected only to a limited extent, by 
the Broadcasting Act 1996; in view of the outline of the aspects of privacy which 
require protection, this chapter aims to investigate whether the extended action for 
breach of confidence can and ought to be further developed to provide fuller protection 
for the privacy of the corporation in English law. This investigation will be undertaken 
through doctrinal analysis – it will engage English courts’ jurisprudence, Strasbourg 
court’s jurisprudence, as well as the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union where it concerns the administration of Article 8 ECHR.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. In part 1, an examination of the extended action 
for breach of confidence upon which the question of whether the privacy of the 
corporation can and ought to be further developed therein is based, is undertaken. This 
examination is undertaken with the aim of understanding its development, nature and 
the extent of its protection. It specifically examines the incorporation of Article 8 and 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 [ECHR] into the domestic laws 
of the United Kingdom, and its consequent effect, which have been the horizontal 
application of the Human Rights Act 1998 [HRA], as well as the emergence of the 
cause of action of the misuse of private information, for the individual. The English 
courts’ position on the extended action vis-à-vis the protection of the privacy of the 
corporation is also considered. This part concludes with an investigation of the 
position of the development of the intrusion privacy interest, and the possible 
development of an intrusion tort. Part 2 examines the Strasbourg court’s interpretation 
of the notion and scope of Article 8 ECHR; it espouses the notion of private life, 
family life, home, and correspondence, and establishes that the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights as well as the Court of Justice of the European 
Union have evolved from the protection of the individual’s privacy under Article 8 
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ECHR, to the extension of Article 8 protection to the corporation’s privacy – that is to 
say, its private life, home, and correspondence. In the light of this established position 
by the Strasbourg court, as strengthened by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, this part argues that the extended action for breach of confidence ought to be 
further developed to provide protection for the privacy of the corporation in English 
law. This further development of the extended action for breach of confidence would 
satisfy the provisions of sections 2 and 6 HRA, it would also satisfy the provision of 
Article 13 ECHR. In addition, it would enable the corporation the autonomy to 
effectively carry out its activities, within the law. 
The extended action for breach of confidence – common law – has been chosen for 
further development because contrary to the mediums of protection investigated in 
chapter 2 such as the Broadcasting Act 1996, Protection From Harassment Act 1997, 
and the Data Protection Act 1998, which provide for specific privacy protection, the 
extended action for breach of confidence is the medium which has been established for 
the general protection of the privacy of the individual. In view of the fact that the 
European Court of Human Rights is the final arbiter of human rights matters for 
Member States of the Council of Europe, the extended action has also been chosen 
because Articles 8 & 10 ECHR, which the English common law incorporated into the 
cause of action for breach of confidence to establish the extended action for breach of 
confidence, have been the basis for the protection of privacy of the corporation at the 
European Court of Human Rights.  
Equally, an examination of Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence is made because the 
developments which have occurred in the protection of privacy at the Strasbourg level, 
from the protection of the individual to the protection of the corporation, culminate to 
serve as the process upon which the question of whether the extended action for breach 
of confidence ought to be further developed to provide protection for the privacy of the 
corporation, is decided; and also because Strasbourg jurisprudence has facilitated in 
shaping the English domestic law in matters relating to privacy. This examination is 
also made because section 2 Human Rights Act 1998 specifically provides that in 
determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right, the 
United Kingdom Court must take into account the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
Court. In addition, the examination is made because as declared by Woolf LJ of the 
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Court of Appeal of the United Kingdom in R v Broadcasting Standards Commission 
ex parte BBC [2001] QB 885, 17, in difficult cases, it is perfectly appropriate to have 


































THE EXTENDED ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONFIDENCE  
The incorporation of the ECHR into the domestic law of the United Kingdom and 
its effect 
The extended action for breach of confidence which protects against the violation of 
the privacy of the individual was established through the incorporation of Article 8 and 
Article 10 ECHR into the cause of action for breach of confidence, by virtue of the 
implementation of the HRA in the domestic law of the United Kingdom. 
Article 8 provides 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 




Article 10 provides 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
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without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This 
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
Before the coming into force of the HRA, the ECHR Article 8 rights of the individual 
to his private life, family life, home or correspondence was not directly applicable and 
did not have legally binding force in English domestic law. This is because the United 
Kingdom is a dualist state, thus a treaty is not directly effective upon ratification and 
therefore cannot automatically become part of the domestic legal system. In this case, 
a treaty has indirect effect because it requires the implementation of local legislation to 
incorporate it into local law so as to give effect to the treaty obligations. As a result of 
this, before the coming into force of the HRA, the ECHR only had limited relevance to 
the domestic law as a public international law instrument. This was illustrated in the 
case of Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner.
378
 On the obligations imposed by 
the ECHR, Megarry V-C noted that Article 1 ECHR provides that ‘the High 
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms set out in Articles 2 – 18 of the European Convention’. His Lordship added 
that the United Kingdom, as a High Contracting Party which ratified the Convention 
on March 8, 1951, had as such long been under an obligation to secure these rights and 
freedoms to everyone. He declared  
That obligation, however, is an obligation under a treaty which is not 
justiciable in the courts of this country. All that I do is to hold that the 
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Convention does not, as a matter of English law, confer any direct rights on the 
plaintiff that he can enforce in the English courts.
379
 
To this end, although the United Kingdom was a signatory to the ECHR, it was at the 
time accepted that there was no free-standing right of privacy in English law. On a 




[There is an] absence of any English authority to this effect… it is no function 
of the courts to legislate in a new field. The extension of the existing laws and 
principles is one thing; the creation of an altogether new right is another… only 
Parliament can create such a right.
381
 
Megarry V-C observed that it seemed that Parliament had abstained from legislating 
on a point that is plainly suitable for legislation, and in the circumstance, it was indeed 
difficult for the court to lay down new rules of common law or equity that would carry 
out the Crown's treaty obligations. 
The absence of a free-standing right to privacy before the coming into force of the 
HRA meant that privacy cases were adjudicated upon through a host of laws at 
common law, such as defamation, malicious falsehood, trespass, breach of confidence; 
and under statute, the Broadcasting Act 1996, Protection from Harassment law 1997, 
Data Protection Act 1998. However, this range of laws did not adequately or 
exhaustively protect the individual’s privacy, although the traditional breach of 
confidence came, prima facie, closest to doing so. The inadequacy of these laws to 
provide an effective remedy in cases involving the individual’s privacy was 
profoundly illustrated in the case of Kaye v Robertson.
382
 In this case, a well-known 
actor who was recovering in hospital, having undergone very extensive surgery due to 
severe head injuries sustained in a car accident, was interviewed by journalists who 
improperly gained access to his room contrary to notices placed against such entry. 
Photographs were also taken. The journalists subsequently announced that they 
intended to publish this interview. The plaintiff, through his next friend, sought an 
interlocutory injunction against this publication alleging trespass to person, passing 
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off, libel and malicious falsehood. He claimed that he had not consented to the 
interview and had anyway not been in a fit state to consent. 
An injunction against publication was granted, but subsequently discharged on appeal. 
At the Court of Appeal, it was held as follows: that there was no passing off as the 
plaintiff was not a trader; there was no libel; on the claim of battery, there was no 
evidence that damage had in fact been caused; that there was no actionable right of 
privacy in English law; and that the elements of a claim for malicious falsehood had 
been made out. Malicious falsehood was the only grounds upon which the Court of 
Appeal felt able to grant relief on the basis that Mr Kaye had a commercial interest in 
his first interview following his accident, and that the newspaper would misleadingly 
damage this commercial interest if it suggested to the public that Mr Kaye had given 
this interview voluntarily. The court did not therefore restrain publication of the 
interview, because it felt unable to do so; all it could do was restrain publication of the 
interview without a clear indication that it had been given involuntarily. The 
newspaper accordingly went ahead and published the interview, notwithstanding the 
fact that it had been obtained without Mr Kaye's consent. 
In light of the apparent inadequacy in the law with regards to the protection of an 
individual’s privacy, the Court of Appeal in arriving at its judgment was unanimous in 
its call for a legal right to privacy. Glidewell LJ in acknowledging the keen need for a 
right of privacy declared 
It is well-known that in English law there is no right to privacy, and 
accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a person's privacy. The 
facts of the present case are a graphic illustration of the desirability of 
Parliament considering whether and in what circumstances statutory provision 
can be made to protect the privacy of individuals.
383
 
Glidewell LJ noted that in the absence of such a right, the plaintiff had sought a 
remedy through other established rights of action. 
Bingham LJ added 
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This case nonetheless highlights, yet again, the failure of both the common law 
of England and statute to protect in an effective way the personal privacy of 
individual citizens … If ever a person has a right to be let alone by strangers 
with no public interest to pursue, it must surely be when he lies in hospital 
recovering from brain surgery… It is this invasion of his privacy which 
underlies the plaintiff’s complaint. Yet it alone, however gross, does not entitle 
him to relief in English law.
384
  
Bingham LJ restated Professor Markesinis
385
 position that although many aspects of 
privacy were protected by a host of existing torts, it however entailed fitting the facts 
of each privacy case into the pigeon-hole of an existing tort which may not only 
involve strained constructions; but often, may also leave a deserving plaintiff without a 
remedy.  
Bingham LJ further observed, extra-judicially, in a subsequent article which he wrote 




…however effective these remedies may be in the cases to which they apply, 
there are other cases in which privacy is infringed and to which they do not 
apply, leaving the victim without a remedy.
387
 
He went on to express his regret on the manner in which Kaye was handled, stating 
that the case ‘served to illustrate the sort of situation in which the courts have held 
themselves to be unable to afford adequate relief to a plaintiff who plainly deserved 
it’.388 To this end, he concluded  
All three members of the court of whom I was one, regretted that in the absence 
of a law protecting privacy in this country they could afford Mr Kaye no more 
effective relief.
389
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Bingham LJ added that the basic human right to privacy is clearly enshrined in 
international treaties which the United Kingdom has bound itself to observe and 
although not directly effective, judges have nonetheless, on occasion, acknowledged 
the importance of the right to privacy.
390
 It is noted that this article as well as Kaye’s 
case were pre-HRA 1998. 
It is interesting to note that in his post-HRA book,
391
 Bingham LJ declared that he 
thought it likely that ‘in years to come there would be some developments in the law of 
privacy, and that the recognition given by the Convention will encourage the courts to 
remedy what have been widely criticised as deficiencies in the existing law’.392 He 
further propounded that the common law was advancing. However, when the 
opportunity arose for Bingham LJ, then at the House of Lords, to advance the law in 
line with his declarations, in the case of Wainwright v Home Office,
393
  it is suggested 
that there was a reluctance to pioneer a much awaited judgment which would have 
charted the course for more protection for privacy. In this case, Bingham LJ instead 
completely agreed with Lord Hoffmann in dismissing an appeal from the Court of 
Appeal, which had overturned the decision of the County Court which had found the 
strip searching of the applicants to be an invasion of their privacy and an unjustified 
trespass to person. Bingham LJ dismissed the appeal on the reasons proffered by Lord 
Hoffmann. This is in spite of the fact that Lord Hoffmann heavily relied on Kaye’s 
case, as well as on the findings of the pre-HRA Calcutt Committee
394
 in arriving at his 
judgment. Relying on Kaye’s case, Lord Hoffmann had declared that ‘all three 
judgments in Kaye’s case were flat against a judicial power to declare a right of 
privacy and he did not think that the judgments suggested that the courts should do 
so’;395 in so declaring, it is suggested, the House of Lords looked to a lower court 
which had regretted its decision for precedence. The Wainwright judgment was also 
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held to be reached on the basis that the HRA should not apply in the present case in 
which events occurred before its coming into force. This position was however settled 
by the European Court of Human Rights which declared that Wainwright was a case 
that clearly fell within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.
396
 
The decision in Kaye’s case was much criticised for showing a regrettable lack of 
boldness and inventiveness. Lester
397
 suggested that Lord Bingham’s statement that 
‘the invasion of Mr Kaye’s privacy, however gross, does not entitle him to relief in 
English law’, was too narrow a view of the judicial function of developing common 
law principles in accordance with contemporary and social needs, adding that the 





 suggested that Kaye should have had available an action for 
breach of confidence in respect of the unauthorised photographs taken of him in the 
hospital, adding that there should be, in the light of this case, more judicial support for 
privacy. Eady
400
 went further to call for the establishment of a statutory right of 
privacy, stating that the dangers in individual judges deciding such often controversial 
matters is that the decision may be drawn unnecessarily into issues of policy.  
 
On the legislative front, considerable attention was given to the development of a law 
of privacy in the United Kingdom. In 1972, the Younger Committee
401
 was constituted 
to inquire whether legislation was needed to give further protection to individuals, and 
also to commercial and industrial interests, against intrusion into their privacy. The 
committee considered that a general right of privacy should not be introduced into 
English law on the grounds that it may be used too readily to trespass upon the 
freedom to receive and use information, as well as express opinions. To this end, the 
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Committee decided by a majority against the creation of ‘a general tort of invasion of 
privacy’.402  
Furthermore, in 1990, the Calcutt Committee
403
 which was instituted to look into press 
behaviour with regards to personal privacy reached the conclusion that in the light of 
the absence of sufficient protection of individuals from press intrusion, a law of 
privacy was both justifiable and practicable. In spite of this conclusion however, the 
committee recommended that ‘an overwhelming case for the introduction of a 
statutory tort of infringement of privacy has not so far been made out’.404 It reported 
that ‘such a tort should not at the time be introduced’.405 The Committee recommended 
the establishment of a Press Complaints Commission. 
In 1993, the Lord Chancellor on behalf of his department launched a consultation 
paper on the infringement of privacy, which recommended that a new civil remedy for 
an effective protection of privacy be created by Parliament.
406
 It recommended a cause 
of action in tort, with respect to reckless, negligent, or intentional conduct tantamount 
to an infringement of privacy.  





recommended that a ‘Protection of Privacy bill’ which provides protection for all 
citizens should immediately be introduced. However in 1995, the government in 
responding to the House of Commons National Heritage Select Committee expressed 
the conclusion that a case had not been made for introduction of a civil remedy for 
infringement of privacy.
408
 It was suggested at the time that the government of the 
United Kingdom was not prepared to act so directly; thus, Britain was left with the 
Press Complaint Commission, and its ‘self-enforced’ Privacy Code.409 
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The failure of an adequate protection for privacy in English law was highlighted as 
‘one of the law’s ironies that although rooted in the English law of confidence, the 
American privacy torts had failed to germinate in England’.410 
 
The position of the ECHR Article 8 rights not being directly applicable, and therefore 
not having binding force in English domestic law, however changed as a result of the 
implementation of the HRA. The HRA came into force in 2000 and serves as a 
constitutional measure designed to give the Convention rights full effect for the aims 
of the Act. This is expressed in the preamble of the HRA which states that it is ‘an act 
to give fuller effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR’. The 
application of the ECHR and Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence in the domestic law of 
the United Kingdom was introduced in sections 2(1)(a), 3(1), and 6. 
Section 2(1)(a) states that  
A court or tribunal determining a question which arises in connection with a 
Convention right must take into account any – (a) judgment, decision, 
declaration or advisory opinion of the Court of Human Rights, whenever made 
or given, so far as, in the opinion of the Court or tribunal, it is relevant to the 
proceedings in which that question has arisen. 
Section 3(1) states that 
So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights. 
Section 6(1) states that 
It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right. 
The combined effect of the foregoing provisions is that the domestic courts must take 
into account the jurisprudence of the ECHR in cases where the ECHR rights are 
                                                          
410
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involved. Furthermore, it seeks to achieve compatibility of Convention rights with the 
domestic legislation as well as the common law of the United Kingdom; making it 
unlawful for a public authority, which includes a court or a tribunal, to act in a manner 
which is incompatible with the ECHR. 
Although the recognition of human rights is not new to English law, and has an ancient 
history which dates back to such instruments as the Magna Carta
411
 and the Bill of 
Rights,
412
 the incorporation of the ECHR and its jurisprudence into United Kingdom 
domestic law has been significant and has been held to ‘transform the previously 
limited circumstances and degree to which the Convention had any relevance in 
domestic judicial proceedings, thereby revolutionizing the United Kingdom legal 
system’s whole approach in the protection of civil liberties and human rights’.413 So 
significant are the developments brought about by the HRA that the Court of Appeal in 
the case of A v B Plc
414




Indeed, by virtue of the incorporation of the ECHR into United Kingdom domestic 
law, the Article 8 right of an individual to his privacy has become recognised as part of 
the domestic laws of the United Kingdom, thereby providing further protection for 
privacy.
416
 However, with the coming into force of the HRA, there has been 
contentious debate on whether there now exists a ‘right of privacy’ in English law. To 
this end, in one of the early post HRA cases, Douglas v Hello! Ltd,
417
  Sedley LJ 
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declared that English law had ‘reached a point in which it could be said with 
confidence that the law recognises and will appropriately protect a right to personal 
privacy’.418  
Some scholars suggested that a right of privacy had emerged as a result of this 
incorporation of the ECHR into the domestic law of the United Kingdom. Singh and 
Strachan
419
 stated that the issue of whether there existed a right to privacy was no 
longer an academic question in the light of Sedley LJ’s declaration, and further 
suggested that the decisions in A v B Plc
420
 and Campbell v Mirror Group 
Newspaper
421
 demonstrate a clear acknowledgement of the principle of a right of 
privacy for all individuals. However Lord Woolf CJ in the Court of Appeal case of 
Wainwright v Home Office
422
 subsequently held that ‘a right of privacy did not exist at 
common law’;423 this was further reinforced on appeal to the House of Lords424 with 
Lord Hoffmann’s declaration that ‘English law did not recognise an omnibus tort of 
privacy and therefore reject the invitation to declare that a tort of privacy existed’;425 
thus reining in that position.
426
 
More recently, however, the question of whether there is a right of privacy in English 
law, it is suggested, was settled by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord 
Judge, in Lord Neuberger’s Committee Reports Findings on Super-injunctions. His 
Lordship declared, inter alia, that  
Before 2000 there was in England and Wales no general right to privacy and 
therefore no right to … enforce any general claim to privacy.427 
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Furthermore, in the key findings and recommendations of the committee, the Master of 
Rolls, Lord Neuberger, reiterated this position, stating that  
 A general right to respect for privacy was not recognised until 2000.
428
 
In accordance with these declarations, it is suggested that a right to privacy was 
recognised since 2000; furthermore, the potential to develop this right was established.  
Lord Judge noted that the development of this right since 2000 was an inevitable 
consequence of the incorporation of the ECHR, and in particular Article 8, into 
domestic law. He emphasized however that this right was not created at common law, 
but by Parliament, and the Courts’ role is to apply the privacy law as created by 
Parliament through the HRA.  
 
From the above, it is seen that the incorporation of the ECHR and by extension Article 
8 provisions into the domestic law of the United Kingdom by virtue of the HRA has 
had the effect of developing the action for breach of confidence. It is submitted that 
this has occurred in two profound ways:  
[A] in the horizontal application of the HRA by courts, which in the words of Sedley 
LJ in Douglas v Hello! Ltd
429
 ‘arguably gives the final impetus to the recognition of a 
right of privacy in English law’; and  
[B] the emergence of the cause of action of the misuse of private information.  
These are examined in turn. Furthermore, the position of the development of the 
intrusion interest of privacy and the possible development of an intrusion tort is also 
considered. 
[A] The horizontal application of the HRA 
At the time of the incorporation of the ECHR into the domestic law of the United 
Kingdom by virtue of the HRA, it was debated whether the HRA would have only 
‘vertical effect’ – to protect individuals’ rights conferred by the Convention from the 
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arbitrary interference of public authorities; or whether it would in addition have 
horizontal effect – to protect individuals’ rights conferred by the Convention from 
interference by other individuals, between themselves. Wade,
430
 who is credited as the 
scholar that ignited this debate
431
 suggested that the HRA would have horizontal 
effect. He contended that the manner in which the two limbs of Article 8 ECHR are 
expressed indicates clearly that it is capable of a much wider meaning, stating that the 
first limb states an unlimited right which is obviously intended for all comers; whilst 
the second limb prohibits public authorities from arbitrary interference except on 
specified grounds, hence specifically involving public authorities. However, he did not 
indicate whether the HRA would have indirect or direct horizontal effect.
432
 In this 
regard, he asserted that there was no significance in distinguishing between direct and 
indirect effect, noting that ‘where a violation of a Convention right has occurred, the 
court would have no option but to obey section 6 HRA and enforce the right. Whether 
this is called direct or indirect effect seems to be a matter of words and makes no 
intelligible difference’.433    
Conversely, it was also argued that the right created by Article 8 ECHR is a right not 
to be interfered with by a public authority, hence a vertically effective right only. The 
main proponent of this view is Buxton
434
 who suggested that in the light of Article 
8(2), the right was intended to apply to acts done by public and not private interests, 
hence a vertically effective right. Furthermore, that section 6 HRA limited a wider 
interpretation of the Convention by stating that it is unlawful for a ‘public authority’ to 
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act in a manner which is incompatible with a Convention right. As such, the HRA is to 
be vertically and not horizontally effective. 
It has since been settled that a wider interpretation of Article 8 is in accordance with 
the spirit and culture of human rights, as reflected by the Strasbourg Court’s 
jurisprudence; and by extension, the HRA is given a statutory impetus for horizontal 
effect by virtue of this fact in itself, in conjunction with the combined effect of sections 
2(1), 3(1) and 6(1). The establishment of horizontal effect in the HRA by sections 2(1), 
3(1) and 6(1) is realized on the basis that a court or tribunal, in determining a question 
which has arisen in connection with a Convention right according to section 2(1), must 
take into account the judgments, decisions, declaration, or advisory opinions which the 
European Court of Human Rights has made. Similarly, the reading of, and giving 
effect to primary or subordinate legislation in a manner which is compatible with 
Convention rights, according to section 3(1), or the requirement of public authority, 
including a Court or tribunal, to act in a manner that is compatible with the ECHR, 
according to section 6; would also entail regard not only between individuals and 
public authorities, but also between individuals. 
This is illustrated in the case of Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd
435
 in which 
the court held that the combined effect of sections 2, and 6 imply horizontal effect 
because although the wording of section 6(1) suggests that the HRA specifically 
applies to public authorities, ‘section 6(3) states that the court is a public authority, and 
in accordance with section 6(1) must itself act in a way compatible with the 
Convention; and in so doing, in accordance with section 2, have regard to the 
Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence’.436 In declaring the horizontal effect of the HRA, 
Butler-Sloss P stated  
The essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary 
interference by public authorities. There may, however, be positive obligations 
inherent in an effective “respect” for family life. Those obligations may involve 
the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for family life, even in the 
sphere of relations between individuals…437 
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Butler-Sloss P, in emphasising the positive obligation on the State to design measures 
to secure respect for family life, even in the sphere of relations between individuals, 
cited Douglas v Hello! Ltd
438
 and further noted that Sedley LJ in Douglas stated that 
section 12(4) HRA  
puts beyond question the direct applicability of at least one Article of the 
Convention as between one private party to litigation and another – in the 
jargon, its horizontal effect.
439
 
Sedley LJ, in underlining the horizontal application of the HRA in Douglas observed  
the two sources of law [common law and HRA which incorporates the ECHR 
into domestic law] now run in a single channel because, by virtue of section 2 
and section 6 of the Act, the courts of this country must not only take into 
account jurisprudence of both the Commission and the European Court of 
Human Rights which points to a positive institutional obligation to respect 
privacy; they must themselves act compatibly with that and the other 
Convention rights. This … arguably gives the final impetus to the recognition 
of a right of privacy in English law.
440
 
Sedley LJ concluded that since the coming into force of the HRA, the courts, in 
accordance with section 6(1) and (3), are required to ‘interpret and develop the 
common law, even where no public authority is a party to a litigation, and that 
approach must be informed by the jurisprudence of the Convention in respect of 
Article 8’.441 
Therefore, for the courts to act in a manner which is compatible with the Convention 
rights, it had to develop the domestic law to be compatible with the Convention. With 
regards to privacy, the action for the breach of confidence would have to be developed 
in a manner which is compatible with Article 8 ECHR, whilst having due regard for 
Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence.  
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Equally, on the horizontal application of Article 8 ECHR, Lord Nicholls in Campbell v 
Mirror Group Newspapers
442
 declared that 
…the values enshrined in articles 8 and 10 [ECHR] are of general application. 
The values embodied in articles 8 and 10 are as much applicable in disputes 
between individuals or between an individual and a non-governmental body 




Likewise, Eady J in Mosley v News Group Newspaper
444
 cited the Council of Europe 
Resolution 1165 of 1998 resolution, that 
[T]he Assembly points out that the right to privacy afforded by article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights should not only protect an individual 
against interference by public authorities, but also against interference by 




Indirect horizontal effect of the HRA has also been firmly recognised by the courts in 
the United Kingdom. This is achieved by extending the traditional breach of 
confidence action to accommodate Article 8 and 10 ECHR. In Campbell v Mirror 
Group Newspaper,
446




The time has come to recognise that the values enshrined in articles 8 and 10 
are now part of the cause of action for breach of confidence … the courts have 
been able to achieve this result by absorbing the rights protected by articles 8 
and 10 into this cause of action. Further, it should now be recognised that … 
the values embodied in articles 8 and 10 are as much applicable in disputes 
between individuals or between an individual and a non-governmental body 
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The United Kingdom courts have therefore achieved the requirement of section 6(1) of 
the HRA by absorbing the Article 8 right into the jurisprudence of the action of breach 
of confidence, and resultantly, ‘have given new strength and breadth to the action so 
that it accommodates the requirement of those articles’.449 
It was suggested by Hunt
450
 that although the HRA may be horizontally applicable to a 
significant degree, a direct horizontal effect application is not intended by the HRA. 
Similarly, Pannick and Lester
451
 suggested that it was clear that the Convention rights 
would exert a powerful influence beyond a direct vertical effect on public authorities 
under section 6, but did not envisage a direct horizontal effect of the HRA; instead, 
they envisaged Convention rights being approached through domestic law. This would 
be achieved by weaving the Convention rights into the fabric of domestic law – into 
principles of common law and equity. Thus, suggesting indirect horizontal effect on 
the premise that it would preserve the integrity of the domestic constitutional and legal 
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order, domesticating rather than alienating convention rights and promoting legal 
certainty.  
There have, however, been particularly keen arguments by scholars
452
 that a direct 
horizontal effect was applied in the case of McKennitt v Ash.
453
 In this case, a close 
friend of a folk singer wrote a book divulging personal information about her. The 
claimant took objection and sued for breaches of privacy or obligations of confidence, 
seeking an injunction from further publication of private material.  
At the High Court, Eady J found for the claimant and granted an injunction preventing 
further publication on the grounds that it constituted private information under Article 
8 ECHR.  
The Court of Appeal upheld this decision. In doing so, Buxton LJ acknowledged that 
there is no domestic tort of invasion of privacy,
454
 therefore, in developing a right to 
protect private information the English courts had to proceed through the action of 
breach of confidence into which the jurisprudence of Articles 8 and 10 has to be 
shoehorned. In stating his discomfort with the accommodation of the jurisprudence of 
Articles 8 and 10 in the action of breach of confidence, he observed 
That a feeling of discomfort arises from the action for breach of confidence 
being employed where there was no pre-existing relationship of confidence 
between the parties, but the “confidence” arose from the defendant having 
acquired by unlawful or surreptitious means information that he should have 
known he was not free to use.
455
 
In approving Woolf CJ’s statement in A v B Plc456 that the court complies with section 
6 of the HRA by absorbing the rights which Articles 8 and 10 ECHR protect into the 
long-established action for breach of confidence, Buxton LJ declared that the effect of 
this argument was that  
                                                          
452
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… in order to find the rules of the English law of breach of confidence we now 
have to look in the jurisprudence of articles 8 and 10. Those articles are now 
not merely of persuasive or parallel effect but, as Lord Woolf CJ says, are the 
very content of the domestic tort that the English court has to enforce. 
Accordingly, in a case such as the present, where the complaint is of the 
wrongful publication of private information, the court has to decide two things. 
First, is the information private in the sense that it is in principle protected by 
article 8? … If “yes”, the second question arises: in all the circumstances, must 
the interest of the owner of the private information yield to the right of freedom 
of expression conferred on the publisher by article 10?
457
 
It has been suggested that the Court of Appeal in so declaring, ‘gave the HRA direct 
horizontal effect by directly applying Article 8 and 10 to this case, thereby relegating 
the common law to a supporting role rather than providing the framework for the 
privacy action.’458 This position seems to gain some weight considering the statement 
made by Eady J in Mosley v News Group Newspaper,
459
 in which he affirmed 
…a claim for invasion of privacy nowadays involves direct application of 
Convention values and of Strasbourg jurisprudence as part of English law...
460
 
In the light of the above, it has been suggested that the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
the McKennitt case indicates a direct application of the right; and the final nail in the 




It is, however, argued that a direct horizontal effect was not applied in the McKennitt 
case; rather, an indirect horizontal effect was applied. It will be recalled that Woolf CJ, 
in the Court of Appeal case of A v B Plc,
462
 espoused the principle that in compliance 
with section 6 HRA, the rights protected by Articles 8 and 10 should be absorbed into 
the cause of action for breach of confidence as the very content of the domestic law. 
Accordingly, the common law was developed by the extension of the traditional action 
                                                          
457
 Para 11. 
458
 Moreham, N. Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law. Law Quarterly Review. 2007: 
123, 373-378, 375. 
459
 Mosley v News Group Newspaper [2008] EWHC 1777. 
460
 Para 196. 
461
 Hughes, K. Horizontal Privacy. Law Quarterly Review. 2009: 125 April, 244-247. 
462
 A v B Plc [2003] QB 195. 
 135 
 
for breach of confidence to accommodate Articles 8 and 10 as the very content of the 
domestic law – thereby adequately protecting the individual’s privacy. This principle 
which brought about the establishment of the extended action for breach of confidence 
was what applied in the McKennitt case; hence, Articles 8 and 10 Convention rights 
were woven into the fabric of the domestic law, and approached therefrom – thereby 
bringing about indirect horizontal effect of the HRA. This approach has been firmly 
established in the domestic law of the United Kingdom. 
These tensions nevertheless, the impact of the HRA of incorporating the ECHR and 
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence into English law, as well as its horizontal application 
have brought about the development of privacy law.  
 
[B] The tort of the misuse of private information 
The second effect of the incorporation of the ECHR into the domestic law of the 
United Kingdom by virtue of the HRA, and the consequential influence of Article 8 
and Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence, has been a significant revision of the status quo 
in English law regarding an individual’s private information. This has brought about 
the courts’ development of the cause of action for breach of confidence and the 
absorption into it of the rights protected by Articles 8 and 10 ECHR ‘as part of the 
Courts’ duty as a public authority to give horizontal effect to Convention rights’.463 
This development of the cause of action for breach of confidence by absorbing the 
rights protected by Articles 8 and 10 ECHR, as put forward by Lord Woolf CJ in A v B 
Plc,
464
  brought about the extended action for breach of confidence which in turn has 
served as the foundation for the establishment of a privacy tort – the tort of the misuse 
of private information. The development of this tort was established in the case of 
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspaper,
465
 considered below. 
 
CAMPBELL v MIRROR GROUP NEWSPAPER 
                                                          
463
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In this case, Naomi Campbell, an internationally famous fashion model, complained 
that a newspaper published an article of her along with photographs showing that she 
was undergoing treatment at Narcotics Anonymous. She alleged that the newspaper 
obtaining and publishing additional details of her therapy at the group meetings and its 
taking of photographs covertly, constituted a breach of confidence in the light of 
Article 8 of ECHR. The defendant raised the defence of public interest stating that it 
was entitled, in the public interest, to publish the information in order to correct the 
claimant’s misleading earlier public statement that she was not addicted to drugs. 
In the court of first instance, Morland J gave judgment for the claimant and held, inter 
alia, that the information complained of was confidential and that having regard to 
section 12(4) HRA, and balancing Article 8 and 10 of the ECHR, the publication was 
not justified in the public interest. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the defendant’s appeal and held that the 
disclosure of information that the claimant was receiving therapy from a self-help 
group could not be equated with disclosure of clinical details of medical treatment, and 
that since it was legitimate for the defendant to publish that the claimant was a drug 
addict who was receiving treatment, the disclosure of the additional information 
complained of was peripheral and not particularly significant. Therefore, the 
publication demonstrated that the claimant had deceived the public, and as such was 
justified in the public interest. Furthermore, the court held that a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities would not find its disclosure offensive. 
The claimant appealed to the House of Lords and the House allowed the appeal (Lord 
Nicholls and Lord Hoffmann dissenting) stating that the threshold test as to whether 
information was private was to ask: whether a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities if placed in the same situation as the subject of disclosure, rather than its 
recipient, would find the disclosure offensive. Furthermore, that the details of the 
claimant’s therapy for her drug addiction related to the condition of her physical and 
mental health, and the treatment she was receiving for it was akin to the private and 
confidential information contained in medical records; therefore, the assurance of 
privacy, confidentiality and anonymity were essential to the claimant treatment. The 
court added that the publication of such information required specific justification and 
in the instant case, the publication went beyond disclosure which was necessary to add 
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credibility to the legitimate story that the claimant had deceived the public; noting that 
although photographs of the claimant were taken in a public place, the context in 
which they were used and linked to the article added to the overall intrusion into the 
claimant’s private life – which a person in the claimant’s position would find 
disclosure highly offensive. The court declared that looking at the publication as a 
whole, and taking account of all the circumstances the claimant’s right pursuant to 
Article 8 to respect for her private life outweighed the defendant’s right to pursuant to 
Article 10 freedom of expression; accordingly, publication of additional information 
and accompanying photographs constituted an unjustified infringement of the 
claimant’s right to privacy for which she was entitled to damages.  
In arriving at its judgment, the House of Lords referred to a host of Strasbourg 
cases,
466
 and noted that the common law, more precisely, courts of equity have long 
afforded protection to the wrongful use of private information by means of the cause of 
action which became known as breach of confidence. Although dissenting, Lord 
Nicholls however noted a shift had occurred as a result of the implementation of the 
HRA 
The common law or, more precisely, courts of equity have long afforded 
protection to the wrongful use of private information by means of the cause of 
action which became known as breach of confidence. Today this nomenclature 
is misleading. The breach of confidence label harks back to a time when the 
cause of action was based on improper use of information disclosed by one 
person to another in confidence. To attract protection the information had to be 
of a confidential nature … disclosed by one person to another in circumstances 
‘importing an obligation of confidence’ …467 
Lord Nicholls in recognising the extended action for breach of confidence therefore 
declared that 
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This cause of action has now firmly shaken off the limiting constraint of the 
need for an initial confidential relationship. In so doing it has changed its 
nature … Now the law imposes a ‘duty of confidence’ whenever a person 
receives information he knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be 
regarded as confidential. Even this formulation is awkward. The continuing use 
of the phrase ‘duty of confidence’ and the description of the information as 
‘confidential’ is not altogether comfortable. Information about an individual's 
private life would not, in ordinary usage, be called ‘confidential’. The more 
natural description today is that such information is private. The essence of the 
tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private information.
468
 
The action for the misuse of private information is referred to as a tort by Lord 
Nicholls as seen from the above declaration. This position is a development from the 
earlier position in Douglas v Hello! Ltd
469
 in which the court viewed privacy from the 
perspective of ‘a developing law of confidentiality; an equitable concept in which an 
equitable jurisdiction is exercised to restrain freedom of speech in circumstances 
where it would be unconscionable to publish private material’.470 It is suggested that in 
the light of the development of the action for the misuse of private information, the 
question of whether the action is a tort was settled by the Master of Rolls, Lord 
Neuberger, in his report on super-injunctions in which he continually referred to the 
action as a tort.
471
  
The misuse of private information tort affords protection for one aspect of the 
individual’s privacy – the information privacy aspect. Lord Nicholls affirmed that the 
ECHR and Strasbourg jurisprudence have undoubtedly had a significant influence in 
this area of the common law. He noted that the provisions of Article 8 right to respect 
for private life, family life, home and correspondence, and corresponding Article 10 
rights to freedom of expression have prompted English courts to identify more clearly 
the different factors involved in cases in which one or both of these two interests are 
                                                          
468
 Para 14. This is reiterated in cases such as McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, para 8; Murray v Express 
Newspapers Plc [2009] Ch 481, para 24. 
469
 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] EMLR 9. 
470
 Para 65. 
471
 Master of Rolls Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions: Super-Injunctions Anonymised 
Injunctions and Open Justice. 20
th
 May, 2011. Para 1.4., 1.20. @ 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/super-injunction-report-
20052011.pdf Accessed on 2/9/2012. 
 139 
 
present; thereby testing the common law against the values encapsulated in these two 
Articles, consequently achieving harmony between the development of the common 
law and the Articles in question. 
Therefore, Lord Nicholls declared  
The time has come to recognise that the values enshrined in article 8 and 10 are 
now part of the cause of action for breach of confidence. As Lord Woolf CJ has 
said, the courts have been able to achieve this result by absorbing the rights 
protected by articles 8 and 10 into this cause of action: A v B Plc [2003] QB 
195, 202, para 4.
472
 
This principle of the recognition of Articles 8 and 10 ECHR as part of the cause of 
action for breach of confidence has brought about the development of this cause of 
action to incorporate Articles 8 and 10 as the very content of the domestic tort; 
consequently, delivering the establishment of the extended action for breach of 
confidence. The principle accords with the provision of Section 6(1) HRA and has 
been firmly established. This is illustrated in McKennitt v Ash
473
 in which Buxton LJ 
noted that under section 6 HRA, the court, as a public authority, is required not to act 
in a manner which is incompatible with a Convention right; and the court is able to 
achieve this by absorbing the rights which Articles 8 and 10 protect into the long-
established action for breach of confidence. On the effect of the foregoing, Buxton LJ 
declared 
The effect of this guidance is, therefore, that in order to find the rules of the 
English law of breach of confidence we now have to look in the jurisprudence 
of articles 8 and 10. Those articles are now not merely of persuasive or parallel 
effect but, as Lord Woolf CJ says, are the very content of the domestic tort that 
the English court has to enforce.
474
 
Accordingly, in deciding the ambit of an individual's private life as guaranteed by 
Article 8, Lord Nicholls concluded  
                                                          
472
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473
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… courts need to be on guard against using as a touchstone a test which brings 
into account considerations which should more properly be considered at the 
later stage of proportionality. Essentially the touchstone of private life is 
whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
475
 
This was reiterated by Baroness Hale who further stated that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy is a threshold test which brings into play the balancing exercise 
between Articles 8 and 10.  
The touchstone of reasonable expectation of privacy has been applied in privacy cases 
following these declarations. In Murray v Express Newspapers Plc,
476
 Sir Anthony 
Clarke MR relying on Campbell stated that on a trial of a complaint of wrongful 
publication of private information, ‘the first question is whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy which is an objective question’.477 On the question of what the 
reasonable expectation of privacy entails, Sir Anthony Clarke declared 
As we see it, the question whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
is a broad one, which takes account of all the circumstances of the case. They 
include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the 
claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and 
purpose of the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or 
could be inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which 
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Although Lord Nicholls judgment in Campbell above is a dissenting judgment, it is 
nevertheless submitted that the declarations therein firmly established principles which 
have become fundamental to the protection of privacy; such as the shift in the 
description of information from confidential to private, the recognition of the values 
enshrined in Article 8 and 10 as part of the cause of action for breach of confidence, 
and the establishment of a tort for the protection of an individual’s private information 
– the tort of misuse of private information. These principles have also been the focus 
of scholarly writings which have contributed to the further development of privacy in 
English law. 
Lord Hoffmann in his judgment in Campbell, although dissenting, espoused principles 
which have also been central to the development of privacy protection. To this end 
Lord Hoffmann stated that although the action for breach of confidence could be used 
to protect privacy in the sense of preserving the confidentiality of private information, 
as is seen in the early case of Prince Albert v Strange,
479
 it was not founded on the 
notion that such information was in itself entitled to protection. He noted that the 
artificiality of breach of confidence in protecting privacy, on the basis that the action 
did not depend upon the personal nature of the information or extent to which such 
information was published, but upon whether a confidential relationship existed 
between the individual who imparted information and the individual who received it; 
and if there was a confidential relationship, then, equity imposed an obligation of 
confidentiality upon the latter individual and any other person who received the 
information with actual or constructive knowledge of the duty of confidence. 
Lord Hoffmann therefore declared that in recent years, and with the influence of the 
HRA, there had been two developments in the law of confidence 
One has been an acknowledgement of the artificiality of distinguishing between 
confidential information obtained through the violation of a confidential 
relationship and similar information obtained in some other way. The second 
has been the acceptance, under the influence of human rights instruments such 
as article 8 of the European Convention, of the privacy of personal information 
as something worthy of protection in its own right… The result of these 
developments has been a shift in the centre of gravity of the action for breach 
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Lord Hoffmann concluded that the new approach takes a different view of the 
underlying value which the law protects. Instead of the misuse of private information 
being based on good faith applicable to confidential information, it focuses upon the 
protection of autonomy and human dignity – the right to control the dissemination of 
information about one’s private life.481 
 
Lord Hope, in adding to Lord Hoffmann’s position on the development brought about 
by the incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law by the HRA, agreed with Lord 
Woolf’s declaration in A v B Plc482 that Articles 8 and 10 give new breadth and 
strength to the action for breach of confidence, but however disagreed with Lord 
Hoffmann declaration that the result of the developments brought about by the HRA 
had been a shift in the centre of gravity.  
It is argued that in the light of the horizontal application of the HRA which has brought 
about the accommodation of Articles 8 and 10 as the very content of the domestic tort, 
and the consequent emergence of the tort of misuse of private information in which the 
fundamental principle has shifted from whether information is confidential and imports 
an obligation of confidence, based on the duty of good faith and trust, to whether 
information is private, based on the protection of human dignity and autonomy; there 
has been a shift in the centre of gravity for the action of breach of confidence. Indeed, 
as declared by Lord Hoffmann, this development has brought about the protection of 
privacy of private information as something worthy of protection in its own right. 
Furthermore, Lord Hope in his judgment declared that with regard to the general 
principle that a duty of confidence arises when confidential information ‘comes to the 
knowledge of a person where he has notice that information is confidential’, as 
espoused by Lord Goff in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd
483
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The language has changed following the coming into operation of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the incorporation into domestic law of article 8 and article 
10 of the Convention. We now talk about the right to respect for private life 
and the countervailing right to freedom of expression.
484
 
In looking to the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence for guidance on the 
approach to be taken with regard to the two competing Convention rights of privacy 
and freedom of expression, Lord Hope indicated that a balancing exercise is involved; 
and that the context for this exercise is provided by Articles 8 and 10. To this end he 
declared 
The rights guaranteed by these articles are qualified rights. Article 8(1) protects 
the right to respect for private life, but recognition is given in article 8(2) to the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 10(1) protects the right 
to freedom of expression, but article 10(2) recognises the need to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others. The effect of these provisions is that the right to 
privacy which lies at the heart of an action for breach of confidence has to be 
balanced against the right of the media to impart information to the public. And 
the right of the media to impart information to the public has to be balanced in 
its turn against the respect that must be given to private life.
485
  
This balancing exercise has firmly established, and has been demonstrated in Mosley v 
News Group Newspaper.
486
 In this case, Eady J, in reference to Campbell’s case 
declared that in a privacy matter, after the first hurdle of demonstrating a reasonable 
expectation of privacy has been satisfied, the court is required to carry out the next step 
of weighing the relevant competing Convention rights in the light of an intense focus 
upon the individual facts of the case.
487
 In undertaking this balancing act, Eady J 
declared 
It was expressly recognised that no one Convention right takes automatic 
precedence over another … it has to be accepted that any rights of free 
expression, as protected by Art.10 … must no longer be regarded as simply 
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‘trumping’ any privacy rights that may be established on the part of the 
claimant. Language of that kind is no longer used.
488
 
In balancing these competing rights, due regard must be paid to proportionality.
489
 
Baroness Hale in Campbell stated that application of the proportionality test involved 
‘first looking at the comparative importance of the actual rights being claimed in the 
individual case; and secondly, looking at the justifications for interfering with or 
restricting each of those rights’.490 
 
From the above declarations, it is submitted that in the light of these changes, criteria 
such as whether information is of a confidential quality, or whether there exists an 
obligation of confidence,
491
 or whether it was in the public interest to maintain 
confidence,
492
 have been replaced with expressions such as whether the information is 
private and whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. There have also been 







 Indeed, in deciding the ambit of an individual's private life, as 
stated by Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale in Campbell, the court needs to essentially 
apply the touchstone of private life which is whether in respect of disclosed facts the 
individual in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The reasonable 
expectation of privacy is ‘a threshold test’ which brings into play the balancing 
exercise which is thereafter undertaken between the individual’s interest under Article 
8 in keeping information private, and the countervailing Article 10 interest of the 
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recipient in publishing it.
496
 This ‘new methodology’497 is now firmly established and 
has been applied by the courts in a variety of cases as illustrated above.
498
 
Accordingly, where information is private, the courts will inquire whether in the light 
of specific facts there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; and if so, the court will 
proceed to undertake a balancing act between the Article 8 rights of the claimant, and 
the Article 10 rights of the defendant; as such the three requirement test espoused by 
Megarry V-C in Coco v Clark
499
 is no longer determinative of privacy matters. To this 
end, the focus in the cause of action of misuse of private information is on whether 
information is ‘private’ and if there is ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’, as 
opposed to whether information is ‘confidential’ and if ‘an obligation of confidence’ 
arises.
500
 This represents the most significant difference between the action of misuse 
of private information and the traditional action for the breach of confidence, that is to 
say, the focus on whether information is private, rather than on whether there is an 
obligation of confidence. As indicated by Eady J in Mosley v News Group 
Newspaper,
501
 the law now offers protection to private information ‘in respect of 
which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, even in circumstances where there 
is no pre-existing relationship which gives rise to an enforceable obligation of 
confidence’.  
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Indeed, the effect of the incorporation of the ECHR into the domestic law of the 
United Kingdom has brought about the development of the tort of misuse of private 
information, thereby providing protection for the information privacy interest. This 
cause of action is established in relation to the protection of an individual’s private 
information, and has presently not been developed to provide protection for the 
corporation’s privacy.  
A case which came close to dealing with the question of whether a corporation is 
entitled to privacy protection is the case of Douglas v Hello!
502
 In this case, the first 
and second claimants, the Douglases’, paid the third claimants, OK! magazine, and 
gave it exclusive rights to publish photographs of their wedding. A rival magazine 
Hello!  surreptitiously took photographs at the wedding which it subsequently 
published.
503
 Hello! was held liable to the Douglases’ for a breach of confidence, and 
the Douglases’ equally recovered for an invasion of their privacy; while Hello! were 
held to be liable to OK! for a breach of confidence. In addition, Lord Hoffmann in the 
House of Lords stated that OK!’s case was not concerned with the protection of 
privacy but the commercial interest in the photographs which were taken at the 
wedding. Lord Hoffmann declared  
But this appeal is not concerned with the protection of privacy. Whatever may 
have been the position of the Douglases, who, as I mentioned, recovered 
damages for an invasion of their privacy, “OK!'s” claim is to protect 
commercially confidential information and nothing more … “OK!” has no 
claim to privacy under article 8 nor can it make a claim which is parasitic upon 
the Douglases' right to privacy.
504
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Therefore, although the information in question happened to have been about the 
private life of the Douglases’ who had contracted OK! for a job in relation to their 
private life; for OK!, the issue was about the commercial interest in the photographs 
which were taken at the wedding. As such, it is suggested that this case did not present 
a full opportunity for the courts to deliberate on the possibility of whether a 
corporation is entitled to privacy protection because it specifically concerned OK!’s 
commercial interest in the photographs which were taken at the wedding; thus 
commercial information of a confidential nature. Had it been that the occasion instead 
involved the Douglases’ as board members of OK!, carrying out the corporation’s 
activities of a non-commercial nature – such corporation functions as the its end of 
year party, possibly held within the corporation’s premises, then the question of 
whether a corporation is entitled to privacy protection, in the event of, for instance, 
press intrusion into the premises, would have provided ample opportunity. This would 
have been so on the basis of the intrusion by Hello! into OK!’s premises and Hello’s 
subsequent publication of photographs taken.  
This notwithstanding, it is observed, however, that the above statement of Lord 
Hoffmann does not exclude the possibility of privacy protection for corporations, but 
rather points to the fact that the appeal before the House of Lords for OK! was not 
concerned with the protection of privacy but with commercial information. 
 
Another case which came close to dealing with the question of whether a corporation 
is entitled to privacy protection is the case of Browne v Associated Newspaper Ltd.
505
 
In this case for breach of confidence and/or misuse of private information, an 
injunction was granted to restrain the defendant from publishing information relating, 
inter alia, to business activities communicated in the course of a personal relationship 
by the claimant, an individual. On the above ground, this injunction was subsequently 
reversed by Eady J., and on appeal to the Court of Appeal, was dismissed. 
In handing down the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Sir Anthony Clarke MR stated 
that ‘although there is no authority to the effect that information relating to business 
activities communicated in the course of a personal relationship or learned in a 
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domestic environment would be characterized as private, it appears to us that it all 
depends upon the circumstances of each particular case’.506 However, this proposition 
does not indicate whether a corporation is entitled to privacy protection under Article 
8, and one wonders whether this may be assumed in the light of the fact that Sir 
Anthony Clarke MR cited, inter alia, Societe Colas Est v France,
507
 which established 
the principle that a corporation is entitled to Article 8 rights to its private life and 
home, and thereafter made the declaration  
In short, each case must be decided on its own facts … without entering into a 
preliminary inquiry as to whether any particular piece of information should be 
allocated a “business” or a “personal” characterisation, the question to ask, in 
relation to each of the categories individually, was whether there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy [and if so] article 8 is engaged.
508
 
From the above, it is clear that the Court of Appeal indicated that information should 
not be characterized as business information or private information, but characterized 
on the basis of whether information has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and if so, 
then it may be protected by Article 8 ECHR. It is not clear however whether the court 
made this declaration as one specific to the case in question, which involved an 
individual; or whether it was a general declaration which would also include the 
protection of the information –business or private – of the corporation, in view of the 
reference to the Societe Colas Est case. 
 
Similarly, in Imerman v Tchenguiz,
509
 the claimant’s wife, through her brothers 
accessed the computer system of her husband, the claimant, Mr Imerman, and without 
his authorization copied information and documents which he had stored there, such as 
electronic copies of e-mails and other documents. In handing down the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal that, inter alia, Article 8 ECHR had been infringed, Lord Neuberger 
MR declared 
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In this case, as far as we can see, there is no question but that Mr Imerman had 
an expectation of privacy in respect of the majority of his documents stored on 
the server… Many e-mails sent to and by and on behalf of Mr Imerman, 
whether connected with his family or private life, his personal and family 
assets, or his business dealings must be of a private and confidential nature.
510
 
Lord Neuberger MR added 
… the fact that the documents [confidential personal or business papers] were 
stored on the server, which was, as [Mr Imerman] knew, owned by Robert 
Tchenguiz [one of Mrs Imerman’s brothers] who enjoyed physically 
unrestricted access to the server, cannot deprive Mr Imerman of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and the consequent right to maintain a claim for breach 
of confidence, in respect of the contents of any of his documents stored on the 
server.
511
   
From the above, the Court of Appeal found that the claimant, Mr Imerman, had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in accordance with Article 8 ECHR in respect of the 
majority of his documents accessed without his authorization; including documents 
connected with his business dealings, which the court classified to be documents of a 
private and confidential nature irrespective of the fact that it had been stored in an 
office. However, although the Court of Appeal established business information to be 
information of a private nature for which there was a reasonable expectation of privacy 
under Article 8, it made this declaration as specific to an individual, Mr Imerman, with 
regard to his business dealings; it however did not test the protection of the corporation 
in this regard. 
Consequently, the above cases of Browne v Associated Newspaper Ltd
512
 and Imerman 
v Tchenguiz
513
 seem to suggest that in certain circumstances Article 8 ECHR may 
provide privacy protection for business information. However, this development is 
limited to the individual, and does not extend to the protection of the corporation’s 
privacy interests. 
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The development of an intrusion tort 
Although the incorporation of the ECHR into the domestic law of the United Kingdom 
has brought about the development of the tort of misuse of private information which 
protects the information privacy interest, protection for the intrusion privacy interest of 
individuals as an independent cause of action is still in the process of development. 
Therefore, where the intrusion privacy interest of an individual is breached, without 
more, a claimant may not be able to claim an infringement of a right privacy.
514
 
Rather, the claimant may have to recover through a claim under legislation such as, for 
example, Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Data Protection Act 1998; or 
through a common law claim such as trespass, or nuisance. Presently, as the position 
on the protection of the intrusion privacy interest evolves, there are two conflicting 
positions as to what the law is. 
The first position, it is suggested, is that the law currently considers the intrusion 
aspect of privacy merely a factor among others for the determination of whether there 
has been a misuse of private information. This is illustrated in Murray v Express 
Newspapers Plc,
515
 in which photographs of the claimant’s son being pushed in a 
pushchair in a public street were taken without his parents’ consent, and through his 
parents, as litigation friends, the son complained that his right to respect to privacy 
under Article 8 ECHR had been breached, and that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with regard to the photographs taken. 
The Court of Appeal held that the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
that engaged his Article 8 rights. 
In arriving at its judgment, the court stated that in the course of investigating whether 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, one of the factors it will consider is ‘the 
nature and purpose of the intrusion’.516 Thus, in seeking to answer the question of 
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, the intrusive manner of targeting 
the claimant and surreptitiously obtaining the photographs will have a direct bearing 
on the decision of the court. This suggests that the court will engage intrusion not as an 
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independent cause of action, but as a stepping stone – a factor – for the determination 
of a privacy action.
517
  
Furthermore, the court stated that the photographs in question 




In addition, the court reasoned that  
It may well be that the mere taking of a photograph of a child in a public place 
when out with his or her parents, whether they are famous or not, would not 
engage article 8 of the Convention… [In the present case] it was the 
clandestine taking and subsequent publication of the photograph in the context 
of a series of photographs …519 
It is submitted that from the above comments, the court’s view was that Article 8 
ECHR may not have been engaged on the mere basis of the deliberate and clandestine 
taking of a photograph, without more – that is to say the intrusion privacy interest; but 
would be engaged, as seen in the present case, on the basis of the deliberate and 
clandestine taking of the photographs in corroboration with its subsequent publication 
– that is to say the information privacy interest.  
Professor Aplin
520
 indicated that from the two above statements of the Court of 
Appeal, two different ways in which clandestine photography may give rise to privacy 
claims under Article 8 are revealed. First, covert photography may engage Article 8 
where there is surveillance of a person or where distress is caused; thus an intrusion 
caused by surreptitious photography. Secondly, where the photograph is deliberately 
taken with a view to publication for profit, knowing that the individual shown is likely 
to object, a reasonable expectation of privacy which would engage Article 8 may be 
established. Professor Aplin adds that this second way is ostensibly linked to 
publication. In addition, it is suggested, as stated in chapter 1, that where the 
photographs are surreptitiously taken with a view to publication, until they are actually 
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published, it is the intrusion privacy interest which is engaged; the information privacy 
interest is engaged from the point of publication onwards. 
The position of the intrusion privacy interest as a stepping stone for the determination 
of a misuse of private information action was illustrated in Campbell v MGN Ltd
521
 in 
which the court, in seeking to determine whether Campbell’s Article 8 rights had been 
violated declared 
Lord Hope declared that  
[The photographs] were taken deliberately, in secret and with a view to their 
publication in conjunction with the article… the photographs were published 
and her privacy was invaded.
522
  
Thus, the intrusive manner in which the photographs were taken – deliberately and in 
secret – served as a stepping stone upon which Lord Hope was led to find that the 
publication of the said photographs by the defendant had breached the claimant’s 
privacy. The fact that photographs were taken surreptitiously was an important 
consideration, but merely a consideration.   
 
The second position regarding the intrusion privacy interest is that some courts have 
envisaged the possibility of the intrusion interest as a cause of action independent of 
the misuse of private information. This is illustrated in the case of Mosley v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd
523
 in which a well-known personality complained of an 
infringement of his privacy where the press, without his consent, published 
information that he engaged in certain sexual acts with prostitutes; the court held that 
the complainant was entitled to the protection of Article 8. 
Although the claim in this case was confined to the publication of information and did 
not include the intrusive means by which the information was obtained, Eady J in his 
judgement indicated that 
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Naturally, the very fact of clandestine recording may be regarded as an 
intrusion and an unacceptable infringement of Art. 8 rights.
524
 
In so stating, it is suggested that the court envisaged the said intrusion as one which 
could in itself, without more, engage Article 8 ECHR.  
Similarly, the courts have proceeded to hold that the circumstances in which a 
photograph is taken in a public place may by itself turn the event into one in which 
Article 8 ECHR is not merely engaged but grossly violated. This was illustrated in 
Wood v Commissioner for Police of the Metropolis.
525
 In this case, the claimant sought 
judicial review by way of declaration that the police actions of surveillance on him and 
the taking of his photographs were in violation of his Article 8 rights. The court held 
that the taking and retention of photographs of the claimant in the street violated the 
claimant’s Article 8 rights. 
In arriving at his judgment, Lord Laws declared  
The act of taking the picture, or more likely pictures, may be intrusive or even 
violent, conducted by means of hot pursuit, face-to-face confrontation, pushing, 
shoving, bright lights, barging into the affected person’s home. The subject of 
the photographer’s interest … may be seriously harassed and perhaps assaulted. 
He or she may certainly feel frightened and distressed. Conduct of this kind is 
simply brutal … It would plainly violate Article 8(1).526 
The protection of privacy involves much more than the protection of private 
information. Intrusion is a recognised legal value in England as suggested by the 
declarations of Eady J in Mosley’s case, and Lord Laws LJ in Wood’s case above. This 
legal value was also illustrated in Campbell v MGN Ltd,
527
 in which Lord Nicholls 
stated that ‘the wrongful disclosure of private information is just one aspect of 
invasion of privacy, and an individual’s privacy can be invaded in ways not involving 
publication of information’.528  
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However, there are tensions in the recognition of the intrusion aspect of privacy, as is 
illustrated by the judgment of the House of Lords in Wainwright v Home Office.
529
 In 
this case, the applicants were subject to strip searches at a prison during a visit to their 
relation who was an inmate. The applicants were shaken by the extreme nature of the 
searches and subsequently filed a civil action against the Home office. This application 
was successful and the applicants were awarded damages following a finding of 
trespass. Furthermore, the County Court held, inter alia, that the strip-searching was an 
invasion of their privacy exceeding what was necessary and proportionate, and thus 
constituted an unjustified trespass to person. 
This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal which disagreed that trespass to 
the person could be extended to fit the circumstances of the case, and found that no 
wrongful act, save for the battery against the second applicant, had been committed.  
The House of Lords upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Lord Hoffmann 
noted that the events in the case took place before the coming into force of the HRA; 
as such, the HRA could not affect the outcome. In the course of its judgment, Lord 
Hoffmann cited with approval Sir Robert Megarry V-C declaration in Malone v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner
530
 that  
… it is no function of the courts to legislate in a new field. The extension of the 
existing laws and principles is one thing, the creation of an altogether new right 
is another ... I readily accept that if the question before me were one of 
construing a statute enacted with the purpose of giving effect to obligations 
imposed by the Convention, the court would readily seek to construe the 
legislation in a way that would effectuate the Convention rather than frustrate 
it. However, no relevant legislation of that sort is in existence.
531
 
Lord Hoffmann relied on this passage in spite of the fact that the HRA had come into 
force, and the power of sections 2 and 6 gave the courts an opportunity to develop the 
law. This is also in spite of the fact that he acknowledged that intrusion upon a 
plaintiff's space or his private affairs' was relevant in Wainwright. It is argued that the 
situation in Wainwright was quite different from the Malone case. Malone was heard at 
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a time when the HRA had not come into force, and as such, Sir Robert Megarry V-C’s 
position that he could not construe a statute enacted with the purpose of giving effect 
to obligations imposed by the Convention, accorded with the time because at the said 
time, no relevant legislation of the sort was in existence. In any case, Sir Robert 
Megarry V-C indicated that if such legislation existed, the court would readily seek to 
construe it in a manner which would effectuate the Convention. Conversely, although 
the events in Wainwright’s case occurred before the coming of the HRA, the case was 
heard at a time when the HRA was in force, thus the above declaration of Sir Robert 
ought not to have been applied. This is because by virtue of section 6 HRA, the Courts 
are mandated to adjudicate cases concerning Convention rights in a manner which is 
compatible with the Convention. For the adjudication to be compatible with the 
Convention with regard to Article 8 ECHR, it is submitted that in the present case, the 
intrusion aspects of Article 8 ought to have been recognised as part of the protection of 
privacy rather than seeking to harness the tort of intentionally inflicting harm, trespass 
or battery to serve as a remedy. 
The House of Lords also relied, as already observed above,
532
 on the Court of Appeal 
case of Kaye which Bingham LJ had declared ‘highlighted, yet again, the failure of 
both the common law of England and statute to protect in an effective way the 
personal privacy of individual citizens’;533 and for which Lord Bingham LJ, extra 
judicially, indicated that ‘all three members of the court of whom I was one, regretted 
that in the absence of a law protecting privacy in this country we could afford Mr Kaye 
no more effective relief’. 534 
Furthermore, as already observed above,
535
 the Court also relied on the 
recommendations of the Calcutt Committee.
536
                      
That intrusion is an aspect of privacy which engages Article 8 ECHR was 
subsequently settled by the European Court of Human Rights in Wainwright v United 
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 This Court declared that this case clearly fell within the scope of Article 
8.  
In arriving at this judgment, the European Court of Human Rights indicated that 
Article 13 ECHR requires an effective remedy in domestic law in respect of violations 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in the ECHR. To this end the court stated  
Where an applicant has an arguable claim to a violation of a Convention right 
… the domestic regime must afford an effective remedy.538 
The court noted that the issue which it must address was whether the applicants had a 
remedy at national level to ‘enforce the substance of the Convention rights in whatever 
form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order’, 539 to which it 
declared that they had not, and thus there had been a violation of Article 13. 
In concluding, the European Court of Human Rights stated that due to the manner in 
which the searches were carried out on the applicants, it was not satisfied that the 
searches were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court found that the 
searches could not be regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ within the 
meaning of Article 8(2) of the Convention.
540
 Accordingly, the court unanimously held 
that there had been a violation of Article 8.  
It is submitted that the outcome in the case of Wainwright v United Kingdom, as well 
as the declarations of Lord Nicholls in Campbell’s case, Eady J in Mosley’s case and 
Lord Laws LJ in Wood’s case above, provide further opportunities for the development 
of independent protection for the intrusion aspect of privacy; that is to say, the 
development of a specific intrusion tort. These declarations and interpretations of the 
scope of privacy by their Lordships are consistent with the Strasbourg Court’s 
interpretation of private life under Article 8, and for the United Kingdom to fulfil its 
positive obligation under the Convention to efficiently protect all aspects of Article 8 
and also satisfy Article 13 ECHR, ‘privacy protection will certainly have to extend 
beyond the protection of private information’.541 Likewise, the protection of all aspects 
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of privacy – the information privacy interest and the intrusion privacy interest – would 
be consistent with section 6 HRA which makes it unlawful for a court to act in a 
manner which is not compatible with Convention rights. However, as English law 
presently stands, the intrusion interest of privacy is yet to develop into an independent 
tort, and is protected through a range of laws under statute and common law. 
It is further submitted that on the basis of the HRA, Parliament has provided the 
groundwork with which a tort of intrusion may be developed by the courts. It is 
proposed that an intrusion tort may be developed in the same manner as it has been 
developed in New Zealand. This development occurred by virtue of the case of C v 
Holland
542
 in which the plaintiff instituted an action for invasion of privacy against the 
defendant on discovering that he had surreptitiously videoed her when she was taking 
a bath, and stored the video on his computer.
543
  
In establishing ‘a tort of intrusion upon seclusion’ as part of New Zealand law,544 
Whata J considered that in Hosking v Runting,
545
 the Court of Appeal confirmed the 
existence of the privacy tort of wrongful publication of private facts subject to the 
fundamental requirements that first, there must exist facts in respect of which there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy; and secondly, publicity must be given to those 
private facts which would be considered highly offensive to an objective reasonable 
person. Accordingly, Whata J declared that the time had come for the above principles 
in Hosking’s case which are sufficiently proximate to enable an intrusion tort, to be 
seen as a logical extension or adjunct to it. Thus, it was functionally appropriate to 
establish a tort of intrusion into seclusion, to the end that privacy protection may be 
afforded an individual where there has been no publicity on an infringement which is 
highly offensive, and in which a reasonable expectation of privacy is entitled. 
Whata J set out the elements of the tort, asserting that in order to establish a claim 
based on the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must show an intentional and 
unauthorised intrusion, into seclusion, involving infringement of a reasonable 
                                                          
542
 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155. 
543
 The court held that the defendant was liable for intrusion into the solitude and seclusion of the 
plaintiff which had infringed the reasonable expectation of privacy of the plaintiff, and that the 
intrusion was highly offensive. 
544
 Para 93, 98. 
545
 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
 158 
 
expectation of privacy; which is highly offensive to a reasonable person.
546
 This 
conclusion was reached on the basis of six observations: 
First, on the basis that freedom from intrusion into personal affairs is a recognised 
value in New Zealand.
547
  
Secondly, that freedom from intrusion into personal affairs is agreeable to accustomed 
justified limitations, including a defence of legitimate public concern based on 
freedom of expression. 
Thirdly, that a tort of intrusion upon seclusion is absolutely compatible with, and a 
logical adjunct to, the Hosking tort of wrongful publication of private facts; 
furthermore, both torts logically attack the same underlying wrong, namely, unwanted 
intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Fourthly, that the right to freedom of expression affirmed by section 14 New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 as well as freedom of speech values are only infringed when 
publication is also contemplated, and where this occurs, the Hosking principles apply.  
Fifthly, that there are clear similarities between the structure of an intrusion tort and 
traditional torts based on the protection of person and property; furthermore, both 
intrusion tort and traditional torts involve unwanted acts which cause harm or damage 
to a person, or a person’s possession.  
And finally, that a feature of the common law is its capacity to adapt to vindicate rights 
in light of a changing social context.
548
 
In the same vein, it is proposed that an intrusion tort may be developed in like manner 
as illustrated in the above case. Intrusion is a recognised legal value in the legislation 
of the United Kingdom by virtue of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000;
549
 and it may be suggested, under common law, by the Campbell case, the 
Mosley case, and the Wood case. Secondly, freedom from intrusion into private affairs 
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as part of the guarantee of Article 8 ECHR would engage a defence of legitimate 
public interest based on freedom of expression as provided for under Article 10 ECHR, 
much in the same manner as the tort of misuse of private information. Thirdly, an 
intrusion tort is entirely compatible with, and a logical adjunct to, the tort of misuse of 
private information established in the Campbell case. Indeed, this is recognised by 
Lord Nicholls above declaration in Campbell that there is more to the invasion of 
privacy than the wrongful disclosure or publication of private information; both 
privacy interests protect the same principle, namely, a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
550
 Fourthly, freedom of speech values and the right to freedom of expression 
affirmed by Article 10 ECHR are only infringed when publication is contemplated, in 
which case the misuse of private information principle of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, as seen in Campbell, would apply. Fifthly, there are clear similarities between 
the structure of an intrusion tort and traditional torts on the basis of protection of 
property and the person, in relation to unwanted acts that cause harm or damage to an 
person’s possession, or to the person. And finally, it is trite that a feature of the 
common law is its capacity to renew itself, and adapt to vindicate rights in light of a 
changing social context. 
It may be suggested that trespass ought to be used to protect privacy. However, it 
becomes debatable whether in the light of technological advances, trespass would 
sufficiently protect infringements that may arise in such cases as surveillance in a 
public place by CCTV, or zoom lens photograph technology. The development of an 
intrusion tort would be consistent with the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of private 
life under Article 8, it would also be consistent with section 6 HRA; this development 
would enable the United Kingdom to meet its positive obligation under the Convention 
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THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH LAW 
This part examines the European Court of Human Rights interpretation of the notion 
and scope of Article 8 ECHR; it espouses the notion of private life, family life, home, 
and correspondence, and establishes that the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union have evolved 
from the protection of the individual’s privacy under Article 8 ECHR, to the extension 
of Article 8 protection to the corporation’s privacy – that is to say, its private life, 
home, and correspondence. In the light of this evolved position, it is submitted that the 
extended action for breach of confidence can and ought to be further developed to 
provide protection for the privacy of the corporation in English law; it is argued that 
this extension would aim to satisfy the provisions of Article 13 ECHR, as well as 
sections 2 and 6 HRA. 
Article 8 stipulates 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedom of others. 
Objective of Article 8  
The original objective of Article 8 is essentially one of protecting the individual 
against arbitrary interference by public authorities, which is primarily a negative 
undertaking.
551 
There is equally an integral positive obligation which involves the 
adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of 
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the relations of individuals between themselves.
552
 It is suggested that in the light of 
the principle established in Societe Colas Est v France,
553
 the objective of Article 8 is 
also one of protecting the corporation against arbitrary interference by public 
authorities.  Equally, there is, arguably, also a positive obligation which involves 
adopting measures designed to secure respect for the private life in the sphere of 
relations of corporations. It is noted that the boundaries between the state’s positive 
and negative obligations under Article 8 are not precisely defined, though the 
applicable principles are similar; and in the exercise of both obligations a fair balance 
has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the community 
as a whole.
554
 In striking this balance, it is noted that the state enjoys a margin of 
appreciation.
555
 Article 8 obliges the state to take pro-active measures to protect the 
privacy of the individual as well as the corporations.  
Strasbourg court’s interpretation of the notion and scope of Article 8 ECHR: the 
development of Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence from the protection of 
individuals to the protection of the corporations and its application to English law  
I The notion and scope of ‘private life’  
In accordance with Strasbourg jurisprudence, respect for private life under Article 8 
ECHR has been held to include an individual’s personal undertakings; it has also been 
held to include the protection of an individual’s business or professional activities, and 
in certain circumstances, the protection of the business and professional activities of a 
corporation.   
                                                          
552
 X and Y v The Netherlands [1986] 8 EHRR 235, para 23; Von Hannover v Germany [2005] 40 EHRR 1, 
para 57; I v Finland [2009] 48 EHRR 31, para 36. 
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 Societe Colas Est v France [2004] 39 EHRR 17. This case is discussed in the ‘notion and scope of 
private life’ in the section below. 
554
 Gaskin v United Kingdom [1990] 12 EHRR 36, para 42; Evans v United Kingdom [2008] 46 EHRR 34, 
para 75.  
555 ‘Margin of Appreciation’ may be defined as a doctrine which the European Courts have developed 
where it takes into consideration the fact that the Convention will be interpreted in different ways by 
the respective member states of the European Union, in view of their various historical, cultural, 
philosophical, and political perspective vis–a-vis the subject matter and background of a case in 
question, and therefore the European courts will take these perspectives into consideration in deciding 
whether to overturn the decision of a national court. See Odievre v France [2004] 38 EHRR 43, para 40; 
Pfeifer v Austria [2009] 48 EHRR 8, para 37. 
The early use of the expression  ‘Margin of Appreciation’  by the European Court of Human Rights can 
be seen in the cases such as Engel v Netherlands[1979-80] 1 EHRR 647 para 100; Handyside v United 
Kingdom [1979-80] 1 EHRR 737, para 48. 
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As indicated above, Article 8(1) prescribes that everyone has the right to respect for 
his ‘private life’, ‘family life’, ‘home’ and ‘correspondence’. This comprises the right 
to privacy in accordance with the ECHR. Respect for private life according to 
Strasbourg jurisprudence has been expressed interchangeably with respect for privacy 
which includes private life, family life, home and correspondence; at other times, 
private life may overlap with other aspects of privacy as family life, home or 
correspondence.  The term ‘private life’ under Article 8 ECHR according to the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive or restrictive 
definition. Pursuant therefrom, the European Court of Human Rights has held in S v 
United Kingdom,
556
 that private life incorporates a variety of situations such as the 
protection of the individual’s personal data,557 physical and psychological integrity.558 
Initially, the notion of private life by the European Court of Human Rights was 
understood to only involve the individual’s personal undertakings and did not envisage 
the protection of the individual’s activities which were of a business or professional 
nature, nor did it envisage the protection of the activities of a corporation.
559
 The 
position of private life solely involving the individual’s personal undertakings 
accorded with the original objective of the establishment of Article 8 by the Council of 
Europe in its preparatory document.
560
 The sole focus on the individual is illustrated in 
the rationale of the said Article 8 by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. As indicated by Teitgen, the rapporteur of the Consultative Assembly of 
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 S v United Kingdom [2009] 48 EHRR 50. 
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 Information of an individual’s health records have been held to be an aspect which affects his 
private life. See Z v Finland [1998] 25 EHRR 371; KH v Slovakia [2009] 39 EHRR 34; Roche v United 
Kingdom [2006] 42 EHRR 30, See also PG v United Kingdom [2008] 46 EHRR 51. 
558
 The physical and psychological integrity of an individual is an aspect of private life which protects 
the individual’s right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships 
with other human beings and the outside world See Friedl v. Austria [1996] 21 EHRR 83; Pretty v United 
Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 1; Mikulic v. Croatia [2002] 1 FCR 720; YF v Turkey [2004] 39 EHRR 34. the 
physical and psychological integrity of an individual can embrace multiple aspects of the person's 
physical and social identity such as an individual’s name, or gender identification – Bensaid v United 
Kingdom [2001] 33 EHRR 10, Peck v United Kingdom [2003] 36 EHRR 41; an individual’s sexual 
orientation and sexual life – KU v Finland [2009] 48 EHRR 52; an individual’s right to his image such as 
his photograph – Sciacca v Italy [2006] 43 EHRR 20; as well as an individual’s decision to or not to 
become a parent – Evans v United Kingdom [2008] 46 EHRR 34. 
559
 This notion of private life is illustrated in such early cases as Golder v United Kingdom [1979-80] 1 
EHRR 524 and Silver v United Kingdom [1983] 5 EHRR 347 [interference with prisoners’ 
correspondence]; Dudgeon v United Kingdom [1982] 4 EHRR 149 [relating to inquiry on homosexual 
conduct in private between consenting males]; Malone v United Kingdom [1985] 7 EHRR 14 
[interception of postal and telephone communications]. 
560





August 1949, the rationale of Article 8 ECHR was the protection of the individual, 
anchored in   
The inviolability of his private life, of his home, of his correspondence and of 
his family life in accordance with Article 12 of the United Nations 
Declaration…561  
However, this view of private life solely involving the individual’s personal 
undertakings began to evolve as the law developed, to the end that the business 
undertakings of the individual were held to fall within the private life of that individual 
as protected under Article 8 ECHR. This is illustrated in Huvig v France.
562
 In this 
case, the applicants’ private as well as business telephone lines were tapped by the 
police on the instruction of an investigating judge, and the applicants complained that 
this violated their Article 8 rights.  
The European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that the tapping of both the 
business and private telephone lines constituted a violation of their Article 8 rights. 
The court declared  
The telephone tapping complained of amounted without any doubt to an 
'interference by a public authority' with the exercise of the applicants' right to 
respect for their … 'private life.'563 
In including the business telephone tapping of the applicants’ as a violation of their 
private life, the court stated that such interference contravened Article 8 unless it was 
'in accordance with the law' and 'necessary in a democratic society' for the purpose of 
achieving one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 8(2) ECHR.  
Consequently, in Halford v United Kingdom,
564
 in which the applicant complained that 
interception of her telephone calls at her home and in her office by the police violated 
her Article 8 right; the European Court of Human Rights in holding, inter alia, that 
                                                          
561
 Council of Europe, Preparatory Work on Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights @ 
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART8-DH(56)12-EN1674980.pdf , page 2. 
Accessed on 13/12/2012. 
562
 Huvig v France [1990] 12 EHRR 528.  
563
 Para 25. 
564
 Halford v United Kingdom [1997] 24 EHRR 523. 
 164 
 
there had been a violation of Article 8 in relation to the calls made on the office 
telephone relied of Huvig’s case and declared  
In the Court’s view, it is clear from its case law that telephone calls made from 
business premises as well as from home may be covered by the notions of 
‘private life’…within the meaning of Article 8(1).565 
 
As the law evolved, the question of whether the notion of ‘private life’ could extend 
beyond the above traditional understanding which entailed the specific protection of 
the individual’s personal undertakings, and be held to solely engage the protection of 
an individual’s business premises arose. This question was tested in the case of 
Niemietz v Germany.
566
 In this case, the applicant complained that a search which had 
been carried out at his office had, inter alia, violated his rights under Article 8 ECHR.  
The European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that the search of the 
applicant’s office engaged a violation of his Article 8 rights. The understanding of 
private life under Article 8 ECHR was therefore expanded to include the business and 
professional premises of the individual. The court in arriving at its decision stated that 
it was difficult to clearly distinguish which of an individual’s activities formed part of 
his business life and which did not; it indicated that an individual’s business and non- 
business activities may be so intermixed that there was no means of differentiating 
between them. In developing the law under Article 8 to include the protection of the 
business and professional premises of the individual, the court declared  
The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive 
definition of the notion of 'private life.' However, it would be too restrictive to 
limit the notion to an 'inner circle' in which the individual may live his own 
personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world 
not encompassed within that circle.… To deny the protection of Article 8 on 
the ground that the measure complained of related only to professional 
activities … could moreover lead to an inequality of treatment, in that such 
protection would remain available to a person whose professional and non-
                                                          
565
 Para 44. See also PG v United Kingdom [2008] 46 EHRR 51, para 42; Kopp v Switzerland [1999] 27 
EHRR 91, para 50. 
566
 Niemietz v Germany [1993] 16 EHRR 97. 
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The court concluded that there was no reason of principle why the understanding of the 
notion of private life should be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business 
nature. It added that to interpret 'private life' as including certain professional or 
business activities or premises would be consonant with the essential object and 




This case therefore established the principle that private life under Article 8 ECHR did 
not only protect an individual’s personal undertakings, but could also solely protect an 
individual’s business or professional activities. This principle was applied in Van 
Vondel v Netherlands
569
 in which an applicant complained that the recording of his 
telephone conversations was in violation of his right to privacy under Article 8 of the 
convention.  
The European Court of Human Rights in unanimously holding that there had been a 
violation of Article 8 declared 
The court reiterates that the term ‘private life’ must not be interpreted 
restrictively… there is no reason of principle to justify excluding activities of a 
professional or business nature from the notion of ‘private life’.570 
Accordingly, the notion of Article 8 ECHR which had erstwhile been recognized as 
protecting the personal undertakings of the individual was thereby established as also 
protecting the individual’s activities of a business and professional nature. Thus, 
private life under Article 8 ECHR had been extended to provide protection for the 
business and professional activities of the individual.
571
 
                                                          
567
 Para 29. 
568 Para 31. Niemietz is also discussed under ‘the notion and scope of home’ below. 
569
 Van Vondel v Netherlands [2009] 48 EHRR 12. This case also discussed under ‘the notion and scope 
of ‘correspondence’ below. 
570
 Para 48. The court relied on Niemietz v Germany [1993] 16 EHRR 97, para 29; Halford v United 
Kingdom [1997] 24 EHRR 523, para 42; PG v United Kingdom [2008] 46 EHRR 51, para 56. 
See also MM v Netherlands [2004] 39 EHRR 19, para 40. 
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 See also Kennedy v United Kingdom [2011] 52 EHRR 4. 
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However, at the time of Niemietz case, the protection of business and professional 
activities under Article 8 was deemed one which operated for the individual alone. The 
closest the law got to the protection of the corporation under Article 8 was the holding 
of the European Commission of Human Rights in the case of Noviflora Sweden AB v 
Sweden
572
 which dealt with a corporation’s private life and correspondence. In this 
case which is further elaborated in the correspondence section below, a corporation 
complained that a search and seizure of documents conducted within its premises by 
public authorities constituted, inter alia, an unlawful interference with its right to 
respect for its private life under Article 8 ECHR. The Government submitted, inter 
alia, that the complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention; 
furthermore, stating that there is no indication that the seized documents did not 
exclusively relate to the applicant company's business activities.  
The European Commission of Human Rights nevertheless rejected the objections by 
the government, and held, inter alia, the applicant’s complaint admissible under 
Article 8. In demonstrating that the notion of private life under Article 8 is applicable 
to corporations, the European Commission of Human Rights declared  
The Commission has carried out, in the light of the parties' submissions, a 
preliminary investigation of the complaints under Article 8 of the 
Convention… The complaints cannot therefore be declared inadmissible as 
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27(2) of the Convention. 
No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established…. The 
Commission has rejected the Government's objections to the admissibility of 
those complaints… Held … Articles 8 complaints admissible 573 
Article 27(2) ECHR provides that  
The Commission shall consider inadmissible any petition submitted under 
Article 25 which it considers incompatible with the provisions of the present 
Convention, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of petition.  
In the light of the above provision, it is suggested that in relying on Article 27(2) 
ECHR and finding the applicant corporation’s complaint admissible, the European 
                                                          
572
 Noviflora Sweden AB v Sweden [1993] 15 EHRR CD 6. 
573
 Para 2-4. 
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Commission of Human Rights considered the corporation’s complaint of an unlawful 
interference with its right to respect for its private life under Article 8 ECHR 
compatible with the provisions of the Convention and manifestly well-founded. In so 
holding, it is submitted that the European Commission of Human Rights held the 
notion of private life under Article 8 to be applicable to the corporation. 
 
In a further development, advancing from the original intention of Article 8 ECHR, 
which reading from the preparatory document whereon the establishment of Article 8 
was based was intended specifically for the protection of the individual;
574
 the notion 
of private life under Article 8 ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights was held 
to include a corporation’s registered office, branches and other business premises. This 
is illustrated in Societe Colas Est v France,
575
 in which the applicant companies’ 
complained that raids and seizures which were undertaken within their premises by 
government inspectors constituted, inter alia, a violation of their right to respect for 
their home, relying on Article 8 ECHR. 
The European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that there had been violations 
of the companies’ Article 8 rights. In extending the notion of Article 8 to include, inter 
alia,
576
 the private life of the corporation, the court declared  
The Court reiterates that the Convention is a living instrument which must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. [Therefore] building on its 
dynamic interpretation of the Convention, the Court considers that the time has 
come to hold that in certain circumstances the rights guaranteed by Art.8 of the 
Convention may be construed as including the right to respect for a company's 
registered office, branches or other business premises.
577
 
On Article 8 ECHR protecting more than the ‘home’ of a corporation, the court 
declared 
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 See Council of Europe, Preparatory Work on Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights @ 
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART8-DH(56)12-EN1674980.pdf, page 2. 
Accessed on 13/12/2012. 
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The Court considers that although the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to which 
the authority responsible for ordering investigations was attached at the 
material time, made no distinction between the power of inspection and the 
power of search or entry, [however] it is not necessary to determine this issue, 
as at all events, “the interference complained of is incompatible with Art.8 in 
other respects”.578 
Although this case sought the Article 8 protection of the corporation’s ‘home’, as will 
be further elaborated in the ‘home’ section below; it is submitted that the European 
Court of Human Rights in stating that ‘the interference complained of –  the raids and 
seizures carried out at the applicants’ premises by the government inspectors –  is 
incompatible with Article 8 in other respects’,579 the court was addressing, inter alia, 
the violation of the corporations’ private life under Article 8 ECHR.580 Equally, in 
stating that ‘Article 8 rights may be construed, in certain circumstances, as including 
the right to respect for a company's registered office, branches or other business 
premises’,581 it is also submitted that the court was speaking to the understanding of 
the private life and home of the corporation under Article 8.                        
By this judgment, the court established that a corporation has, inter alia, a private life 
under Article 8 which is worthy of protection from intrusion. The court justified this 
approach noting that with regard to Convention rights being extended to corporations, 
it had already recognised a corporation’s right under Article 41 to compensation for 
non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of a violation of Article 6(1) of the 




The position of the inclusion of the professional or commercial activities of a 
corporation within the protection of ‘private life’ is supported by the European 
Commission in its Impact assessment on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of undisclosed know-how and 
business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and 
                                                          
578
 Para 46. 
579
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580
 See also the ‘correspondence’ section below. 
581 Para 41. 
582





 The European Commission, in recognising that the rights guaranteed in 
Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000 
correspond with the rights guaranteed in Article 8 ECHR and carried with it the same 
meaning and scope, in accordance with the provisions of Article 52(3) of the Charter, 
declared  
Several judgments of the European Court of Human Rights have interpreted 
that the notion of 'private life' cannot be taken to mean that the professional or 
commercial activities of either natural or legal persons are excluded (See, for 
instance, Niemietz v Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, §29; Société 
Colas Est and Others v France, §41…) This case-law has been recognised by 
the European Court of Justice, which refers to the right to respect for private 





Furthermore, the principle in Societe Colas wherein the notion of private life under 
Article 8 is established as including the protection of the corporation has also been 
further strengthened by the recognition and application of the principle by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in the recent case of Agrofert Holding A.S. v European 
Commission.
585
 This case, which was heard at the Court of Justice of the European 
Union involved, inter alia, the Commission invoking Article 8 ECHR.  Herein, 
Agrofert sought the annulment of the Commission’s decision to refuse it access to 
unpublished documents concerning the notification procedure of a merger which the 
Commission had authorised. The Commission in response invoked Article 8 of the 
ECHR as a fundamental right with regard to the respect for the privacy of its 
undertakings.  
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In expressing the principle enshrined in Article 6(2) Treaty on the European Union, 
that the Union shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European 
Convention and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, as general principles of Community law; the Court of Justice of the 
European Union declared  
The right to respect for private life is a fundamental right which forms an 
integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which the Court 
ensures… The right to respect for private life is, moreover, reaffirmed in art.7 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 
7 December 2000 in Nice... The notion of private life may include activities of 
a professional or business nature of natural or legal persons. (judgment of the 
European Court Of Human Rights, Niemietz v Germany, 16 December 1992, 
(1993) 16 EHRR 97, 29… Societe Colas Est v France (37971/97), 16 April 
2002, (2004) 39 EHRR 17, 41), these being activities which may be covered by 
a merger notification (see, by analogy, in respect of public procurement 
procedures …586 
The Court of Justice of the European Union although holding that a merger 
notification may come within activities of a professional or business nature and within 
the scope of Article 8 ECHR, however, rejected the Commission’s plea of Article 8 
with respect to the privacy of its undertakings. It is nevertheless submitted that the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in espousing the notion of private life 
acknowledged that a corporation, just like an individual, may have a private life 




From the above, therefore, the notion of ‘private life’ under Article 8 ECHR was 
initially deemed one applicable only to the individual’s personal undertakings, as 
illustrated, for instance, in Golder v United Kingdom,
588
 and Dudgeon v United 
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This notion of private life is also seen in such protection as the protection 
of the individual’s personal data, his physical and psychological integrity, as well as 
the protection of the individual’s privacy in public places. With the evolution of the 
law, this traditional interpretation of private life was consequently developed to 
include the individual’s activities in his business or professional life, as illustrated in 
Niemietz v Germany.
590
 By the case of Societe Colas Est v France,
591
 as affirmed in 
Agrofert Holding A.S. v European Commission,
592
 and Schenker North AB v EFTA 
Surveillance Authority
593
 the law has further evolved to include certain activities of a 
corporation within the meaning of private life for the purposes of Article 8.  
It is therefore submitted that by the above cases, the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights, as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
evolved to the extension and applicability of the notion of ‘private life’ under Article 8 
to corporations; and these serve as important and decisive indicators of the approach to 
be taken in the protection of privacy for the corporations in English law. To this end, 
the extended action for breach of confidence can and ought to be further developed to 
provide protection for the privacy of the corporation in English law – that is – the 
protection of the corporation’s ‘private life’ under Article 8 ECHR. This would satisfy 
the provision of Article 13 ECHR which provides that there should be an effective 
remedy at domestic law for the violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
ECHR; it also accords with the provision of Section 6 HRA which makes it unlawful 
for a United Kingdom public authority to act in a manner which is incompatible with 
Convention rights. 
 
II The notion and scope of ‘family life’  
In accordance with Strasbourg jurisprudence, family life under Article 8 ECHR has 
been espoused as encompassing the protection of the traditional family of the 
individual, as well as the individual’s de facto family.  
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This is illustrated by the European Court of Human Right in Marckx v Belgium
594
 in 
which a single mother and her illegitimate child complained, inter alia, that certain 
aspects of Belgium Illegitimacy law such as, the existence of limitations on the 
mother's capacity to give or bequeath, and the child's capacity to take or inherit 
property, infringed on her right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the 
Convention. 
The European Court of Human Rights held, inter alia, that the legislation in question 
failed to respect the applicants’ family life as protected by Article 8. 
In Marckx case, the court had to determine whether the natural relationship which 
exists between an unmarried mother and her illegitimate child gave rise to family life 
within the meaning of Article 8. In arriving at its judgment, the court therefore first 
sought to clarify the meaning and purport of the expression ‘respect for family life’ as 
envisaged under Article 8. To this end, the court stated that by guaranteeing the right 
to respect for family life, Article 8 presupposes the existence of a family; and a single 
mother and her child are one form of family no less than others.  
The court declared  
Article 8 makes no distinction between the ‘legitimate’ and the ‘illegitimate’ 
family. Such a distinction would not be consonant with the word ‘everyone’, 
and this is confirmed by Article 14 with its prohibition, in the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention, of discrimination grounded 
on ‘birth’ … Article 8 thus applies to the ‘family life’ of the ‘illegitimate’ 
family as it does to that of the ‘legitimate’ family.595 
The court in making this declaration observed that at the time the ECHR was drafted, it 
was regarded as permissible and normal in many European countries to draw a 
distinction between the 'illegitimate' and the 'legitimate' family; however, there had 
been an evolution of the domestic law of the majority of Member States and the States 
have moved towards full juridical recognition of the illegitimate family. The court 
therefore concluded that the Convention must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions. Thus, in holding that the relationship which exists between an unmarried 
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 Marckx v Belgium [1979-80] 2 EHRR 330. 
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 Para 31. See also Johnston v Ireland [1987] 9 EHRR 203, para 55. 
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mother and her illegitimate child gives rise to family life under Article 8, the court 
declared 
…the members of the ‘illegitimate’ family enjoy the guarantees of Article 8 on 
an equal footing with the members of the traditional family.”596 
Therefore, Article 8 applies to the family life of the illegitimate family in the same 
manner as it does to the legitimate family.
597
 This has been justified on the basis that 
‘the normal development of the natural family ties between the first and second 
applicants and their daughter required that she should be placed, legally and socially, 
in a position akin to that of a legitimate child’.598 In the court’s opinion, ‘family life’ 
within the meaning of Article 8 also includes situations where a unit exists between an 
unmarried couple and their child, such as where the couple have engaged in long 
periods of cohabitation.
599
 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has held 
that a relationship amounting to family life will exist between a child and his or her 
parents even if at the time of his or her birth the parents are no longer co-habiting or 
their relationship has ended.
600
 Thus cohabitation is not a prerequisite of family life 
between unmarried parents and minor children.
601
 The court has however held that 
where couples are legally married, family life will ‘normally’ involve cohabitation.602  
Respect for family life involves an obligation for the State to act in a manner 
calculated to allow family ties to develop normally.
603
 As stated above, the objective of 
Article 8 is principally that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference 
by public authorities. In addition to this negative undertaking, as seen in the cases 
above, there is also a positive obligation on the State, when it determines in its 
domestic legal system the regime applicable to certain family ties, ‘to act in a manner 
calculated to allow those concerned to lead a normal family life’; and a law which fails 
to satisfy this requirement violates Article 8(1).
604
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From the above, the notion of ‘family life’ under Article 8 ECHR is deemed one 
applicable to the traditional family as well as the de facto family. The interpretation of 
the notion of ‘family life’ has more recently been developed to include such other 
matters as the risk of severe environmental pollution,
605
 prisoners’ ability to maintain 
contact with their close family either through visits or correspondence,
606
  as well as 
the exercise of effective access to an applicant’s information concerning his health and 
reproductive status.
607
 Unlike the notion of ‘private life’ dealt with above, wherein the 
law has evolved from its traditional interpretation of the protection of the individual to 
include certain activities of a corporation within the scope of Article 8, family life 
continues to involve the protection of the individual alone. It is observed that there is 
yet no Strasbourg court case which has tested whether the violation of the privacy of a 
group of corporations which have been recognised by law to constitute a single 
economic unit, such as a corporation and its subsidiaries, would amount to an 
interference with the family life of the said group as understood under Article 8.
608
 
Nonetheless, ‘family life’ has been considered because an examination of the 
Strasbourg court’s interpretation of the notion and scope of Article 8 would be 
incomplete without illustrating the aspect of family life. Equally, this section has also 
been considered to demonstrate that although privacy is a matter which may concern 
the individual as well as the corporation as illustrated by Strasbourg court’s 
jurisprudence in private life above, and will be illustrated in its jurisprudence of 
‘home’ and ‘correspondence’ below, privacy for the corporation presently excludes 
respect for family life; and this serves as a guide to the approach on how English law 
ought to be developed, that is to say, in accordance with Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. 
Accordingly, the protection of the family life from unwanted intrusion, and the 
protection of the private information resulting from the said intrusion, from publication 
or dissemination, is an aspect of privacy which is exclusive to the individual. 
 
                                                          
605
 Lopez Ostra v Spain [1995] 20 EHRR 277; Guerra and Others v Italy [1998] 26 EHRR 357. This also 
overlaps with home life. 
606
 Ostrovar v Moldova [2007] 44 EHRR 19. This also overlaps with correspondence. 
607
 KH v Slovakia [2009] 39 EHRR 34. This also overlaps with private life. 
608
 The principle of the commercial reality of a corporation with subsidiaries constituting a single 
economic unit as espoused by Lord Denning is illustrated in the case of DHN Food Distributors v Tower 
Hamlets [1976] 3 All ER 462. 
 175 
 
III The notion and scope of ‘home’ 
In accordance with Strasbourg jurisprudence, respect for home under Article 8 ECHR 
has been held to include an individual’s private residence, his business premises, as 
well as a corporation’s premises.  
A traditional understanding of home under Article 8 was espoused by the European 
Court of Human Right in Moreno Gomez v Spain.
609
 In this case, the applicant 
complained that the very high level of noise emanating from night clubs and bars 
which operated in her neighbourhood prevented her from sleeping, and caused her 
other health problems. Relying on Article 8, she alleged that this noise constituted 
interference to her right to the respect of her home.  
The European Court of Human Rights held that the State had failed to discharge its 
positive obligation to guarantee the applicant's right to respect for her home; 
consequently, there had been a violation of the applicant’s Article 8 rights. 
In arriving at this judgment, the court espoused the notion of home and what 
constitutes a breach thereof, thus 
A home will usually be the place, the physically defined area, where private 
and family life develops. The individual has a right to respect for his home, 
meaning not just the right to the actual physical area, but also to the quiet 
enjoyment of that area.  Breaches of the right to respect of the home are not 
confined to concrete or physical breaches, such as unauthorised entry into a 
person’s home, but also include those that are not concrete or physical, such as 
noise, emissions, smells or other forms of interference. A serious breach may 
result in the breach of a person's right to respect for his home if it prevents him 
from enjoying the amenities of his home.
610
    
The court added that although the objective of Article 8 is principally the protection of 
the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it may also 
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involve the public authorities adopting measures designed to secure respect for private 
life in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. To achieve this 
objective, a fair balance has to be struck between the positive duty on the State to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicants' rights under the first 
limb of Article 8, and the justification of interference by a public authority in 
accordance with the second limb of Article 8. 
Accordingly, ‘home’ under Article 8 of the ECHR was envisaged to be an individual’s 
private residence in which physical space the individual may enjoy the right to the 
development of his private and family life. This traditional understanding of the notion 
of home under Article 8 ECHR was the only understanding of the notion of home in 
the early cases heard by the European Commission and this was illustrated in the case 
of X v Belgium
611
 in which the European Commission declared that ‘home’ under 
Article 8 was to be understood as an individual’s principal residence, and that that 
concept of ‘home’ as one’s principal residence was a specific concept which may not 
to be arbitrarily extended.
612
 
Subsequent to this restricted understanding, as the law evolved, the notion of home 
came to be held to include an individual’s residence which the individual may have 
had long periods of absence from, as long as the individual maintained sufficient links 
to it. This was the case in Gillow v United Kingdom.
613
 In this case, the applicants who 
owned a house were refused permission to occupy it under the Housing Law 
1969/1975 and were subsequently prosecuted for unlawful occupation. They alleged, 
inter alia, a violation of Article 8.  
The European Court of Human Rights unanimously held, inter alia, that there had 
been a breach of the applicants’ Article 8 rights as far as the application of the above 
legislation was concerned. 
In arriving at this judgment, the court considered whether the applicants’ residence 
which they had been absent from for over eighteen years qualified as ‘home’ as 
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understood under Article 8 ECHR. The court was satisfied that sufficient continuing 
links had been made by the applicants’ as ‘they had established the house in question 
as their home before they left it and had retained ownership of the said house, as well 
as the furniture in it, with the intention of returning in the future’.614 As the court 
noted, retention of sufficient links were further demonstrated by the fact that upon the 
applicants’ return, ‘they lived in the property with the intention of taking up permanent 
residence there, not having established any other home elsewhere’.615  For these 
reasons therefore, the court held that the house in question qualified as ‘home’ for the 
purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR.  
Thus, the traditional notion of ‘home’ was extended to include private residence in 
which the owners had been absent for long periods, on the basis that they maintained 
sufficient links to it. This principle was reiterated in Prokopovich v Russia,
616
 in which 
the court declared that the concept of ‘home’ within the meaning of Article 8 ‘is not 
limited to those which are lawfully occupied or which have been lawfully established; 
and whether or not a particular habitation constitutes a home which attracts the 
protection of Article 8 will depend on the factual circumstances, such as the existence 
of sufficient and continuous links with a specific place’.617 Indeed, Strasbourg Court’s 
jurisprudence had developed an autonomous notion of ‘home’ which did not depend 
on and was not hindered by its classification under domestic law.
618
 Accordingly, the 
fundamental right of inviolability of the home under Article 8 ECHR was deemed one 
which was specifically applicable to the private residence of natural persons. 
 
As the law progressed, the question of whether the notion of ‘home’ could extend 
beyond this traditional understanding which entailed the specific protection of an 
individual’s private residence, and be held to include a business premises, arose. This 
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was illustrated in Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities,
619
 a case 
which was heard at the Court of Justice of the European Communities. On the 
applicant’s reliance on the requirements stemming from the fundamental right to the 
inviolability of the home under Article 8, the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities noted that there at the time was no case law in the European Court of 
Human Rights on the subject. This court therefore declared  
Since the applicant has also relied on the requirements stemming from the 
fundamental right to the inviolability of the home, it should be observed that, 
although the existence of such a right [the fundamental right to the inviolability 
of the home] must be recognised in the Community legal order as a principle 
common to the laws of the member-States in regard to the private dwellings of 
natural persons, the same is not true in regard to undertakings … afforded to 
business premises against intervention by the public authorities.
620
 
As there was no case law of the European Court of Human Rights for reference on the 
subject, the understanding of ‘home’ continued to be restricted to its traditional 
understanding, and could not be extended to protect the business premises on the basis 
that the protective scope of Article 8 was concerned with the development of the 
individual’s personality, and as such, no inference could be drawn from Article 8 
regarding commercial enterprises.  
This was the position before the case of Niemietz v Germany.
621
 As the law further 
evolved, the European Court of Human rights in Niemietz v Germany
622
 firmly 
established that the notion of ‘home’ under Article 8 ECHR includes the protection of 
an individual’s professional or business premises.  In this case, a complaint was made 
by a lawyer that a search executed at his office had, inter alia, violated his right to 
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respect for his home as guaranteed by Article 8 of the convention. In a unanimous 
judgment, it was held that there had been a violation of Article 8.
623
   
The Strasbourg court in holding that the search of the applicant’s office violated his 
Article 8 rights, considered the word ‘home’ appearing in the English text of Article 8. 
As regards the word 'home,' appearing in the English text of Article 8, the 
Court observes that in certain Contracting States, notably Germany, it has been 
accepted as extending to business premises.
624
 Such an interpretation is, 
moreover, fully consonant with the French text, since the word 'domicile' has a 
broader connotation than the word 'home' and may extend, for example, to a 
professional person's office …625 
The court in noting that the French text expression of home as ‘domicile’ carried a 
broader connotation than home and may extend to a professional person’s office 
declared therefore  
In this context also, it may not always be possible to draw precise distinctions, 
[between an individual’s home and his business premises] since activities 
which are related to a profession or business may well be conducted from a 
person’s private residence and activities which are not so related may well be 
carried on in an office or commercial premises.
626
   
To this end, the court accordingly concluded  
More generally, to interpret the words [inter alia] 'home' as including certain 
professional or business activities or premises would be consonant with the 
essential object and purpose of Article 8, namely to protect the individual 
against arbitrary interference by the public authorities.
627
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The court indicated that to interpret ‘home’ narrowly would give rise to the same risk 
of inequality of treatment as a narrow interpretation of the notion of private life.
628
 
Therefore, the court understood ‘home’ under Article 8 of the Convention as 
encompassing the individual’s private residence, as well as his professional or business 
premises. This broad interpretation of the English text of Article 8 of the ECHR by 
reference to the French text of Article 8 accords with Article 33(1), (3) and (4) of the 
Vienna Convention.
629
 Article 33(1) provides 
When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is 
equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties 
agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
Article 33(3) provides 
The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each 
authentic text. 
Although paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention state that the text 
of a treaty which has been authenticated in two languages or more are equally 
authoritative, and the terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in 
each authenticated text; paragraph 4 of the said Article provides an exception to the 
above paragraphs to the end that paragraphs 1 and 3 apply 
Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a 
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the 
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best 




Therefore, the broad interpretation of the notion of ‘home’ by the court in the above 
case of Niemietz v Germany
631
 best accords with the object and purpose of ECHR 
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which is an instrument that must be interpreted and applied in such a way as to 




Furthermore, in a dynamic development, advancing from the original intention of 
Article 8 ECHR as a human rights provision prescribed for the specific protection of 
the individual, the notion of ‘home’ under Article 8 has been held by the Strasbourg 
court to include the protection of a corporation’s registered office, branches and other 
business premises. This was established by the case of Societe Colas Est v France.
633
 
In this case, the applicant companies complained that raids and seizures which were 
undertaken in their premises by government inspectors constituted, inter alia, a 
violation of their right to respect for their home under Article 8 ECHR.  
The European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that there had been violations 
of the companies’ Article 8 rights.  
In extending the notion of home under Article 8 to corporations, the court referred to 
the case of Niemietz v Germany
634
 and reiterated that the word ‘domicile’ had a 
broader meaning than the word ‘home’ and may extend to a professional person’s 
business premises. The court added that in Chappell v United Kingdom,
635
 it had held 
that a search conducted at a private individual's home which was also the registered 
office of a corporation run by the individual had amounted to interference with his 
right to respect for his home within the meaning of Article 8.  
Accordingly, the court declared  
The Court reiterates that the Convention is a living instrument which must be 
interpreted in the light of present – day conditions. As regards the rights 
secured to companies by the Convention, it should be pointed out that the Court 
has already recognised a company's right under Art.41 to compensation for 
non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of a violation of Art.6(1) of the 
Convention. [Therefore] building on its dynamic interpretation of the 
Convention, the Court considers that the time has come to hold that in certain 
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circumstances the rights guaranteed by Art.8 of the Convention may be 
construed as including the right to respect for a company's registered office, 
branches or other business premises.
636
 
On this approach, the court relied on the case of Cossey v United Kingdom
637
 and 
declared that the Convention being a living instrument, the court’s departure from an 
earlier decision may be warranted in order to ensure that the interpretation of the 
Convention reflects societal changes and remains in line with present day conditions.  
The court, although acknowledging that interference by a public authority may be 
more far-reaching where the business premises of a juristic person are concerned, 
nevertheless concluded that ‘the inspections in issue, on account on the manner in 
which they were carried out – the inspectors simultaneous entry into the premises of 
the applicant companies' head and branch offices without judicial authorisation, and 
the seizure of various documents containing evidence unrelated to the operations in 
issue – constituted intrusions’ into the applicant companies’ “homes” ’.638  
It is suggested that in holding that a corporation’s registered office and other business 
premises constitute its home within the meaning of Article 8, and that the manner in 
which the raids and seizures in issue were carried out constituted intrusions into the 
applicant companies’ homes, the court sought to realise, guarantee and safeguard 
Convention rights ‘in a practical, effective and dynamic manner to ensures that the 
interpretation of the Convention reflects societal changes and remains in line with 
present day conditions’.639 In so holding, the court had adopted an autonomous 
interpretation of ‘home’ in a manner which was not hindered by its meaning as given 
under domestic law.
640
 This interpretation also accords with the court’s principle in 
Airey v Ireland 
641
 to the end that the Convention is intended to guarantee ‘rights that 
are practical and effective, and not rights that are theoretical and illusory’. 
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This dynamic interpretation of Article 8 ECHR by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Societe Colas Est v France,
642
 extending the notion of home thereunder to 
corporations, has been further reinforced by its subsequent judgments in Buck v 
Germany
643
 and Sallinen v Finland.
644
 In Buck’s case, the court declared 
The Court would point out that, as it has now repeatedly held, the notion of 
“home” in Art.8(1) encompasses not only a private individual's home… 
“home” is to be construed as including also the registered office of a company 
run by a private individual, as well as a juristic person's registered office, 
branches and other business premises.
645
 
This declaration was subsequently reiterated in Sallinen’s case.646 
 
Correspondingly, the above stated principle of Article 8 including the protection of a 
corporation’s registered office, branches and other business premises, as established by 
the European Court of Human Rights in Societe Colas Est v France,
647
 has been 
adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. In Roquette Freres SA v 
Directeur General de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Repression des 
Fraude,
648
 this court relied on the Societe Colas judgment, as well as Niemietz 
judgment to reject its earlier position in Hoechst case that business premises was not 
included in the notion of ‘home’ under Article 8 ECHR. In departing from its Hoechst 
judgment, the court stated  
…fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law 
observance of which the Court ensures… The ECHR has special significance 
in that respect… For the purposes of determining the scope of that principle in 
relation to the protection of business premises, regard must be had to the case 
                                                          
642 Societe Colas Est v France [2004] 39 EHRR 17. 
643
 Buck v Germany [2006] 42 EHRR 21. 
644
 Sallinen v Finland [2007] 44 EHRR 18. 
645
 Para 31. 
646
 At para 70. 
647 Societe Colas Est v France [2004] 39 EHRR 17. 
648
 Roquette Freres SA v Directeur General de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Repression 
des Fraude [2003] 4 CMLR 1. This case involved the requirement by the European Commission for 
Roquette to submit itself for an investigation concerning alleged participation in monopoly practices, 
and price fixing.   
 184 
 
law of the European Court of Human Rights subsequent to the judgment in 
Hoechst. According to that case law, first, the protection of the home provided 
for in Art.8 of the ECHR may in certain circumstances be extended to cover 
such premises and, second, the right of interference established by Art.8(2) of 
the ECHR “might well be more far-reaching where professional or business 
activities or premises (Societe Colas Est v France, April 16, 2002) were 
involved than would otherwise be the case (Niemietz v Germany, December 16, 
1992: [1993] 16 EHRR 97).
649
 
This principle has been further reinforced by its reiteration in the recent case of 
Conseil National de l’Ordre des Pharmaciens (CNOP) v European Commission650 in 
which the Court of Justice of the European Union declared  
…under the case law, the protection of private life provided for in art.8 of the 
ECHR must be respected and the protection of the home is extended to the 
premises of commercial companies.
651
 
In Schenker North AB v EFTA Surveillance Authority,
652
 the court similarly declared 
It must also be recalled that, in certain circumstances, art.8 ECHR protects the 
right to respect for a company’s business premises, and that seizure of 
documents under an administrative investigative procedure may constitute an 
interference with a company’s rights pursuant to art.8 ECHR (compare the 
European Court of Human Rights Société Colas Est v France (37971/97) 




As seen from the above, the notion of ‘home’ under Article 8 ECHR was initially 
deemed one which was applicable only to the private residence of natural persons, as 
illustrated, for instance, in the case of X v Belgium;
654
 and subsequently in Gillow v 
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 As the law advanced, this traditional interpretation of home was 
extended to the end that the individual’s business or professional premises may be 
deemed his home within the meaning of Article 8, as illustrated in Niemietz v 
Germany.
656
 By the Societe Colas Est v France
657
 case, the law has been further 
developed to include the corporation’s premises as its home within the meaning of 
Article 8. This principle of home extending to corporations’ business premises has 
been adopted by the ECJ in Roquette Freres SA v Directeur General de la 
Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Repression des Fraude,
658
 and Agrofert 
Holding A.S. v European Commission.
659
 
It is therefore submitted that by the above cases, the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
evolved to the extension and applicability of the notion of ‘home’ under Article 8 to 
corporations; and these serve as important and decisive indicators of the approach to 
be taken in the protection of privacy for the corporations in English law. To this end, 
as equally submitted in ‘private life’ above, the extended action for breach of 
confidence can and ought to be further developed to provide protection for the privacy 
of the corporation in English law – that is – the protection of the corporation’s ‘home’ 
under Article 8 ECHR. This would satisfy the provision of Article 13 ECHR which 
provides that there should be an effective remedy at domestic law for the violation of 
the rights and freedoms set forth in the ECHR; it also accords with the provision of 
Section 6 HRA which makes it unlawful for a United Kingdom public authority to act 
in a manner which is incompatible with Convention rights. 
 
IV The notion and scope of ‘correspondence’  
In accordance with Strasbourg jurisprudence, respect for correspondence under Article 
8 ECHR has been held to include an individual’s private correspondence, his business 
correspondence, as well as a corporation’s correspondence. These correspondences 
                                                          
655
 Gillow v United Kingdom [1989] 11 EHRR 335. 
656
 Niemietz v Germany [1993] 16 EHRR 97. 
657 Societe Colas Est v France [2004] 39 EHRR 17. 
658
 Roquette Freres SA v Directeur General de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Repression 
des Fraude [2003] 4 CMLR 1.   
659
 Agrofert Holding A.S. v European Commission [2011] 4 CMLR 6. 
 186 
 
may include telephone conversations, consultations with one’s solicitor, as well as 
written, facsimile or email communications. 
Initially, the understanding of correspondence under Article 8 was held to involve the 
individual’s correspondence in his personal undertakings. This is espoused by the 
European Court of Human Right in cases such as Golder v United Kingdom
660
 and 
Silver v United Kingdom.
661
 In Golder’s case, the applicant, a prisoner, complained 
that the refusal to allow him to consult a solicitor with a view to commencing legal 
proceedings amounted to, inter alia, a violation his right to the respect of his 
correspondence under Article 8. The European Court of Human Right held that there 
had been a violation of Article 8. 
Likewise in Silver’s case, the applicants, prisoners, complained that the control of their 
mail by the prison authorities constituted, inter alia, a breach of their rights to respect 
for correspondence under Article 8 ECHR. 
The European Court of Human Right held that there had been a violation of Article 8. 
In pointing out that there was no material difference between the facts of the present 
case and those of Golder v United Kingdom,
662
 the European Court of Human Rights 
declared  
Restriction of correspondence… restriction on communications in connection 
with any legal or other business… prohibition on complaints calculated to hold 
the authorities up to contempt… prohibition on the inclusion in letters to legal 
advisers and Members of Parliament of unventilated complaints about prison 
treatment…  was not 'necessarily in a democratic society'; …. there has 
therefore been a violation of Article 8 in each case.
663 
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As the law advanced, the European Court of Human Rights held ‘correspondence’ 
under Article 8 ECHR to involve activities occurring in the individual’s private 
premises as well as his business premises. This is illustrated in Huvig v France
664
 
wherein the applicants’ complained that the tapping of their business and private 
telephones violated their Article 8 rights.  
In arriving at its judgment, the European Court of Human Rights declared that  
The telephone tapping complained of amounted without any doubt to an 
'interference by a public authority' with the exercise of the applicants' right to 
respect for their 'correspondence'... 
This judgment was arrived at in spite of the fact that business premises was 
involved.
665
 In Halford v United Kingdom
666
 the European Court of Human Rights 
further declared that with reference to the interference with telephone calls on business 
premises, ‘an applicant would have a reasonable expectation of privacy for such 
calls’.667 Such interference would result in the breach of the individual’s Article 8(1) 
rights unless it is in accordance with law, pursues one or more legitimate aims, and is 
necessary in a democratic society to achieve those aims, as intended under Article 
8(2).  
 
With the further evolution of the law, the Strasbourg court also held the understanding 
of ‘correspondence’ under Article 8 ECHR to solely include the individual’s 
correspondence of a business and professional nature. This is established in Niemietz v 
Germany.
668
 In so extending the law, the European Court of Human Rights stated  
[On the search operations by public authorities] Their operations must perforce 
have covered 'correspondence' and materials that can properly be regarded as 
such for the purposes of Article 8. In this connection, it is sufficient to note that 
that provision does not use, as it does for the word 'life,' any adjective to 
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qualify the word 'correspondence' … the Court did not even advert to the 
possibility that Article 8 might be inapplicable on the ground that the 
correspondence was of a professional nature.
669
 
The principle in Niemietz case therefore established that Article 8 protects 
correspondence of a professional nature. It is, however, not clear whether the premises 
of the corporation was also envisaged in the above pronouncement. However, as 
indicated by the court, the provision of Article 8 does not use the word ‘life’ to qualify 
correspondence; as further indicated by the court, the possibility of Article 8 not being 
applicable to correspondence of a business or professional nature is not adverted to. 
Consequently, in the light of the above, it is suggested that in providing Article 8 
protection to correspondence of a business and professional nature, the corporation’s 
correspondence may also be included within this protection. 
This notion of ‘correspondence’ as including a corporation’s correspondence is 
strengthened by the further development of the law by the European Commission of 
Human Rights which has held the notion of ‘correspondence’ under Article 8 ECHR to 
include the corporation’s correspondence. This is established in the case of Noviflora 
Sweden AB v Sweden,
670
 in which the applicant, a corporation, complained that a 
search and seizure of documents conducted within its premises constituted, inter alia, 
an unlawful interference with its right to respect for its correspondence under Article 8 
ECHR. The Government submitted, inter alia, that the complaint was incompatible 
ratione materiae with the Convention, adding that there was no indication that the 
despatching, transmission or reception of the corporation's correspondence was 
interfered with.  
The European Commission of Human Rights, however, rejected the objections by the 
government, and held the applicant’s complaint, inter alia, admissible under Article 8. 
In extending the notion of correspondence under Article 8 to corporations, it declared  
The Commission has carried out, in the light of the parties' submissions, a 
preliminary investigation of the complaints under Article 8 of the 
Convention… The complaints cannot therefore be declared inadmissible as 
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27(2) of the Convention. 
                                                          
669
 Para 32. 
670
 Noviflora Sweden AB v Sweden [1993] 15 EHRR CD 6. 
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No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established…. The 
Commission has rejected the Government's objections to the admissibility of 
those complaints… Held … Articles 8 complaints admissible 671 
It is suggested that in relying on Article 27(2) ECHR
672
 and finding the applicant 
corporation’s complaint admissible, the European Commission of Human Rights 
considered the corporation’s complaint of an unlawful interference with its right to 
respect for its correspondence under Article 8 ECHR compatible with the provisions of 
the Convention and manifestly well-founded. In so holding, it is therefore submitted 
that the European Commission of Human Rights held the notion of correspondence 
under Article 8 to be applicable to the corporation. Consequently, an intrusion into, 
and, or, interference with the correspondence of a corporation is engaged within the 
scope of Article 8. Equally, by the declaration of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Societe Colas Est v France,
673
 that ‘the interference complained of – the raids and 
seizures carried out at the applicants’ premises by the government inspectors – is 
incompatible with Article 8 in other respects’,674 it is further submitted that the court 
was addressing, inter alia, the violation of the corporations’ correspondence under 
Article 8 ECHR.
675
 Correspondingly, building on the declaration of the European 
Court of Human Rights that ‘Article 8 ‘rights’ may be construed, in certain 
circumstances, as including the right to respect for a company's registered office, 
branches or other business premises’,676 it is suggested that correspondence, inter 
alia,
677
 is an Article 8 right which may be applicable in this regard.
678
 On the principle 
that the entry into the premises of the applicant companies' offices and the seizure of 
various documents containing evidence unrelated to the operations in issue, constituted 
intrusions’ into the applicant companies’ homes; it therefore follows that intrusion 
                                                          
671
 Para 2-4. 
672
 See in the private life section above. 
673 Societe Colas Est v France [2004] 39 EHRR 17. 
674
 At para 46. 
675
 As well as its private life. 
676
 At para 41. 
677
 As well as private life and home.  
678 The right to respect to private life, family life, home and correspondence according to Article 8(1) 
ECHR are subject to the Article 8(2) which prescribes that there shall be no interference of these rights 
except such interference is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedom of others. 
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into, or publication of the correspondence of a corporation would engage the scope of 
Article 8.  
 
It is therefore submitted that by the above cases, the jurisprudence of the European 
Commission of Human Rights as well as the European Court of Human Rights has 
evolved to the extension and applicability of the notion of ‘correspondence’ under 
Article 8 to corporations; and these serve as important and decisive indicators of the 
approach to be taken in the protection of privacy for the corporations in English law. 
To this end, as also submitted in the cases of ‘private life’ and ‘home’ above, the 
extended action for breach of confidence can and ought to be further developed to 
provide protection for the privacy of the corporation in English law – that is – the 
protection of the corporation’s ‘correspondence’ under Article 8 ECHR. This would 
satisfy the provision of Article 13 ECHR which provides that there should be an 
effective remedy at domestic law for the violation of the rights and freedoms set forth 
in the ECHR; it also accords with the provision of Section 6 HRA which makes it 
unlawful for a United Kingdom public authority to act in a manner which is 
incompatible with Convention rights. 
 
From the above jurisprudence on privacy, therefore, it is submitted that the protection 
provided by Article 8 ECHR has been further developed to include the corporation’s 
privacy, that is to say, the protection of its private life, home and correspondence. This 
evolution has occurred notwithstanding the fact that the ECHR was primarily targeted 
at the protection of the individual, as illustrated by Schuman’s statement that ‘the 
ECHR provided foundation upon which to have defence of human personality against 
all tyrannies and against all forms of totalitarianism’.679 Correspondingly, the 
European Court of Human Rights was to be a court ‘before which cases of 
infringement of fundamental human rights was to be brought to judgment’.680  
                                                          
679
 Schuman, R. The Adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. The Sixth Session of the Council of Europe. 4
th
 November, 1950. 
680
 See Winston Churchill’s statement at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s 1
st
 
Session, 1949. On the ECHR, see generally, Teitgen, P.H. Introduction to the European Convention on 
Human Rights in Macdonald, R., Matscher, F. and Petzold, H. (eds) The European System For The 
Protection Of Human Rights. London: Martinus Dordrecht, 1993; Gomien, D., Harris, D. and Zwaak, L. 
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Equally, the evolution in the protection of Article 8 ECHR to include the protection of 
the corporation’s privacy has also occurred notwithstanding the fact that Article 8 
ECHR was originally intended for the sole protection of the individual, and did not 
envisage the inclusion of legal persons such as corporations. This is illustrated in the 
preparatory document upon which Article 8 was based at its institution by the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. The preparatory document indicates 
that Article 8 ECHR was included in the agenda of the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe with the objective of fulfilling the declared aim of the Council of 
Europe, in accordance with Article 1 of the Statute, with regard to the safeguarding 
and further realization of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
681
 In this 
preparatory document, there was no mention of legal person in the debate, nor 
provisions for the development of this jurisprudence in future. In the proposed drafts, 
amendments, and final draft of Article 8 ECHR,
682
 there was no mention of future 
possibility of legal persons being a part of the said Article; it was only individuals that 
were envisaged in the protection, in the same manner as in Article 12 UDHR 1948.  
However, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently indicated that the 
Convention is a living instrument with rights which will be guaranteed in a practical 
and effective manner to reflect the times;
683
 and in response to the dynamic nature of 
interpretation of the ECHR, Article 8 has been developed and extended to protect the 
corporation. This may have been enabled by the provision of the preamble of the 
ECHR in which the rights contained in the Articles of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948 were referred to as ‘fundamental freedoms’. The preamble of the 
ECHR states  
The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of Europe, 
Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Law and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1996; Van Dijk, P. and Van Hoof, G.J.H. Theory and Practice of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 3
rd
 edn. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998; 
Blackburn, R. and Polakiewicz, J. Fundamental Rights in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
681
 Council of Europe, Preparatory Work on Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights @ 
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART8-DH(56)12-EN1674980.pdf , page 2. 
Accessed on 13/12/2012. 
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 Council of Europe, Preparatory Work on Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights @ 
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General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948; Considering 
that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition 
and observance of the Rights therein declared … Reaffirming their profound 
belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foundation of justice and 
peace in the world … Being resolved, as the Governments of European 
countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political 
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law to take the first steps for the 
collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration… 
Thus, the Council of Europe, in taking the first step towards the collective enforcement 
of the Universal Declaration by the institution of the ECHR, saw the rights contained 
in the said Universal Declaration as not only ‘human rights’, but also fundamental 
freedoms; thus, giving allowance at inception for the future protection of non-human 
persons. This may also be corroborated by Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe 1949 which states  
Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule 




Equally, the protection of non-human persons is provided for by Article 34 ECHR 
which states  
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by 
one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or 
the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in 
any way the effective exercise of this right. 
Thus, the rights and freedoms of the European Convention are to be secured for natural 
and non-natural persons within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State; and by non-
governmental organisations, the European Court of Human Rights seem to have 
effectively interpreted it to include the corporation. 
                                                          
684 Article 3, Statute of the Council of Europe 1949. The Statute of the Council of Europe found the 
Council of Europe, which went on to introduce the ECHR. 
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Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that there are Articles which are presently limited to 
individuals, although there is no knowing what the advances of the future may bring. 
The European Convention, being a living instrument which must be interpreted in the 
light of present-day conditions, may well entail that in future, a right such as the right 
to life under Article 2 ECHR may be extended to protect the ‘life’ of a corporation 
which is presently held to exist, under company law, until, for instance, the corporation 
is wound up. However, the focus here is Article 8 ECHR. 
Accordingly, the evolution in the development of privacy protection under Article 8 
ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights has occurred from the traditional 
protection of the individual’s privacy, to the protection of business premises of the 
individual, to the protection of interferences occurring in public places as seen in cases 
such as Peck v United Kingdom
685
 and Von Hannover v Germany;
686
 and most 
recently, to the extension of Article 8 to the corporation. The European Court of 
Human Rights, in the dynamic interpretation of the ECHR in line with the reflection of 
present day conditions in its jurisprudence,
687
 has therefore demonstrated that the 
ECHR is indeed a living instrument which will guarantee rights in a practical and 
effective manner; and has accordingly extended the protection of Article 8 to the 
corporation in response to societal changes and the demands of the present times. This 
broad interpretation of Article 8 ECHR also accords with Article 34 ECHR, wherein a 
non-natural person may bring an action before the Strasbourg court. Furthermore, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s recognition of the privacy of the corporation 
under Article 8, as established by the European Court of Human Rights, serves to 
strengthen the position of this area of law. Consequently, both courts’ jurisprudence 
represents the law on privacy in the European area; and this evolution of privacy 
jurisprudence serves as an important and decisive indicator of the approach to be 
adopted in English law regarding the breadth and scope of protection of privacy as 
understood under Article 8 ECHR – which includes the protection of corporations. In 
accordance with this evolution, it is submitted that the extended action for breach of 
confidence ought to be further developed to afford protection for the privacy of the 
corporation in English law. This fully accords with the European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence on privacy, it would also satisfy the provision of Article 13 
                                                          
685
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ECHR; furthermore, it accords with the provision of Section 6 HRA. It would provide 
the corporation with the necessary autonomy it requires to effectively carry on its 
activities, within the law. In addition, it would provide adequate protection to everyone 
subject to English law; and as such, reflect the modern day reality. Finally, in the light 
of the proposed accession of the European Union to the ECHR which strengthens the 
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, this serves as another reason for 
English law to be consistent with Strasbourg’s jurisprudence; this consistency is again 





This chapter has established that by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union, Article 8 ECHR provides 
protection for the privacy of the corporation; consequently, in accordance with these 
jurisprudence, the corporation’s privacy can and ought to be developed under the 
extended action for breach of confidence which incorporates Article 8 and 10 ECHR 
into the jurisprudence of English domestic law. In the light of the above conclusion 
that the extended action for breach of confidence can and ought to be further 
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developed to provide protection for the corporation’s privacy, it is therefore reasoned 
that this submission brings on the question of the details of how the corporation’s 
privacy ought to be developed, in order to ensure compatibility with the Convention in 
accordance with sections 2 and 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, satisfy Article 13 
ECHR, as well as provide the corporation with the necessary autonomy it requires to 
effectively carry on its activities within the law. However, before this investigation is 
undertaken in the final chapter of this research, the question of whether in the 
alternative, the corporation’s privacy would be more suitably protected if developed as 




















PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF THE CORPORATION – THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATION’S PRIVACY AS A PROPERTY 
RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL 1 ECHR 
INTRODUCTION 
Having found that the corporation’s privacy can and ought to be developed through the 
extended action for breach of confidence in the preceding chapter 3, this chapter aims 
to determine through doctrinal analysis whether in the alternative the corporation’s 
privacy would be more suitably protected if developed as a property right under 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 {ECHR}.  
To achieve this, this chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1undertakes an examination 
into the established purpose and original scope of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR; this 
examination is based on the ‘Preparatory Work on Article 1 of Protocol 1’ by the 
Council of Europe at the time of the establishment of the said Article in 1952. This 
examination is undertaken to illustrate the initial purpose of the protection of Article 1 
of Protocol 1 ECHR as created by the Council of Europe, that is, for the individual; 
and its development to include the protection of the corporation. It is also undertaken 
to illustrate the restricted original scope of protection of the said Article 1, that is, to 
protect against the arbitrary confiscation of property by oppressive governments; and 
its evolution. The examination is undertaken with the overall aim of deciding whether 
the corporation’s privacy ought to be developed under Article 1 of Protocol 1. The 
investigation of whether the privacy of the corporation ought to be developed as a 
property right under Article 1 of Protocol 1 is the subject of part 2 of this chapter. Part 
2 specifically examines the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol 1 which protect the 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions of both natural and legal persons, and provides for 
exceptional circumstances in which the State may deprive the natural or legal persons 
of the use of their property. These provisions are respectively tested ultimately to 
decide whether the corporation’s privacy would be more suitably protected if 
developed as a property right under Article 1 of Protocol ECHR. An investigation of 
the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol 1 is made with the aim of demonstrating the 
evolution which has occurred from a restricted original scope of protection to an 
enlarged actual scope of protection presently, based on the jurisprudence of the 
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European Court of Human Rights. This investigation is primarily undertaken because 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the said provisions are 
respectively tested, to decide whether the privacy of the corporation would be more 
suitably protected if developed as a property right under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
Likewise, the investigation of the provisions is made because the ECHR upon which 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is based, is the source from 
which Article 1 of Protocol 1 ensues; and also because the European Court of Human 
Rights is the final arbiter of human rights matters regarding Article 1 Protocol 1.  
This chapter concludes that Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR would not suitably provide 



















BACKGROUND: THE ESTABLISHED PURPOSE AND ORIGINAL SCOPE 
OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL 1 ECHR 
Established purpose of Article 1 of Protocol 1 
The primary purpose of the establishment of the European Convention on Human 
Rights was to ensure the principles of the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental 
freedoms for all persons within its jurisdiction.
689
 In establishing the ECHR, the 
individual’s fundamental rights were at the core of the council’s foundation. Similarly, 
the protection of the individual was the initial primary focus of the establishment of the 
right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR by the Consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe on 20
th
 March 1952.  
This focus on the individual is illustrated in the debates on the early drafts of the 
proposed Article 1 of Protocol 1 by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe which was anchored in the free development of the individual’s personality – 
the human personality, the development of his family, and his home. In the earliest 
draft, the proposed Article 1 provided 
Every State party to this Convention shall guarantee to all persons within its 




Subsequent amendments which were also specific to the individual were proposed to 
the above draft, such as the contributions made by Andre Phillip of France,
691
 Lord 
Layton of United Kingdom
692
 and Sundt of Norway;
693
 all of the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. In the debates that ensued on the proposed Article 
1 of Protocol 1 drafts, the focus on the individual is further demonstrated in Andre 
Phillip’s statement  
                                                          
689
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690
 Council of Europe, Preparatory Work on Article 1 of the First Protocol, European Convention on 
Human Rights @ http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-P1-1-CDH(76)36-
EN1190643.pdf, page 2. Accessed on 27/04/2013. 
691
 Ibid at page 4. 
692
 Ibid at page 6. 
693
 Ibid at page 12. 
 199 
 
As regards to the rights to own property, I have submitted an amendment 
affirming what I think to be the true right to own property, conceived as a 
fundamental human right. It is the right for each one of us to own as property 
for the owner’s personal use – truly the projection of his person – those 
belongings which are tied to his being. I am speaking of his furniture and of the 
house in which he lives … possession of goods of personal use…694 
Dominedo of Italy, of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe added 
[Of the right to own property] I speak naturally of the right which results in an 
extension of human personality…695 
Cingolani of Italy, of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, on further 
amendments to the proposed draft also reiterated  
We think that the right to own property [is] an integral part of the rights of 
human personality and must be confirmed in our declaration.
696
 
These positions on the development of the human personality were reaffirmed by 
Bastid of France, of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, in his 
statement  
We reaffirm that property is an extension of the personality…it is bound up 
with the development of the human being. Property is an extension of the 
man…697 
Equally, it will also be noted that the focus on the individual was illustrated in the 
declaration of Man Entee of Ireland, of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, in his motion of 16
th
 August 1950 in which he stated that although not 
representing his views, the Committee had reached a compromise and recognised that 
man as a human being had a right to own and enjoy property. He added  
                                                          
694
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Of course, the right to own and enjoy property is limited… nature has 
intimately connected private ownership with the existence of human society 
and its true culture, and especially with the existence and development of a 
family. It is the function of private property to secure for the father of a family 




This focus on the right to own property as functioning for the development of the 
family was reiterated by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in its 
declarations regarding the primary purpose of the said Article 1. To this end, the 
majority of the Legal Committee of the Consultative Assembly stated that 





As seen from the above, these declarations by the Consultative Assembly focused on 
the development of the human being and the free development of his personality – the 
human personality, the development of his family, his home and the maintenance of 
his independence. This development of the individual – the human being, as well as 
the maintenance of his personal and family independence, represents one of the two 
aspects of Article 1 of Protocol 1, which is the ‘personal aspect’.700 
Initially, early drafts of Article 1 of Protocol 1 did not provide for legal persons. The 
majority of the Committee members initially voted for the inclusion of the right to own 
property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR on the basis of the personal aspect 
of the right – that is the importance of the part the right played as an integral part in 
‘the development of the human personality and also as a pre-condition of personal and 
family independence’.701 As such, legal persons were not included in its protection.  
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It is suggested that this initial exclusion of legal persons from protection under the 
proposed Article 1 of Protocol 1 was as a result of the fact that the protection of the 
legal person’s right to property was deemed an economic right by the Consultative 
Assembly, and some of its members were of the view that economic rights ought not to 
be included in the guarantees of the Protocol of the ECHR to begin with. To this end, 
Andre Phillip of France, of the Consultative Assembly stated that the right to own 
property should be confined to the right to ‘possession of goods for one’s personal 
use’.702 In the light of this statement, Andre Phillip declared 
Once you leave possession of the goods of personal use, and you deal with 
goods of production, it is only possible to affirm one fundamental right: [one of 
an economic nature] … This being the case, the only declaration that we could 
make on this point, if we want to guarantee the right to own property, would 
concern the ownership of personal effects. We must not go further and endow 
our Courts with competence … to cover not only individual but also collective 
ownership; where the Court be left to decide if, in certain cases, property 
should be individual or collective … This would be a grave error on our part … 
I think that this must be avoided.
703
 
Andre Phillip also added that to extend the right to own property to ‘ownership of 
means of industrial production’ would mean to introduce an economic and social 
aspect to the protection.
704
  
Thus, the ownership of means of industrial production and collective ownership of an 
economic nature represent the ‘economic aspect’ of the said Article. It was on these 
bases, as stated by Andre Phillip above, that the personal aspect of the proposed 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 initially triumphed over the economic aspect. 
However, in subsequent debates which took place, the importance of the economic 
aspect of the protection of property was highlighted and considered;
705
 and in the 
subsequent discussion of the draft, it was recognised that there were two aspects to the 
right to own property. Consequently, Ungoed -Thomas of United Kingdom declared  
                                                          
702
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Some of my friends on the Committee thought that you could not really have a 
complete life unless you had property and were able to use it in your own way. 
I am not disputing that at all. I do not want in the least to dispute that. But there 
is not only that aspect to a right of property. There is also an economic aspect. 




After much deliberation a subsequent draft text was proposed and unanimously 
approved by the Legal Committee in its Interim Report at the Second Session of the 
Consultative Assembly, including legal persons in the proposed protection of Article 1 
Protocol 1.
707
 This proposed text clearly established that the right to own property 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1 is a fundamental principle which a person – natural or 
legal – is entitled to. Thus, by this text, any natural or legal person had the right to 
respect for, and the protection of, his or its property which may not be the object of 
arbitrary confiscation. 
In all subsequent draft texts which were produced by the Committee of Experts, the 
recommendations by the Committee of Ministers and the whole Consultative 
Assembly, as well as the final text, legal persons were included in protection of 
property.
 708
 Thus, in establishing Article 1 of Protocol 1, the Council of Europe 
developed the protection from its initial position of the protection of the individual 
alone, to the protection of the individual, as well as corporations. Although the ECHR 
is a Convention on Human Rights, the legal person was included in its Article 1 
Protocol 1 protection, and the making this inclusion was carefully considered.
709
 In so 
doing, the two pillars of Article 1 of Protocol 1 – the personal aspect and the economic 
aspect – were recognised. 
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Original scope of Article 1 of Protocol 1 
The original scope of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR, based on the Preparatory Work on 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 by the Council of Europe, was restricted to the protection of 
property from arbitrary confiscation by oppressive governments. To this end, an early 
text of the proposed Article 1 Protocol 1 reads  
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Everyone has a right to 
own property, alone as well as in association with others.
710
 
On this scope, Sundt of Norway of the Consultative Assembly stated 
I consider that the fact that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of his property 
is a fundamental minimum of individual privilege which is accepted by all 
civilised nations, and which therefore ought to have its place in the collective 
guarantee… Protection should be given to the individual to ensure that 
deprivation shall not take place in an arbitrary manner.
711
 
However, in line with its dynamic manner of making Convention rights practical and 
effective, the European Court of Human Rights has developed the restricted scope of 
protection of Article 1 of Protocol 1; the Court has extended the interpretation of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 beyond the protection of property from arbitrary confiscation 
by oppressive governments.
712
 Equally, its protection is not limited to ownership of 
‘physical goods’, but also to certain other ‘rights and interests’ which constitute 
‘assets’ and which can also be regarded as ‘property rights’.713 This principle known as 
the autonomous meaning principle, as well as the developed scope of Article 1 
Protocol 1, as illustrated in a host of cases, are discussed in the succeeding part 2 
below. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVACY OF THE CORPORATION AS A 
PROPERTY RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL 1 ECHR: THE 
THREE RULES  
Having examined the established purpose and original scope of Article 1 of Protocol 1 
ECHR based on the ‘Preparatory Work on Article 1 of Protocol 1’, by the Council of 
Europe 1952 in the preceding part of this chapter; this part examines whether the 
privacy of corporations ought to be regarded as a property right which can be 
developed under Article 1 of Protocol 1. Accordingly, the provisions of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 ECHR are specifically examined, thereby investigating the actual scope of 
its protection based on the developed jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. This investigation of the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol 1 is made primarily 
because the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the said 
provisions are respectively tested, to decide whether the privacy of the corporation 
would be more suitably protected if developed as a property right under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 ECHR.   
Article 1 of Protocol 1 stipulates   
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions.  
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and 
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of 
international law.  
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties. 
The above provisions specifically mention legal persons as included in its protection. It 
therefore follows that the above provisions are prescribed for the individual as well as 
the legal person; including corporations. On the nature of Article 1 of Protocol 1, as 
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That Article comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is of a general 
nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in 
the first sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of 
possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the second 
sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that the States are 
entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the 
purpose; it is contained in the second paragraph.
715
 
Furthermore, in James v United Kingdom,
716
 the Court added 
The three rules are not, however, 'distinct' in the sense of being unconnected. 
The second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of 
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should 




Thus, by virtue of its three rules, Article 1 of Protocol 1 protects natural as well as 
legal persons, including corporations, from arbitrary interference with their 
possessions by the State; equally, it recognises the right of the State to deprive a person 
of their possessions or control the use of a person’s property with due regard to the 
conditions set forth in the Article.
718
  
The object of Article 1 of Protocol 1 as expressed in Part 1 above, is the right to the 
protection of property. Although the first and second rules categorically refer to 
possessions, in substance, it is the right to protection of property which is involved. 
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This is conveyed in the above declarations in Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweeden
719
 and 
James v United Kingdom;
720
 it is also conveyed in the Marckx v Belgium
721
 judgment 
in which the European Court of Human Rights declared 
By recognising that everyone has the right to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions, Article 1 is in substance guaranteeing the right of property. This is 
the clear impression left by the words 'possessions' and 'use of property' (in 
French: biens, propriété, usage des biens); the travaux préparatoires, for their 
part, confirm this unequivocally: the drafters continually spoke of 'right of 
property' or 'right to property' to describe the subject-matter of the successive 
drafts which were the forerunners of the present Article 1.
722
  
Similarly, the European Court of Justice declared in the case of Hauer v Land 
Rheinland –Pfalz723  
The right to property is guaranteed in the Community legal order in accordance 
with the ideas common to the Constitutions of the Member States, which are 
also reflected in the first Protocol to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights.
724
  
The right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR as established by the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe is based on Article 17 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 which provides  
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
725
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The influence of Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
provisions of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR is demonstrated in the declaration of Gulek 
of Turkey of the Consultative Assembly, that 
The right to own property is one of these rights (we are going to guarantee). It 
is, moreover, been taken from the United Nations Declaration… To omit the 




However unlike the general right of property under Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration, Article 1 of Protocol 1 goes further to prescribe restrictions to the general 
rules, which enable the State control the use of property in certain circumstances.
727
  
Similarly, a right to property is also protected in Article 17 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000, and states 
Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully 
acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except 
in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by 
law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use 
of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general 
interest.  




A right to property was not defined by the Consultative Assembly at the establishment 
of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR by the Council of Europe. The difficulty involved in 
proffering a definition of a right to property for the purpose of Article 1 of Protocol 1 
was expressed by the Council’s Consultative Assembly. To this end, Roberts of the 
United Kingdom of the Consultative Assembly indicated that 
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Human Rights @ http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-P1-1-CDH(76)36-
EN1190643.pdf , page 50. Accessed on 27/04/2013. See also Sir David Maxwell- Fyfe of United 
Kingdom, at page 32-33. 
727
 This is discussed below. 
728
 Article 17 (1)&(2). 
 208 
 




In response, Pernot of France of the Consultative Assembly declared that any 
definition may lack clarity, nevertheless, in interpreting what a right to property 
means, one may rely on the jurisprudence of the Court when the time comes. 
…we may rely on the European Court of Justice to discriminate, when the time 




When considering what would amount to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1, the 
Court shall first examine whether there exists a possession – property right – falling 
within the ambit of that provision; secondly consider whether there has been 




A specific examination of the three rules of Article 1 of Protocol 1 and the scope of its 
protection is now undertaken. In making this examination, however, it is stated, as 
noted by the European Court of Human Rights in Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweeden
732
 
and James v United Kingdom
733
  that although these three rules are distinct, they are 
not distinct in the sense of being unconnected; they flow into each other. Thus, as far 
as it is possible to do so, an examination of each of these rules is undertaken in 
separate subsections below. These rules are then respectively tested, to decide whether 
the corporation’s privacy would be more suitably protected if developed as a property 
right under Article 1 of Protocol ECHR. 
I. The entitlement to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions  
                                                          
729
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The first rule of Article 1 of Protocol 1 provides that ‘every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions’. This general rule applies for the 
natural as well as legal persons, including the corporation. The notion of the word 
‘possessions’ in Article 1 of Protocol 1 was debated by the Consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe at the establishment of the said Article. Andre Phillip of France, 
of the Consultative Assembly stated of ‘possessions’   
As regards the right to own property… It is the right for each one of us to own 
as property for the owner’s personal use – truly the projection of his own 
person – those belongings which are tied to his being. I am speaking of his 
furniture and the house in which he lives… This being the case, the only 
declaration that we could make on this point, if we want to guarantee the right 
to own property, would concern the ownership of personal effects.
734
 
This definition of possessions which limits possessions to goods of personal use was 
questioned by Pernot of France, of the Consultative Assembly
735
 who noted that the 
above definition of possessions limited the right to own property to goods of personal 
use such as clothing and lodging alone, and consequently questioned whether the right 
to own property would also protect a person’s goods of production such as cultivated 
land.  
This position on the definition of ‘possessions’ was however expanded by Cingolani of 
Italy who declared 
We think that the right to own property, includ[es] not only goods for personal 
use, but the products of thrift, and the right to own a hereditary family 
property…736 
It will be recalled that Pernot had declared that in interpreting a definition which 
lacked clarity, one may rely on the jurisprudence of the Court to discriminate.
737
 To 
this end, the notion of the word ‘possessions’ in Article 1 of Protocol 1 was clarified 
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by the European Court on Human Rights in Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v 
Netherlands.
738
 In this case, an applicant corporation complained that the seizure of its 
machine by a public authority to cover for the payment of taxes deprived it of its 
possessions in violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1. The European Court on Human 
Rights stated the seizure and sale of the machine constituted an “interference” with the 
applicant company's right “to the peaceful enjoyment” of a “possession” within the 
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 1;
739
 however, this interference was necessary for the 
purpose of securing the payment of taxes, in accordance with the third rule of Article 1 
of Protocol 1. The court therefore held that there had been no violation of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1. 
In arriving at this judgment, the court elucidated on the notion of ‘possessions’  
The notion “possessions” in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous 
meaning which is certainly not limited to ownership of physical goods: certain 
other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as “property 
rights”, and thus as “possessions”, for the purposes of this provision.740 
This case is significant for having established the principle of Article 1 of Protocol 1 
with regards to the scope of the concept of ‘possessions’. It is suggested that this 
autonomous meaning principle was envisaged in the preparatory work on Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, in which Sundt of 
Norway stated  
There is no doubt that the right to own property is so general that it is very hard 
to give a precise definition. The definition varies from time to time, from 
country to country and from party to party.
741
 
In line with the autonomous meaning principle above, it is observed that the developed 
scope of Article 1 of Protocol 1 has been interpreted to include a variety of 
circumstances not dealing solely with protection against the arbitrary confiscation of 
property by oppressive governments; thus extending Article 1 of Protocol 1beyond its 
originally established scope by the Council of Europe. Of significance is the fact that 
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the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has prescribed the actual 
scope of protection of Article 1 of Protocol 1. In this regard, the Court, in developing 
Article 1 of Protocol 1, has held ‘possessions’ to include company shares which have 
economic value,
742




 the unchallenged rights 
of a parcel of land as well as the revenue derived from working on the said land,
745
 an 
arbitration award which is final and binding with no appeal laid against it,
746
 right to 
pension,
747




 Equally, the Court has 
also held ‘the entitlement to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions’ to generally 










to recognise a contract of sale,
754
 failure of Court to protect a minority shareholder 
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from oppression by the majority,
755
 and entitlement to social welfare benefits such as 
pensions.
756
 The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has 
progressively developed the notion of what is protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1. To 
this end, in a dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, the Court has stated that in certain 
circumstances, a ‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining an asset could also qualify for 
protection under Article 1 of Protocol 1.
757
 An example of a proprietary interest vested 
with a ‘legitimate expectation’ and which has been held to engage Article 1 of Protocol 




Having illustrated the actual scope of the protection of the first rule of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1, above, that is, the entitlement to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, in 
deciding whether the corporation’s privacy ought to be developed as a property right 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1, the corporation’s intrusion privacy interest is tested on 
the first rule of Article 1 Protocol 1. To this end, the question is asked: 
On the entitlement to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1, can intrusion into the corporation’s premises or property constitute an 
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions? In order to answer this 
question, the first step is to ascertain whether the corporation’s premises or property 
can be deemed its possessions.  
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Having stated at the beginning of this part of the chapter, in accordance with the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, that the clear impression left by 
the words ‘possessions’ and ‘use of property’ in the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol 
1 is that in stating ‘possessions’ in the said Article, it is the protection of ‘property’ 
which is involved; it is therefore settled that the right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions under Article 1 of Protocol 1 is in substance guaranteeing the right to 
property. Consequently, if in speaking of possessions in the rules of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 it is the protection of property which is involved; it thus follows that the 
corporation’s premises or property can be deemed its possessions.759 It is therefore 
submitted that there exists a possession in the premises or property of a corporation; 
accordingly, a corporation’s premises or property can be deemed its possessions. 
Equally, as illustrated above, in accordance with the autonomous meaning principle, 
the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence has developed Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 and broadly interprets the scope of what qualifies as possessions under the 
Article as not limited to physical goods, but also includes a wide range of interests 
which constitute assets; adding that such interests can be regarded as property rights. 
On the strength of this autonomous meaning principle, therefore, it is consequently 
submitted that the corporation’s premises or property, which can properly be regarded 
as an asset, can be deemed its possessions.  
Having found that the corporation’s premises or property qualifies as its possession; 
can intrusion into the corporation’s premises or property constitute an interference 
with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions?  
It will be recalled that in chapter 1,
760
 the first privacy interests of the corporation – the 
intrusion privacy interest – was established to involve the unwanted access into the 
corporation’s home or its property. On the strength of Societe Colas Est v France,761 a 
corporation’s property or its premises – its head office and branch offices – are deemed 
its home and represents its own space which may be subject to an intrusion. 
Accordingly, it was reasoned that an unwanted access into a corporation’s premises or 
property for such activities as searches by a public authority, or surreptitious 
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surveillance within such premises by the press or its agents, would constitute an 
intrusion into its home. From this intrusion privacy interest a definition of the 
corporation’s privacy ensued, as the freedom from unwanted interference or 
disturbance – intrusion – into the corporation’s private sphere which is its home or 
property.  
Thus, on whether an intrusion into the corporation’s property constitutes an 
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, it is submitted that having 
established that the corporation’s property is deemed its possessions, and reiterated 
that a corporation has an intrusion privacy interest to speak of; an intrusion into the 
corporation’s property can constitute an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its 
possessions. This accords with the principle espoused above at the beginning of this 
part of the chapter,
762
 that in considering whether there has been a violation of Article 
1 of Protocol 1, the Court shall first examine whether there exists a possession falling 
within the scope of that provision, secondly consider whether there has been 
interference with that possession; and ultimately, the nature of that interference.  
It also accords, it is suggested, with the declaration of the Consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe on Article 1 of Protocol 1 at the time of its institution. It will be 
recalled, as stated in Part 1 of this chapter, that the Consultative Assembly conceded 
that ‘it was impossible to define a right to property in general term, hence the 
jurisprudence of the Court would be relied upon to discriminate, when the time 
comes’.763 It accords in the sense that the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights having found that property includes assets which have economic value, 
it follows that the disturbance of this asset, in this case the corporation’s property, 
would interference with the peaceful possession of it. 
The development of the above declaration of the Consultative Assembly with regards 
to whether intrusion into corporation’s property can constitute an interference with the 
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peaceful enjoyment of its possessions may be reflected in the case of Noviflora Sweden 
AB v Sweden.
764
 In this case which was heard by the European Commission of Human 
Rights, the applicant, a corporation, complained, inter alia, that the search of its 
property by Government authorities constituted a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 
ECHR. The Government objected to this complaint on the grounds that it was 
incompatible with the Convention as the measures complained of did not interfere with 
the applicant’s rights under the said Article 1. The European Commission of Human 
Rights held the complaint, inter alia, admissible under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
In arriving at its decision, the European Commission of Human Rights declared 
The applicant company further alleges that the search … violated Protocol No. 
1 Article 1 to the Convention. … The Commission has rejected the 
Government's objections to the admissibility of those complaints. … 
Accordingly, the present complaint must also be admitted.
765
 
Following from the above, it is suggested that the European Commission of Human 
Rights rejection of the Government’s objection to the admissibility of the applicant’s 
complaints, and its holding that the complaint must be admitted, is indicative that 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 is applicable to searches. Equally, in the light of Article 27 
ECHR which states that ‘a single judge may declare inadmissible or strike out of the 
Court, an application submitted under Article 34 ECHR’;766 the fact that the Court 
declared the complaint admissible also suggests that Article 1 of Protocol 1 is 
applicable to searches. Furthermore, as earlier indicated, searches of the premises or 
property of a corporation by a public authority constitutes an intrusion; therefore, it is 
suggested that the intrusion interest of Noviflora Sweden AB was engaged by this 
violation.  
Consequently, intrusion into the corporation’s property – its possession – can 
constitute an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. This accords 
with the first limb of the definition of the corporation’s privacy as the freedom from 
unwanted intrusion into the corporation’s private sphere which is its home or property. 
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Pursuant to this submission, the intrusion into the entitlement of the corporation to the 
peaceful enjoyment of its possessions is involved where there is unwanted access into 
the corporation’s property – its possessions.  
 
In view of the above declaration that intrusion into the corporation’s property can 
constitute an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, for an 
intrusion to be justified, it must satisfy the requirements of Rule 3 of Article 1 Protocol 
1 which provides that ‘the preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair 
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties’. Thus, interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its 
possessions can only be justified if it is shown to be ‘in accordance with the general 
interest’ or ‘subject to the conditions provided for by law’.767  
This exception in providing the State with the right to enforce laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, is 
intended to make the distinction between the capricious deprivation of property and the 
social conception of property which is to be used for the public good.
768
 This accords 
with the declaration made at the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe at 
the time of the institution of Article 1 of Protocol 1. Therein, De Valera of Ireland of 
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe declared 
Those of us who claim that the right to own property is fundamental, admit, 
and readily admit, that there are the demands of social justice which must be 
met, and that it is the right of the State to see that justice is done, and to 
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regulate, in the interest of the common good, the way in which individuals who 
own property use that property.
769
 
Equally, any interference with property must also satisfy the requirement of fair 
balance and proportionality. This was stressed by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Brumarescu v Romania
770
 in which it declared  
As the Court has repeatedly stated, a fair balance must be struck between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual's fundamental rights, the search for such a fair 
balance being inherent in the whole of the Convention. The Court further 
recalls that the requisite balance will not be struck where the person concerned 
bears an individual and excessive burden.
771
 
The importance of achieving a fair balance and proportionality was also stressed by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v 
Netherlands
772
 in which the Court declared 
The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 as a 
whole, including the second paragraph: there must therefore be a reasonable 




Whether in the circumstances of each case, an applicant has had to bear ‘an individual 
and excessive burden’ is the essential question to bear in mind in achieving a fair 




II. Deprivation of possessions  
                                                          
769
 Council of Europe, Preparatory Work on Article 1 of the First Protocol, European Convention On 
Human Rights @ http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-P1-1-CDH(76)36-
EN1190643.pdf , page 28. Accessed on 27/04/2013. 
770
 Brumarescu v Romania (2001) 33 EHRR 35. 
771
 Para 77. See also Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v Netherlands [1995] 20 EHRR 403, para 
62. 
772
 Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v Netherlands [1995] 20 EHRR 403. 
773
 Para 62. See also Holy Monasteries v Greece [1995] 20 EHRR 1, para 70. 
774
 Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v Netherlands [1995] 20 EHRR 403, para 67. 
 218 
 
The second rule of Article 1 of Protocol 1 provides that ‘no one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law and by the general principles of international law’. This rule applies for the 
natural as well as legal persons, including the corporation. The principle behind the 
deprivation of property is the protection of the legal rights of an owner or possessor of 
property from deprivation of the possession of said property. In investigating matters 
concerning deprivation of possessions, the Court will consider whether deprivation is 
in the public interest and subject to the provision of law. In addition, the Court will 
consider whether there has been a ‘formal’ expropriation of property; it will also 




These two types of expropriation of property: formal expropriation and de facto 
expropriation are examined below, and will be subsequently tested with the aim of 
deciding whether the privacy of the corporation ought to be developed as a property 
right under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
Formal expropriation  
Formal expropriation occurs where a person has been deprived of ownership of their 
possessions. This is illustrated in the case of Handyside v United Kingdom.
776
 In this 
case, copies of the applicant books which were held to be obscene under the Obscene 
Publications Acts 1959 and 1964 were seized, and the applicant complained, inter alia, 
that the seizure of the books was in violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1.  
The European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that there had been no breach 
of Article 1 of Protocol 1. In the course of its judgment, the Court stated that the 
second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol 1 – deprivation of 
possessions – was not applicable in this case, as the seizure complained of was 
temporary. To this end, the Court expressed its notion of ‘deprivation of possessions’ 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1 
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Admittedly the expression 'deprived of his possessions', in the English text, 
could lead one to think otherwise but the structure of Article 1 shows that that 
sentence, which originated moreover in a Belgian amendment drafted in French 
… applies only to someone who is 'deprived of ownership'.777 
According to the above reading, deprivation of possessions applied to a person only 
where there had been a transfer of ‘ownership’ – that is, where an owner has been 
wholly deprived; conversely, where an owner has not been wholly deprived, a 
deprivation as envisaged by Rule 2 of Article 1 Protocol 1 would not have occurred.
778  
Therefore, a formal expropriation of property involves an acquisition or deprivation of 
legal title to property, whether or not physical possession is taken.
779
 This position 
accorded with the established intention of the Article at the time of its inception, with 
themes of ‘arbitrary confiscation’, and ‘arbitrary deprivation’; as examined in the 
background and purpose of Article 1 of Protocol 1 in Part 1 above. However, in line 
with the dynamic nature of the Convention to make rights practical and effective, the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights subsequently prescribed the 
actual scope of the deprivation of possessions to include circumstances where there has 
not only been deprivation of full ownership of property, but also where there has been 
a de facto expropriation of property. 
De facto Expropriation 
In the absence of formal expropriation, in which there has been a transfer of ownership 
of property, deprivation of possessions has also been held to involve the taking of 
physical possession of property, such that the owners of property are unable either to 
make use of their property or to sell, bequeath, mortgage or make a gift of it. This is 
referred to as a de facto expropriation of property, and is illustrated in the case of 
Papamichalopoulos v Greece,
780
 in which the applicants complained that they were 
deprived of the use of their land by virtue of a Greek law which transferred the land to 
the Greek Navy. They complained that the subsequent occupation of the Greek Navy 
on their land violated their Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR right. 
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The European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that there had been a 
continued breach of Article 1 of Protocol 1. In arriving at its judgment, the Court noted 
that although under Greek law the applicants' land had not been formally expropriated 
but had instead been occupied; nevertheless, by virtue of Greece’s ratification of the 
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol 1, the original deprivation of land occurred after 
said ratification of the Convention. Consequently, the Court in the absence of a formal 
expropriation of the land, considered whether there had been a de facto expropriation; 




In the absence of a formal expropriation, that is to say a transfer of ownership, 
the Court considers that it must look behind the appearances and investigate the 
realities of the situation complained of. Since the Convention is intended to 
guarantee rights that are 'practical and effective', it has to be ascertained 
whether that situation amounted to a de facto expropriation…782 
The court considered that although the applicants’ property had not been formally 
expropriated, deprivation of possessions had occurred as the owners of property were 
‘unable either to make use of their property or to sell, bequeath, mortgage or make a 
gift of it’.783 
To this end, the Court concluded 
The Court considers that the loss of all ability to dispose of the land in issue, 
taken together with the failure of the attempts made so far to remedy the 
situation complained of, entailed sufficiently serious consequences for the 
applicants de facto to have been expropriated….784 
The Court also noted that the Greek government interference complained of by the 
applicants was not for the purpose of controlling the use of property within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol 1.  
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Thus, from the above, in the absence of a formal expropriation of property, a de facto 
expropriation of property – that is to say a deprivation of property in a manner such 
that the owner is unable either to make use of their property, or to sell, bequeath, 
mortgage, or make a gift of it – may amount to a deprivation of possessions in 
accordance with Article 1 of Protocol 1. This position is reiterated in the case of 
Vasilescu v Romania
785
 in which the applicant complained that the Romanian police 
had prevented her from regaining possession of her property in the form of gold coins 
which were seized by the police while searching her home, without a warrant, in 
connection with an investigation on her spouse which had been discontinued. Upon 
failed attempts to obtain a remedy at the National Courts, she complained at the 
European Court of Human Rights that seizure of the gold coins violated her right to 
her property under Article 1 of Protocol 1. The European Court of Human Rights in 
holding that there had been a violation of Article 1 Protocol 1 sought to ascertain 
whether the situation complained of amounted to a de facto confiscation, and thereto 
declared 
The Court considers that the loss of all ability to dispose of the property in 
issue, taken together with the failure of the attempts made so far to have the 
situation remedied by the national authorities and courts, has entailed 
sufficiently serious consequences for it to be held that the applicant has been 
the victim of a de facto confiscation incompatible with her right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of her possessions.
786
 
The Court indicated that the established unlawfulness of the seizure of the applicant's 
property was a decisive factor for determining the said case. 
Thus, for a deprivation of possessions as envisaged under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to 
have occurred, there must have been an acquisition of legal title to property; or there 
must exist a state in which a person, natural or legal, is unable to exercise any of his 
rights of property such as the right to use the property, let it, or sell it.
787
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Having illustrated the actual scope of the protection of the second rule of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1, that is, the deprivation of possessions, above, in deciding whether the 
privacy of the corporation ought to be developed as a property right under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1, the corporation’s information privacy interest is tested on the second rule 
of Article 1 Protocol 1. 
To this end, therefore, the following question is asked: 
On the subject of deprivation of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol 1, can the 
disclosure – publication or dissemination– of the corporation’s private information 
constitute deprivation of its possession?  
It will be recalled that in chapter 1,
788
 the second privacy interests of the corporation is 
the information privacy interest. The information privacy interest of the corporation 
was established to involve the protection of the corporation’s private information from 
unwanted dissemination or publication. It was further established that corporations 
have information which it could justifiably regard as private and may wish to protect 
from unwanted publication or dissemination. Accordingly, the private information of 
the corporation was held to be certain information of the corporation which it may not 
wish to be the subject of dissemination or publication, for instance, information 
obtained from the clandestine filming or listening to the activities of a board meeting, 
or from hacking into the corporation’s telephone or computer, or from the surreptitious 
spying into the corporation’s internal correspondence.  
The focus of the corporation’s information privacy interest was held to be on the 
dissemination or publication of the result of an interference or disturbance. This 
information privacy interest brought about a definition of the corporation’s privacy as 
a claim to the control of the corporation’s private information from being released into 
the public domain against the corporation’s wishes, thereby protecting the said 
information from unwanted dissemination or publication. 
 
In the light of the above understanding, on the question: can the disclosure – 
publication or dissemination – of the corporation’s private information constitute 
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deprivation of its possessions? In order to answer this question, the first step is to 
ascertain whether the corporation’s private information can be deemed its possessions.  
On the established principle above, the concept of ‘possessions’ under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 was defined as having an autonomous meaning which is not limited to the 
ownership of physical goods, but includes the certain rights and interests which can be 
regarded as assets. Pursuant therefrom, on the one hand, it is suggested that the private 
information of the corporation, for instance, information obtained from hacking into 
the corporation’s computer or telephone, or from the clandestine filming or listening to 
the activities of a board meeting, or from the surreptitious spying into the corporation’s 
internal correspondence, cannot properly be classified as its possessions as understood 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1. This is suggested on the grounds that such information 
does not have direct economic value, and consequently cannot be qualified as an asset. 
On the other hand, however, it is suggested that the private information of the 
corporation, for instance, the title deed of a corporation’s landed property, can be 
deemed its possessions. This is suggested on the grounds that such private information 
may be classified as an interest which can constitute an asset. 
In view of the above, it is therefore submitted that certain aspects of the corporation’s 
private information can be deemed its possessions, whilst other aspects cannot. 
Furthermore, from the understanding of the corporation’s private information, the 
majority of the corporation’s information which would qualify as having economic 
value, and therefore possessions, would not be classified as private information, but 
rather as commercial information. This poses a difficulty as it limits the scope of what 
may be protected as the corporation’s possessions as understood under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1. 
Having found that some corporation’s private information may be deemed its 
possessions, albeit to a limited extent, the next step is to question: can the disclosure – 
publication or dissemination – of the corporation’s private information which qualifies 
as possessions constitute deprivation of its possessions? 
It will be recalled as expressed above that deprivation of possessions involves two 
kinds of expropriation of property: a formal expropriation and a de facto expropriation. 
A formal expropriation of property was held to occur where a person had been wholly 
deprived of ownership of property, such that there had been an acquisition or 
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deprivation of legal title to property; a typical example of this is where there had been 
a transfer of ownership of property. A de facto expropriation was held to be involved 
where, in the absence of a formal deprivation of property, there had been the taking of 
physical possession of property, such that the owner of the said property is made 
unable either to make use of it; or to sell, bequeath, mortgage or make a gift of it. 
Accordingly, on whether the disclosure – publication or dissemination – of the 
corporation’s private information which qualifies as possessions can constitute 
deprivation of its possessions, it is submitted that in the light of the above definition of 
deprivation of possessions, the disclosure of the corporation’s private information 
which qualifies as possessions cannot constitute a deprivation of its possessions under 
Article 1 of Protocol 1. This is rationalized on the basis that the publication or 
dissemination of private information cannot be said to permanently or temporarily 
deny a corporation of the use of the said private information which may be its 
possessions or property. For instance, where the contents of the corporation’s private 
information, such as its title deed, is surreptitiously photographed, and the information 
obtained therefrom is published or disseminated; such disclosure cannot be argued to 
deprive the corporation of legal title to its property, neither can it be argued to have 
deprive the corporation of the right to use or sell or bequeath or mortgage or make a 
gift of the said possessions or property. Consequently, in the absence of a formal 
expropriation or a de facto expropriation, a deprivation of possessions cannot be held 
to have occurred. 
Conversely, a deprivation of possession can be said to be engaged where corporation’s 
documents containing private information which qualifies as possessions are seized; 
for instance, where the title deed of a corporation’s landed property is seized. Where 
this occurs, it is suggested that it could constitute a de facto deprivation of its 
possessions as understood under Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR. This is because the 
seizure of the said document of the corporation can be argued to deprive the 
corporation of the right to use or sell or bequeath or mortgage or make a gift of it; such 
deprivation would in turn constitute an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its 
possessions. However, the seizure of documents by a public authority is not usually 
undertaken for the purpose of publication or dissemination, and as such, although it 
may constitute a de facto deprivation, it would not qualify for protection under the 
information interest, but under the intrusion interest.   
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The seizure of documents was allowed under Article 1 of Protocol 1 in the earlier 
discussed case of Noviflora Sweden AB v Sweden.
789
 Herein, the European 
Commission of Human Rights, in deciding, inter alia, whether the search and seizure 
of documents by Government authorities, inter alia, constituted a violation of Article 1 
of Protocol 1, declared that ‘the applicant company’s complaint that the search and 
seizure of documents violated Article 1 of Protocol 1 must be admitted’.790 It was 
however not specified under which of the three rules of Article 1 of Protocol 1 the 
complaint came under. It was also not specified the nature of documents in question, 
whether they were commercial or private documents. Nevertheless, the European 
Commission of Human Rights declared that the applicant’s complaint to be admissible 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
In view of the submission that seizure of the corporation’s private information, which 
qualifies as possessions, can constitute deprivation of its possessions, just as earlier 
illustrated in the case of an intrusion into the corporation’s property which amounts to 
an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, above; for interference 
to be justified, such interference must be ‘in accordance with the general interest’ or 
‘subject to the conditions provided for by law’ in accordance with Rule 3 of Article 1 
Protocol 1; with due regard for the requirement of fair balance and proportionality. 
 
From the above, four sets conclusions can be made: first, on whether the corporation’s 
private information can be deemed its possessions; secondly, on whether the disclosure 
– publication and dissemination – of the corporation’s private information constitutes 
deprivation of its possessions; thirdly, on whether the corporation’s premises or 
property can be deemed its possessions; and fourthly, on whether intrusion into the 
corporation’s premises or property constitutes an interference with the peaceful 
enjoyment of its possessions.  
On the question of whether the corporation’s private information can be deemed its 
possessions, it has been established that certain aspects of the corporation’s private 
information can be deemed its possessions, whilst other aspects cannot. Furthermore, 
from the understanding of the corporation’s private information, the majority of the 
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corporation’s information which would qualify as having economic value, and 
therefore possessions, would not be classified as private information, but rather as 
commercial information. This poses a difficulty as it limits the scope of what may be 
protected as the corporation’s possessions as understood under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
On the question of whether the disclosure – publication and dissemination – of the 
corporation’s private information constitutes deprivation of its possessions, it has been 
established that the disclosure of the corporation’s private information which qualify as 
possessions cannot constitute a deprivation of its possessions under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1; because the disclosure of the said private information does not deprive the 
corporation of legal title to its property, nor does it deprive the corporation of the right 
to use or sell or bequeath or mortgage or make a gift of the said possessions or 
property. Consequently, it is submitted that Article 1 of Protocol 1 cannot provide 
protection for the information interest of the corporation.  
Additionally, a deprivation of possession has conversely been established to be 
engaged where corporation’s documents containing private information which 
qualifies as possessions are seized by a public authority. This is because the seizure of 
the said document can be argued to deprive the corporation of the right to use or sell or 
bequeath or mortgage or make a gift of it. However, this as the seizure of documents 
by a public authority is not usually undertaken for the purpose of publication or 
dissemination, although the said seizure may constitute a de facto deprivation, it would 
not qualify for protection under the information interest, but under the intrusion 
interest.   
On the question of whether the corporation’s premises or property can be deemed its 
possessions, it has been established that the corporation’s premises or property, being 
an interest which qualifies as an asset, can be deemed its possessions as understood 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
On the question of whether intrusion into the corporation’s premises or property 
constitutes an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, it has been 
established that intrusion into the corporation’s premises or property can constitute an 




Pursuant from the four conclusions above, it is observed that it is only in the case of 
intrusion into the corporation premises or property that Article 1 of Protocol 1 may 
provide protection; Article 1 of Protocol 1 does not provide any protection for the 
disclosure of private information aspect of the corporation, which focuses on the 
publication or the dissemination of private information. On this intrusion aspect, 
another difficulty arises, the difficulty herein is that it is questionable whether the 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 Protocol 1 would easily carry all 
aspects of intrusion into the corporation’s premises or property – intrusion into the 
corporation may occur through interference by a public authority, or interference by 
press agents, or by other corporations’ agents. This is because presently, the vertical 
application of Article 1 of Protocol 1 is not in doubt; it is however not very clear how 
other violations, such as, violations by the press agents, as well as other corporations 
would be handled; that is to say, horizontal protection. Furthermore, it is uncertain how 
the English courts would interpret this vagueness in view of the fact that although the 
HRA gives horizontal application impetus to the Articles of the ECHR,
791
 the 
interpretation which the European Court of Human Rights has made on Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 points to cases involving protection against public authority, ab initio; thus, 
vertical application. It may be suggested that a horizontal application of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 ought to be developed; however, it would seem that Article 1 of Protocol 1 
is considered as a right which is applicable where the State interferes with property 
rights. This position is illustrated in the statement by Grgic et al,
792
 in the human rights 
handbook for the Council of Europe, that ‘Article 1 of Protocol 1 is not concerned with 
relationships between private persons’; as such, a court ruling which requires a person 
‘to surrender property to another pursuant to generally applicable laws under the law 
of contract and family law generally fall outside the precincts of the protection of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1’. In determining the effects of legal relations between 
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individuals on property, Grgic et al
793
 however noted that ‘in certain circumstances, the 
State may be under an obligation to intervene in order to regulate the actions of private 
persons’. Therefore, Article 1 of Protocol 1 in general applies ‘where the State itself 
interferes with property rights or permits a third party to do so’.794 Equally, on the 
manner in which the right to property applies between private parties, Carss-Frisk,
795
 
in the human rights handbook for the Council of Europe, stated that  
It is clear that the application of the right to property in Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 is not restricted to interferences with property which involve the transfer 
of some benefit to the State. This article is capable of applying to measures 
introduced by the State (or other public authority) which affect an individual’s 
property rights by transferring them to, or otherwise benefiting, another 




This would seem to support the view that an interference must be in some way 
connected to the State to be justiciable under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
In the light of the above discussion on the limited application of intrusion protection 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1, as well as the above supporting declarations, it is 
submitted that Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR would not provide full protection for the 
intrusion aspect of the corporation’s privacy; equally, from the above, it has also been 
submitted that Article 1 of Protocol 1 cannot provide protection for the disclosure of 
information. Consequently, the privacy of the corporation cannot be suitably 
developed as a property right under Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR.  
Accordingly, due to the nature of the dimensions of Article 8 ECHR
797
 to provide 
comprehensive protection for the corporation’s privacy as has been demonstrated in 
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chapter 3, the extended action for breach of confidence is the more suitable medium 
which ought to be further developed to provide protection for the privacy of the 
corporation in English law.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established that Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR would not suitably 
provide protection for the corporation’s privacy; rather it upholds that the extended 
action for breach of confidence as a more natural and suitable home for the protection 
of the corporation’s privacy in English law. In the light of this conclusion, it is 
therefore reasoned that the final question of this research is directed to the details of 
how the corporation’s privacy ought to be developed under the extended action. This 
















CHAPTER 5  
NATURE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATION’S PRIVACY 
UNDER THE EXTENDED ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 
In submitting that the English common law ought to be further developed in order to 
provide fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation, this chapter concludes this 
research by making a statement on why the English common law ought to be 
developed; and having submitted that the English common law ought to be developed 
through the extended action for breach of confidence, this chapter finally proposes 
how the corporation’s privacy ought to be developed under the extended action for 
breach of confidence. 
Why the English common law ought to be developed: Section 2 & 6 HRA 1998, 
and Article 13 ECHR 
The position that the English law of privacy ought to be further developed to provide 
fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation, it is suggested, accords fully with 
sections 2 and 6 HRA 1998.  
 On the interpretation of the Convention rights, section 2(1) (a) HRA 1998 states 
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with 
a Convention right must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration 
or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights. 
On the acts of public authorities, section 6(1) states that 




By section 6(3), a public authority includes a court or tribunal. 
Equally, in addition to sections 2 and 6 HRA 1998, to hold that the English law of 
privacy ought to be further developed to provide fuller protection for the corporation’s 
                                                          
798 Although not directly relevant to this work, that the domestic courts must have regard for the 
Convention rights is further demonstrated by section 3(1) HRA 1998 which deals with the 
interpretation of legislation. This section provides that ‘So far as it is possible to do so, primary 
legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with 
the Convention rights’. 
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privacy also accords with the Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence as illustrated in chapter 
3. Furthermore, it fulfils the obligation as set out in Article 13 ECHR which provides 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 




Therefore, the development of the extended action for breach of confidence to provide 
protection for the privacy of the corporation accords with and fulfils the requirement of 
sections 2 and 6 HRA 1998 in taking account of Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence in 
determining a question in connection with a Convention right, it also accords with 
acting in compatibility with the Convention rights. Furthermore, the development of 
the extended action for breach of confidence also fulfils the requirement of an effective 
remedy before a national authority, as set out in Article 13 ECHR.  
In view of the above, it is therefore suggested that the extended action for breach of 
confidence as it currently stands does not fully provide an effective remedy for the 
violation of Article 8 rights in accordance with the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence 
which has since declared Article 8 ECHR applicable to the protection of the 
corporations,
800
 on the grounds that it protects only the individual’s privacy but is 
silent on the protection of the privacy of the corporation. As the English common law 
presently stands, the protection of the corporation’s privacy as provided under Article 
8 has not been recognised as part of the law. Pursuant thereto, the lack of protection for 
a violation of the privacy of the corporation in English common law may be suggested 
to imply that English common law has not fulfil the requirements of section 6 HRA 
1998; equally, it may also be held to violate the provision of Article 13 ECHR. 
Consequently, for the English courts to act in a manner which is compatible with the 
Convention rights as prescribed by section 6 HRA, and also fulfil its obligation as 
instructed under Article 13 ECHR, it would have to develop the domestic law to be 
compatible with the Convention.  To this end, it is therefore proposed that the English 
common would need to provide protection for all aspects of Article 8, and this would 
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 James v United Kingdom [1986] 8 EHRR 123. 
800
 This evolution of the law of privacy has also been fully recognised and applied by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. 
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entail the development of the extended action for breach of confidence to provide 
protection for the privacy of the corporation. 
In view of the issue of whether English law should be developed in the light of section 
2 and 6 HRA 1998 and in compliance with Article 13 ECHR, therefore, it is a settled 
principle of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence; that a State, when it 
determines the regime applicable in its domestic legal system, must take into account 
its positive and negative obligations. In the present case, the State’s positive obligation 
involves the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for the privacy of 
corporations in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights; and its negative obligation lies in protecting the corporation against arbitrary 
interference by public authorities. It is a generally principle of law as established by 
the Strasbourg court that ‘a law which fails to satisfy the requirement of Member 
States compliance with the Convention rights’ is held to violate Article 8(1)’.801 
Consequently, it is submitted that English common law ought to be developed to 
provide protection for all aspects of Article 8 ECHR, so as to fulfil the requirements of 
sections 2 and 6 HRA, Article 13 ECHR, as well as to enable the State to fulfil its 
positive and negative obligations under the Convention. However, it is also recognised 
that in view of fulfilling the requirements of sections 2 and 6 HRA 1998, Article 13 
ECHR, and the State’s positive and negative obligations, the State enjoys a margin of 
appreciation.
802
 Therefore, the question of whether English common law ought to be 
developed to provide protection for the privacy of the corporation would be subject to 
the principle of the interpretation of the Article 8 ECHR by the State, based on its 
historical, political, cultural and philosophical perspective. Nevertheless, it is observed 
that the evolution of privacy jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights 
has been fully recognised and consistently applied by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, and as such has been well established in the European area. 
Accordingly, the development of the English common law in accordance with its 
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Marckx v Belgium [1979-80] 2 EHRR 330, para 31; Johnston v Ireland [1987] 9 EHRR 203, para 55, 71-
2, 74-5; Keegan v Ireland [1994] 18 EHRR 342, para 49-50. 
802
 Margin of Appreciation is defined as a doctrine which the European Courts have developed where it 
takes into consideration the fact that the Convention will be interpreted in different ways by the 
respective member states of the European Union, in view of their various historical, political, cultural, 
and philosophical perspective vis–a-vis the subject matter and background of a case in question. The 
European courts take these perspectives into consideration in deciding whether to overturn the 
decision of a national court. See Odievre v France [2004] 38 EHRR 43, para 40; Pfeifer v Austria [2009] 
48 EHRR 8, para 37. 
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historical, political, cultural and philosophical perspective, it is suggested, would have 
to be balanced off with the reality of the evolution of the privacy jurisprudence in the 
European area; that is to say, the incorporation of the protection of the corporation 
under Article 8. On this point of balance, it is a recognised principle of the Strasbourg 
court’s jurisprudence, as reiterated in Societe Colas Est v France803 that “the Court has 
consistently held that the Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in 
assessing the need for interference, but it goes hand in hand with European 
supervision”.804 
As such, in the light of the evolution of the law in the European area, as established by 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, it is finally submitted that English common law ought to comply 
with the requirements of sections 2 and 6 HRA, Article 13 ECHR, as well as its 
positive and negative obligations under the Convention, and develop its law to provide 
protection for all aspects of Article 8 ECHR. In so doing, cases involving the privacy 
of the corporation, as well as that of the individual would be brought on its own merit, 
rather than through the aspect of the corporation’s privacy being shoehorned into the 
aspect of the individual’s privacy; or, in the alternative, the aspect of the corporation’s 
privacy not recognised at all.  
The inadequacy of English common law in providing protection for the privacy of the 
corporation was seen in such cases as Lakeside Homes Ltd
805
 and BKM Ltd v BBC.
806
 
In both actions, there was reluctance to bring the cases as ones involving, inter alia, 
the privacy of the corporation on its own merit; rather there was the transferring of the 
privacy concerns of the corporation to represent the privacy of the individual 
inhabitants of a corporation alone. In BKM Ltd v BBC,
807
 for instance, it is observed 
that in the application for the injunction by the claimant corporation, it, inter alia, 
prayed the court to restrain the defendants from broadcasting ‘any part of the 
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 Societe Colas Est v France [2004] 39 EHRR 17. 
804
 Para 47.  
805
 Lakeside Homes Ltd v BBC [2000] WL 1841602. 
806
 BKM Ltd v BBC [2009] EWHC 3151. Both cases are discussed in chapter 2 of this research. 
807
 BKM Ltd v BBC [2009] EWHC 3151. It will be recalled that in this case, a corporation which operated 
a nursing home brought an application seeking an injunction to restrain the BBC from broadcasting a 
programme which was based on surreptitiously obtained material; and this injunction was sought, not 
in pursuit of any rights of its own as a corporation, but in order to protect the rights of the home's 
residents the court under Article 8 ECHR. The injunction was refused on the strength of the Article 10 
rights of the press. 
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bedrooms, toilets, bathrooms and/or lounges, including the entrances thereto within the 
Glyndwr Nursing Home (the Surreptitious Film)’.808 As argued in chapter 2, the 
corporation, in making the plea for the privacy of empty bathrooms or toilets being 
private areas of the corporation, it was actually speaking to a possible reasonable 
expectation of the privacy for itself. As contemplated by Mann J. regarding the 
application for relief based on the privacy of the individual  
It was not clear to me why film of empty bathrooms or toilets was an 
infringement of privacy rights.
809
 
On the reluctance of the corporation to bring the action on its own merits, Mann J. 
elaborates on his statement above and reiterates
810
  
I have already pointed out that BKM does not rely on any of its own rights in 
relation to this application. It seems to rely on the rights of its residents.
811
  
The combined effect of both statements by his Lordship arguably points to the fact that 
the infringement of privacy complained of with respect to the filming of the empty 
spaces was invariably directed at the corporation’s protection. That BKM was 
particularly unwilling to pursue this case as a corporate privacy case speaks to the 
inadequacy of the English common law with regard to the protection of the 
corporation’s privacy. It is suggested that the Court had an opportunity to develop the 
common law by stating that the corporation in the said case had a right to privacy of its 
private life and premises – home – in accordance with the principle in Societe Colas. 
To so state would not have been incompatible with the Convention; indeed, it would 
have accorded with sections 2 and 6 HRA. Furthermore, it would not have offended 
the provision of Article 13 ECHR; it would rather have satisfied it. 
Likewise, in the case of Schering Chemicals v Falkman Ltd,
812
the interference with 
Schering’s internal correspondence, that is to say, the publication of the contents of the 
file of the said internal correspondence by Sunday Times without Schering’s consent, 
as well as the surreptitious taking of the said file by Sunday Times without Schering’s 
consent, engaged both the intrusion privacy interest and the information privacy 
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809
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810
 Mann J. had emphasized this out initially in para 7. 
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interest of the corporation. However, these aspects of the corporation privacy interests 
were not recognised nor accorded protection by the majority of the court.
813
 It is 
submitted that these are aspects of the corporation’s privacy which are worthy of 
protection in English law. 
As the English law presently stands, save for broadcasting matters, privacy protection 
is still a matter which is restricted to the individual. Initially, privacy protection was 
exclusively applicable to the personal affairs of the individual. However, cases such as 
Browne v Associated Newspaper Ltd
814
and Imerman v Tchenguiz,
815
 seem to suggest 
an evolution of the law to the extent that Article 8 ECHR is now applicable an 
individual’s business information. It will be recalled that Sir Anthony Clarke MR, in 
handing down the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Browne v Associated Newspaper 
Ltd
816declared that ‘business information which is communicated in the course of a 
personal relationship or learned in a domestic environment may be characterized as 
private, depending upon the circumstances of a particular case’; and that the question 
to ask in the circumstance is ‘whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
and if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, Article 8 would be engaged’817 
Similarly, Lord Neuberger MR, in handing down the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
in Imerman v Tchenguiz,
818
 declared that an individual’s personal and business 
documents which were stored on a computer system were entitled to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under Article 8 ECHR’.819   
Consequently, it would seem that the English law of privacy for the individual, save 
for broadcasting matters, is at a similar stage as the Strasbourg court’s law at the time 
of the case of Niemietz v Germany,
820
 wherein the European Court on Human Rights 
held Article 8 ECHR as including the protection of certain professional or business 
activities or premises of the individual.
821
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In arguing for the further development of corporation’s privacy, therefore, Eady J 
declaration in Mosley v News Group Newspaper
822
 is instructive. Eady J declared 
…a claim for invasion of privacy nowadays involves direct application of 
Convention values and of Strasbourg jurisprudence as part of English law...
823
 
Although Eady J made this declaration with regard to the protection of the individual’s 
privacy, it is suggested that in arguing for the further development of the corporation’s 
privacy under English common law, regard ought to be had of the evolution of the 
application of Convention values by Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. The development of 
the English common law, through the extended action for breach of confidence, to 
provide fuller protection for the corporation’s privacy would enable the corporation to 
exercise its autonomy in the effective administration of its activities.  
 
Recommendations on how the corporation’s privacy under English common law 
ought to be developed 
In putting forward an argument that English common law ought to be further 
developed to provide fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation, the question 
may arise as to how English common law ought to be developed? To this end, the 
framework for the proposed protection of the privacy of the corporation would be 
structured as follows. 
Corporation’s privacy interests 
The two fundamental privacy interests of the corporation would be the intrusion 
privacy interest and the information privacy interest.  
Intrusion privacy interest 
Intrusion privacy interest for the corporation would entail the freedom from unwanted 
access or disturbance or interference or surveillance into the corporation’s private 
sphere – a sphere in which the corporation is free to carry on its activities – and this 
would include unwanted access into the corporation’s home, or property, which 
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represents its space. The breach of the corporation’s intrusion privacy interest would 
be held to occur where there is an unwanted and unjustified access into a corporation’s 
home or premises or property.  
Information privacy interest 
The information privacy interest for the corporation would entail protection against the 
unwanted dissemination or publication of the private information ensuing from an 
intrusion. The focus of the corporation’s information privacy interest would be on the 
dissemination or publication of the result of an interference or disturbance. 
Accordingly, where the private information of a corporation has been obtained and 
taken away from the corporation, it would be the intrusion privacy interest which 
would be involved; however, information privacy interest would be engaged at the 
point of dissemination or publication. Consequently, the breach of the corporation’s 
information privacy interest would be held to occur where there has been the unwanted 
and unjustified publication or dissemination of its private information. It will be 
recalled that although information which ensues from a corporation are generally 
regarded as commercial information, there are situations wherein there occurs a 
transmutation from the commercial sphere to the private sphere; and this occurs 
through the manner in which certain corporation’s commercial information are 
handled. Instances include where there has been surreptitious obtaining and 
publication or dissemination of certain information ensuing from a corporation’s 
meetings, such as policy discussions; or ensuing from its internal correspondence. 
These may be held to be the publication of the private information of the corporation; 
and publication or dissemination which may occur through the hacking into the 
corporation’s computer or telephone, or through clandestine filming or zoom lens 




The corporation’s intrusion privacy interest and the information privacy interest – the 
two fundamental privacy interests –independent of each other may result in a loss of 
the corporation’s privacy; thus a privacy action may be brought where an intrusion has 
occurred, independent of the misuse of private information. 
                                                          
824
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Definitions of privacy for the corporation 
Privacy for the corporation would be defined in two limbs which incorporate the 
fundamental privacy interests of intrusion privacy and information privacy which are 
the hallmark of what privacy represents: first, as the state in which the corporation 
wishes to be free from unwanted interference or disturbance – intrusion – into its 
private sphere, and this includes its home or its property which represents its own 
space; and secondly, as a claim to the control of the corporation’s private information 
from being released into the public domain against the corporation’s wishes, thus 
protecting the said information from unwanted dissemination or publication. 
 
Rationale of privacy for the corporation  
The rationale for the protection of the corporation’s privacy is held to be the autonomy 
rationale. The function of this autonomy gives the corporation, the power and control 
to make a choice in deciding who to grant access into its premises or its property, as 
well as who to disclose its private information to. Accordingly, it is submitted that a 
corporation can exercise autonomy in its home or property to protect its intrusion 
privacy interest and its information privacy interest; and the corporation’s ability to 
exercise autonomy in the management of its activities justifies the importance of this 
rationale.  
Although only one rationale of privacy is engaged in the case of the corporation, this 
does not deny the corporation the proposition for privacy protection in English law. As 
submitted in chapter 1, the autonomy rationale is an independent privacy rationale for 
the corporation; it applies as a stand-alone rationale. This accords with the views of 
scholars such as Bloustein,
825




 who although 
referring to the individual’s privacy protection, nevertheless, defined the rationale of 
privacy solely on a single rationale. Equally, it is suggested that the protection by the 
Broadcasting Act 1996 of the privacy of the corporation in broadcasting matters is 
based on this sole rationale of autonomy of the corporation – that is to say, its ability to 
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protect itself from unwanted intrusion and interference.
828
 As such, the privacy of the 
corporation is fully supported by the autonomy rationale alone. 
 
The methodology 
The name of the action for the protection of the corporation’s privacy would be known 
as the extended action for breach of confidence. The emergence of the extended action 
for breach of confidence for the individual brought with it a new methodology for 
adjudicating privacy cases. This new methodology incorporated Article 8 and 10 
ECHR into the cause of action for breach of confidence; the threshold test which was 
established was that in cases involving privacy, the question to ask is: whether in 
respect of the interference complained about there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. This test brings on the balancing exercise.  
It is suggested that for the corporation, the principles established by the new 
methodology for privacy remain the same. Therefore, in a privacy case of the 
corporation, the extended action for breach of confidence which would protect against 
the violation of the corporation’s privacy would also be established through the 
incorporation of Article 8 and 10 ECHR into the cause of action for breach of 
confidence. The threshold test under the new methodology would equally apply to the 
corporation – whether in respect of the interference complained about by the 
corporation, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. This test, if answered in the 
negative ends the case; but if answered in the affirmative, would bring on the 
balancing exercise which are of two types, depending on the defendant. On the one 
hand, where the interference complained by the corporation is against the press, then 
the balancing exercise would be between the corporation’s Article 8 ECHR right to 
privacy and the press Article 10 ECHR right to freedom of expression. On the other 
hand, where the interference complained of by the corporation is against a public 
authority, then, the balancing exercise would be between Article 8(1) and (2) ECHR. 
The corporation’s privacy case would then be decided on the basis of proportionality, 
as with the individual’s case. 
                                                          
828
 From “unwarranted infringements of privacy”. Section 110(1)(b) Broadcasting Act 1996. 
 240 
 
Therefore, the extended action for breach of confidence would protect the privacy of 
the individual and also the corporation. However, in the case of the corporation, its 
interests in Article 8 ECHR are different from that of an individual. In the individual’s 
case, Article 8 protects his private life, family life, home and correspondence from 
intrusion as well as interference with his private information. In the case of the 
corporation, Article 8 ECHR would protect the corporation’s private life, its home, and 
its correspondence from intrusion as well as interference with its private information. 
However, it is suggested that the weight of interest in the protection of privacy for the 
corporation would depend on the type of the corporation involved, to the end that it 
would affect the manner in which damages are enforced, as seen below. 
 
Remedies  
This section sets out the remedies which may be available to the corporation in the 
event of a complaint of a violation of its privacy. 
In considering the grant of a remedy in a case against the press, the court would have 
to take into particular consideration section 12 HRA. Accordingly, this section would 
apply where a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might 
affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression.
829
 If the person 
against whom the application for relief is made is neither present nor represented, no 
such relief would be granted unless the court is satisfied that the applicant has taken all 
practicable steps to notify the respondent; or, that there are compelling reasons why the 
respondent should not be notified.
830
 In addition, no such relief is to be granted so as to 
restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely 
to establish that publication should not be allowed.
831
 And finally, the court must have 
particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression. 
Where it appears to the court that proceedings relate to journalistic, literary or artistic 
material, the court must have particular regard to (i) the extent to which the material 
has, or is about to become available to the public, or (ii) whether it would be in the 
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public interest for the material to be published, and (iii) any relevant privacy code.
832
 
Pursuant to the foregoing, there is a high threshold in favour of the press on the subject 
of remedies. 
The remedies which would be available to the corporation in the case of a violation of 
its privacy may be held to be the following: 
Injunction 
Injunctions available to the corporation may take the form of interim injunctions and 
final injunctions. The court may award the corporation the remedy of an interim 
injunction before or during a trial to restrain the publication or dissemination of the 
result of an intrusion into the corporation’s premises or property, where the 
corporation is aware of a pending dissemination or publication of said information. 
However, where publication or dissemination has already occurred, and at the end of a 
successful trial in favour of the corporation there is a continuing threat of further 
publication or dissemination on the corporation, then a final injunction may be 
awarded to prevent further publication or dissemination. 
Similarly, an injunction may be granted to prevent intrusion into the corporation’s 
premises or property. As in the case of dissemination or publication, an interim 
injunction may be granted to prevent an intrusion whilst a case is pending; and if the 
case is successful, a final injunction may be granted to prevent further intrusions for a 
set period of time, or indefinitely.  
However, as seen from the above, section 12 HRA is particularly important in cases of 
restraining orders; consequently, in considering the grant of an injunction, the court 
must apply section 12 HRA; particularly, section 12(3) HRA, wherein, the court, in 
granting an interim injunction, must be satisfied that the applicant is likely to succeed 
at trial in establishing that publication should not be allowed. Furthermore, in deciding 
whether to grant an interim injunction which affects the freedom of expression, the 
courts, in considering the requirements of section 12 HRA, would have to balance the 
freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR with the corporation’s rights to privacy 
under Article8 ECHR in arriving at a decision. 
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Damages may be awarded in addition to injunction, in the spirit of the principle of 
Lord Cairns’ Act 1858.833 Damages may also be awarded in lieu of an injunction 
where the harm sustained can be calculated in monetary terms, and it would be 
oppressive to grant an injunction. The award of damages may be available to the 
corporation for a successful plea of an invasion of privacy. The justification for such 
an award would be for the treatment of harm or unfairness suffered as a result of a 
violation of the corporation’s autonomy.  However, the nature of the corporation 
involved would affect the manner in which damages are enforced.  
As seen in the case of Defamation Law, the Defamation Act 2013 provides that  
A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to 
cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.
834
 
From this provision, the law seems to make a general rule for non-profit persons, to the 
end that they must prove serious harm in a claim for defamation.  
The Defamation Act goes on to subsequently provide a different requirement for profit 
trading persons, thus  
For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that trades for 




From the above provision, it is clear that profit trading persons would have to prove 
special damages. It is suggested that a similar principle be also applicable to the 
corporations in privacy cases.  
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Accordingly, in the case of corporations trading for profit, the damages which may be 
available to it would be pecuniary damages. On pecuniary damages, the corporation 
would have to prove that it suffered financial loss; for instance, loss of its income, or 
loss of contracts, or loss of employees, as a result of the violation of its autonomy. It 
may be appropriate to award the corporation special damages where it is proved.  
In the case of corporations not trading for profit, the violation of its privacy may give 
rise to non-pecuniary damages under Article 8 ECHR. Corporations which do not trade 
for profit may be awarded non-pecuniary damages in cases where it has suffered 
unfairness.
836
 Compensatory damages may be available to corporations which do not 
trade for profit to compensate for the harm to its autonomy.  
Retraction and/or enforced apology 
The remedy of the retraction of offending information and, or, issuing an apology may 
be ordered where private information has been published or disseminated; the remedy 
of issuing an apology may also be ordered in the case where there has been an 
intrusion of the corporation’s premises, activities, or property. It is suggested that the 
remedy of an enforced apology would be awarded as supplementary to the award of 
injunction or damages. This is because an apology, without more, may not provide 
enough vindication for the violation of the corporation’s privacy; however, the award 
of damages, for instance, in addition to an enforced apology, may go a long way to 
mitigate the harm to the corporation’s autonomy.  
Destruction or delivery up of articles 
The remedy of destruction of articles or delivery up of articles may be ordered where 
articles have been made by using corporation’s private information. This was the case 
in Prince Albert v Strange
837
 wherein the court ordered that the impressions of the 
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etchings made without the consent of the plaintiff be destroyed. The court will 
however not order that any ‘material of intrinsic value’ be destroyed.838 
 
Finally, an account of profit has not been explored in any privacy matters involving the 
individual, even in situations in which there has been commercial exploitation of 
private information, as seen in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd.
839
 
Consequently, the discussion of the possibility of the remedy of an account of profits 
for the privacy of the corporation would not be pursued further at this time. 
 
Defences  
The defences which would be available to defendants in corporation privacy cases 
would be the same as the defences available to defendants in individual privacy cases. 
Under the new methodology of privacy protection, the defences which may be pleaded 
are found within the Convention rights involved; in this case, Article 8 ECHR and 
Article 10 ECHR. 
Article 8(2) ECHR 
In the case of a corporation’s complaint of an interference with its privacy against a 
public authority, the public authority would have the host of defences under Article 
8(2) ECHR. Therefore, a public authority may justify its interference on the grounds 
that such interference is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of (a) national security, public safety, or (b) the economic well-
being of the country, or (c) the prevention of disorder or crime, or (d) the protection of 
health or morals, or (e) the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 10(1)&(2) ECHR 
In the past, the most significant defence in the case of the press was one of an 
overriding public interest in disclosure. This defence was pleaded on the basis of 
freedom of expression of the press. The basis of the public interest defence is rooted on 
                                                          
838
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839
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the over 150 year old idea by Sir William Page-Wood V-C in Gartside v Outram
840
 
that “there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity.”841 Consequently, the law 
of privacy could not be used as a means of suppressing information concerning 
unlawful conduct. 
However, the emergence of the extended action for breach of confidence which 
incorporated, inter alia, the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR into 
domestic law, has brought about a new methodology. This involves the pleading 
Article 10(1) ECHR, that it has the right to freedom of expression, which includes the 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas. However, in 
exercising this freedom, it must take account of Article 10(2) ECHR, to the end that 
Article 10(1) ECHR carries with it duties and responsibilities. As such, the exercise of 
Article 10(1) ECHR may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the 
interests of (a) national security, territorial integrity or public safety, or (b) the 
prevention of disorder or crime, or (c) the protection of health or morals, or (d) the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, or (e) preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or (f) maintaining the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary. 
It is nevertheless noted that where the press or other persons plead the defence of 
freedom of expression and in raising this defence state that the said expression is in the 
public interest, the information to be disclosed must actually be in the public interest, 
and not what is interesting to the public. As Westkamp
842
 put it, “no legitimate public 
interest exists in cases … without proper reasons beyond satisfying public 
curiosity”.843 Furthermore, it may be in the public interest that certain information be 
disclosed, not to the public, but rather to an appropriate body; thus, an obligation of 
restrictive disclosure.  
                                                          
840
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841
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The aim of this thesis as set out at the beginning of this work has been to investigate 
whether English law ought to be further developed to provide fuller protection for the 
privacy of the corporation. Consistent with this aim, this thesis has endeavoured to 
demonstrate that corporations do have the privacy interests of intrusion privacy and 
information privacy, as well as the right to a private life, home, and correspondence; 
which are worthy of protection in English law, under the extended action for breach of 
confidence. Although half a decade ago, it would have almost been inconceivable to 
suggest that consideration be had for the protection of the privacy of the corporation, 
this thesis has been has been a mindful effort that has been strengthened at English law 
by the Broadcasting Act, which has since 1980 to the present, consistently provided 
protection for the privacy of corporations in broadcasting matters. This thesis has also 
been strengthened by the evolution of the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the protection of the fundamental right of the corporation to its 
privacy under Article 8 ECHR. The United Kingdom being a Member State of the 
Council of Europe and having incorporated the ECHR into its domestic law through 
the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998, it is suggested that if English law 
is to provide fuller protection for the privacy of the corporation beyond broadcasting 
matters, it would accord with section 2 and 6 HRA and Article 13 ECHR; it would also 
provide the corporation the autonomy which it requires to effectively carry on its 
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